Tag Archives: New Scholarship

With the VRA on life-support, now is the time to reconsider goals and tactics

The Supreme Court’s decision to set Louisiana v. Callais for reargument next term suggests that the Voting Rights Act’s respite from the conservative Court’s attacks is likely over. It is, therefore, time for those who remain committed to the United States as a multiracial democracy to start reimagining our goals and tactics. Toward that end, I offer some food for thought and a preview from a chapter I recently completed that will appear in Race, Racism, and the Law (Aziza Ahmed & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, eds., forthcoming 2026). The chapter makes a few points.

An increasingly conservative Supreme Court and an evolving political landscape require a reassessment of our goals and tactics in the continued fight for an inclusive multiracial democracy.

The Roberts Court is not just a reluctant enforcer of the openness of the political process, but a hostile policer of congressional efforts to do so. The gutting of the VRA is a manifestation of this trend. Voting rights activist must reconcile themselves to having lost their most important political ally in the fight for a multiracial democracy as it was conceived in the mid-twentieth century.

But the need for reevaluating goes beyond the conservative Court. The VRA and the related priorities of the voting rights community are increasingly mismatched with how race continues to influence politics and with evolving conceptions of race.

Taking the latter point first. As Americans increasingly operate with broader understandings of race, there are genuine questions about how relevant the categories that defined voting rights jurisprudence under the VRA will be in the future. The twentieth-century version of race, which “divide[s] us all up into a handful of groups,” is increasingly incongruous with the fact that “American families have become increasingly multicultural.” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 293 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Americans appear to agree with Chief Justice Roberts that the typical racial “categories [on various forms] are themselves imprecise in many ways . . . [sometimes] plainly overbroad.” Id. at 216 (Roberts, J.)

This concession does not require accepting the conservative Court’s colorblind vision of the Constitution or its belief that an entirely white legislature would be legitimate so long as there were no formal barriers to electoral participation. Still, we would be remiss not to consider the evolving ways in which race matters to politics: discrete categories often matter less than shared intersectional experiences of racial and economic oppression.

Third and most importantly, we need to reconsider our tactics and expand our thinking in our fight for a more inclusive multiracial democracy. Failures to address enduring economic and social inequality, far more than the remaining formal and informal barriers to voting, are the primary obstacles to realizing an inclusive multiracial democracy.

The chapter makes the case for each of these claims—most importantly the third—and argues that, given these realities, a new paradigm for change should measure progress in terms of the policy returns to voters of color of their political participation. This means prioritizing building political power through political parties with a focus on party-centric reforms to revitalize our party system. In recognition of the skepticism with which voting rights advocates and the communities they represent are likely to approach a call that involves working with political parties, the chapter devotes significant attention to the promises and pitfalls for communities of color of more fully embracing a party-centric power-building strategy in the fight for a meaningfully inclusive multiracial democracy.

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New Article: “The Brave New World of Judicial Elections: What We Know and What We Don’t”

Charles Gardner Geyh (Indiana University Maurer School of Law) has posted this new article on judicial elections on SSRN:

In this essay, I begin with a discussion of established legal theory, which elucidates the difficulties created by calling upon judges to interpret and apply the law in a democratic republic. Next, I synthesize the scholarship, spanning thirteen books, that explains, defends, and critiques the modern era of judicial elections. Read synthetically, this body of work provides a well-developed, three-dimensional understanding of judicial elections at the turn of the 21st century. At the epicenter of the developments that this literature analyzes are battleground states where well-financed interest groups poured money into supreme court races to people high courts with judges whose perspective on tort liability was simpatico with that of their campaign supporters. That literature also reveals that tort reform campaigns in state judicial races later peaked as spending tapered off in the 2010s, signaling a lull in what leading, good-government interest groups denominated the “new politics of judicial elections.  I argue that this lull ended with the 2023 Wisconsin Supreme Court election, which heralded the arrival of a new generation of judicial elections in which state supreme courts are becoming war-torn forums for the resolution of deeply divisive policy questions that the federal courts and the political branches of government have been unwilling or unable to address. It is a development that portends to be of unprecedented intensity and poses new challenges for legal theory and the existing judicial elections literature to explain. And it adds new urgency to an increasingly stark choice: whether to fight to preserve the distinctive role that judiciaries have long played in interpreting and upholding the rule of law; or to acquiesce to a new world order in which judges are politicized actors responsive to their constituencies in ways traditionally associated with the other, so-called “political” branches of government.

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New Paper–“An Internet Voting System Fatally Flawed in Creative New Ways”

Andrew W. Appel (Princeton, Computer Science) and Philip B. Stark (UC Berkeley, Statistics) have a new paper cautioning about a new software designed to accelerate the count for overseas votes by relying on the internet.

. . . . The enunciated motivation for the [“MERGE”] protocol is to allow (electronic) votes from overseas military voters to be included in preliminary results before a (paper) ballot is received from the voter. MERGE contains interesting ideas that are not inherently unsound; but to make the system trustworthy–to apply the MERGE protocol–would require major changes to the laws, practices, and technical and logistical abilities of U.S. election jurisdictions. The gap between theory and practice is large and unbridgeable for the foreseeable future. . . .

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“Historians and the Strange, Fluid World of Nineteenth-Century Politics”

ERIK B. ALEXANDER AND RACHEL A. SHELDEN have published a blog post reflecting on the significance of their recent article, which I mentioned a few weeks back in a post on the history of third parties in the United States.

For more than half a century, historians have relied (often implicitly) on a model of organizing U.S. political history around distinct and separate “party systems,” pitting two competitive, stable, national parties against one another for long stretches of time between short bursts of realignment. In the context of the shifting political landscape of 1868, however, explaining the partisan politics of the Johnson impeachment through the party system model is the equivalent of forcing a square peg into a round hole.

They then apply this to Andrew Johnson’s impeachment vote.

How, then, are we to understand the partisan breakdown of the 1868 vote to impeach? If we conflate the Union Party with the Republican Party, was Johnson a Republican? He may have flirted with the Democrats in pursuing a revived Union Party, but he was not a Democrat. And while Democrats certainly supported Johnson’s vision for Reconstruction over that of the Republicans, they did not view him as a member of their party either. In other words, including Johnson in any kind of accounting of the partisan politics of impeachments is confusing at best.

. . . .

We argue that it is high time to shed the confines of that model. Nineteenth-century politics are better described as fluid, unstable, and federal, operating through a series of mechanisms—networks, newspapers, customs, and laws—unique to that era. Political actors used these mechanisms to address the most pressing ideological and constitutional conflicts of their era, often in concert with broader political activism. They could quickly organize new parties to address problems as they arose, and just as quickly discard parties when the issues were resolved (or when absorbed by another party). In this way, parties were deeply integrated into the broader fabric of American political life, rather than serving as its organizing structures.

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A Justice’s Perspective on Moore v. Harper

Justice Scott Kafker of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and his co-author Simon Jacobs have published a new article, The Supreme Court Summons the Ghosts of Bush v. Gore: How Moore v. Harper Haunts State and Federal Constitutional Interpretation of Election Laws, 59 Wake Forest L. Rev. 61 (2024).

There is a dangerous lack of clarity in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Moore v. Harper, which held that state supreme courts’ interpretations of their state election laws are subject to review and reversal in federal court when “they transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review such that they arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislature to regulate federal elections.” By resurrecting the reasoning of Bush v. Gore, with particular emphasis on the concurrence by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court risks unleashing the same chaotic reaction to the judiciary caused by the original decision.

But this is not necessary. In our view, the original understanding of the Elections Clause provides for a very limited form of additional federal oversight. The provision does not authorize the Supreme Court to substitute its judgment for state courts on the meaning of state election statutes or state constitutions, as Chief Justice Rehnquist did in Bush v. Gore. Nor does it authorize an open-ended inquiry into what it means to transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review, as there is no consensus on the Supreme Court or other courts on what that means. It also does not prevent state courts from providing greater protection of voting rights than that provided by state legislatures or the federal Constitution when such rights are granted by the state constitution. Nor does it impose a particular interpretive methodology on state courts in interpreting their constitutions or the federal constitutional conception of separation of powers or stare decisis. It only prevents state courts from performing the function of state legislatures, as the state legislatures are expressly responsible under the federal Constitution for prescribing the time, place, and manner of elections, subject to state constitutional review. Justice Souter’s dissent in Bush v. Gore encapsulates the overreach at issue. State courts may not create new election laws untethered to the legislative act or state constitutional provision in question. Such fundamental rewriting of the election laws, and usurpation of the legislative function is forbidden.

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Travis Crum Reviews “The Court v. The Voters”

Travis Crum (Wash U) reviews Joshua Douglas’ new book in the Washington Monthly.

The Court v. The Voters: The Troubling Story of How the Supreme Court Has Undermined Voting Rights is essential for anyone who wants to understand the Supreme Court’s role in setting the rules of our democracy and what threats loom this year’s elections. As a professor of constitutional law and voting rights, I will recommend Douglas’s book to my students who are looking for a primer on election law. Here are five key takeaways from Douglas’s book.”

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Out Today: “The Court v. The Voters”

Joshua A, Douglas‘ new book, “The Court v. The Voters: The Troubling Story of How the Supreme Court Has Undermined Voting Rights” offers an accessible look at the erosion of voting rights and its implications for democracy. Focusing on nine major Supreme Court cases, Douglas demonstrates the erosion of meaningful protections for the right to vote before turning to offer some legislative proposals for reversing this course. There is a nice review in Salon. Very much looking forward to reading it.

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New Podcast: Alex Keyssar on why we still have the Electoral College

In a new episode of Democracy Paradox sponsored by the Ash Center, Justin Kempf sat down with Alex Keyssar to discuss his book Why We Still Have the Electoral College?— and what the future holds for this archaic institution. Keyssar explores the history behind efforts to reform the Electoral College, how the different sides of the debate changed over time, and why reformers have repeatedly failed in their efforts.

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“Assembly as Political Practice”

Columbia’s actions this past week, especially its decision to invite the NYPD onto campus, have prompted me to post a new chapter, “Assembly as Political Practice,” forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of Peaceful Assembly (Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Michael Hamilton, Thomas Probert & Sharath Srinivasan, eds.). Recent events highlight the interrelationship between protest politics and electoral politics, the rise of a new McCarthyism focused on educational institutions, its power, but also the pervasive devaluing of it as a form of politics. Most disheartening to me personally is the widespread perceived reasonableness of Columbia’s actions including among First Amendment scholars. It stems, in my view, from a misconception of assembly as a lesser form of speech and an inclination to over estimate the risks of disorder.

“[A]ssemblies come in a range of . . . forms, including annual parades, smaller political protests, and weekly gatherings of social groups. All these forms of assembly sustain and reinforce the capacity for democratic politics, and their value does not turn on their expressive ends alone. Both the possibility of effective democratic politics, and a proper construction of the right of peaceful assembly, demand that we recognize the value of assembly, as assembly, and its latent and constitutive political functions.”

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“The Associational Rights of Political Parties”

Sharing a chapter I have written for The Oxford Handbook of American Election Law (Eugene Mazo, ed.) (2023, forthcoming). The chapter, among other things, stresses the ways that the U.S. Supreme Court’s current approach to the associational freedom of political parties significantly constrains party reform strategies. Given the manifest need for party regulation in the interest of a healthy democracy and the recent buzz around Lee Drutman’s report and op ed arguing for more and better parties, this seems a good time to share.

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New Issue: Fordham Law Voting Rights and Democracy Forum

Tired of the 24 hour news cycle? Check out the final issue of the inaugural Fordham Law’s Voting Rights and Democracy Forum. With articles written by both established scholars in the field and JD candidates, it is a refreshing change of pace. Richard Briffault argues that New York’s first round of independent redistricting was an “epic fail.

“In 2014, following passage in two successive legislatures, New York voters ratified amendments to the state constitution to change both the process and substantive rules governing the decennial redistricting of the state’s legislature and congressional delegation. . . . . Sadly, the new process employed in the 2022 redistricting was an epic fail. This Essay examines the first test of this new constitutional procedure and contends that the IRC, the state legislature, and the subsequent judicial intervention, all flunked it.”

Other crisp and timely articles in the volume include:

Voting Rights and the Electoral Process: Resolving Representation Issues Due to Felony Disenfranchisement and Prison Gerrymandering

Third Parties and the Electoral College: How Ranked Choice Voting Can Stop the Third-Party Disruptor Effect

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Electing Women Could Reduce Polarization

A thanks to Lee Drutman for resurfacing a 2022 article in the American Political Science Review, based on an original dataset of political parties in 20 Western democracies, suggesting that having more elected officials who are women associated with a political party may reduce levels of hostility to that party by those in the opposite party. This may, of course, require making it easier for younger women to run for office and to serve as legislators: A Time exclusive reports Representative Anna Paulina Luna (Republican Florida) will be “only the 12th member of Congress to give birth while in office.”

“Second, independently of whether women representatives behave differently from men, women’s descriptive representation affects both citizens’ and journalists’ political perceptions. US-based studies show that respondents hold gender-trait stereotypes, seeing women politicians as more caring and compassionate, more likely to compromise and build legislative consensus and having better interpersonal skills.”

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“Do We Need to Party Better to Fix U.S. Democracy?”

Didi Kuo and I recently spoke with Daniel Stid, Executive Director of Lyceum Labs about our recent article, Associational Party Building: A Path to Rebuilding Democracy.  Daniel pushed us on the questions such as whether we are calling for a turn away from national politics and how we think about parties past. We reminded party skeptics that they are part of the party already. A lightly edited version of the full conversation appears on the Art of Association.

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