Daniel Magleby and Michael D. McDonald have written this draft for ELJ. Here is the abstract:

The Roberts Court has turned over efforts to limit gerrymanders to politics and willing state courts. Scholars have proposed several methods for evaluating possible gerrymanders, and recent legislation that gained some traction in Congress would have enshrined some of these methods into law. We argue that these methods come with trade-offs and their utility is determined by the circumstances in which a map might be used and the values that mapmakers hope to promote or protect when they delineate district boundaries. We illustrate these trade-offs in policy maker and scholarly proposed methods for identifying the distortive effects of district lines by examining congressional maps enacted following the 2020 census. Among the 37 states with three or more congressional districts, we find consistent evidence of partisan gerrymandering in four states, consistent evidence of no partisan gerrymandering in 12 states, and mixed evidence of gerrymandering in the remaining 21. Considering the large number of mixed findings, we conclude with a discussion of the likely next step needed for confronting the pernicious effects of gerrymandering.

Daniel Wodak has posted this paper (forthcoming, Northwestern University Law Review). Here is the abstract:

Malapportionment—electoral districts with divergent ratios of people to representation—was ruled to be unconstitutional in a widely venerated series of cases before the Warren Court. Those cases held that a principle of political equality, ‘one person, one vote’, is required by the Constitution. But what is the content of that principle? Many Justices and commentators declare that it is vague, empty, circular, or meaningless. This creates a murder mystery. Malapportionment was killed; but by what, exactly? This Article seeks an answer by focusing on the Court’s commitments about the scope and strictness of one person, one vote: it is a broad (rather than narrow) principle of rough (rather than exact) equality. As such, one person, one vote requires an equal number of people per district and an equal number of votes per voter; and it requires a roughly equal number of people per district. These commitments are attractive in isolation. But, this Article shows, they are objectionable in conjunction: they entail that one person, one vote is too permissive, as it only requires a roughly equal number of votes per voter. If your vote is roughly equal to mine when your district is fractionally more populous than mine, your vote is also roughly equal to mine when I can cast fractionally more votes than you. Since this problem follows inexorably from the Court’s commitments about the scope and strictness of one person, one vote, there are two possible solutions. First, one person, one vote could be broad a principle of exact equality; administrability may then justify underenforcing the principle in distributing voters to districts, but not in distributing votes to voters. Second, one person, one vote could include a narrow principle requiring rough equality in apportionment, as well as a distinct principle requiring exactly equal votes per voter. These solutions have important constitutional implications—including for resolving the population baseline at issue in malapportionment, which remains uncertain after Evenwel v. Abbott. But neither provides an easy way out. Each makes one person, one vote either too restrictive or too permissive. This puzzle brings to light why the operative principle in a venerated series of cases is deeply unclear and unsettled. But it has a special significance beyond that. One person, one vote lies at the heart of America’s constitutional democracy, which is already under considerable threat. On the one hand, if the content of the principle is too restrictive (or too uncertain), then objections to its constitutionality are considerably strengthened. On the other hand, if it is too permissive, then one person, one vote provides little constraint on Vice-President J.D. Vance’s recent proposal to give extra votes to parents, as well as myriad similar policies and procedures that would erode voters’ equality at the ballot box.

Sam Wang and Zacharia Sippy have posted this draft on SSRN (forthcoming, Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy). here is the abstract:

In the last decade, redistricting commissions have proliferated across the United States as a means of reducing partisan gerrymandering. This article provides a comprehensive evaluation of their performance through both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Drawing on redistricting data from all fifty states between 2021 and 2024, we analyze how different commission designs impact partisan fairness, competitiveness, and adherence to traditional principles like compactness and preservation of communities of interest. Our analysis reveals that autonomous commissions with final map-drawing authority, balanced bipartisan processes with multiple non-partisan actors, and binding judicial review consistently produced redistricting plans with lower partisan bias and higher electoral competition. These successful commissions were typically established through popular ballot initiatives. Conversely, commissions serving only in an advisory role or lacking clear judicial oversight frequently saw their work undermined by legislatures pursuing partisan advantage. We conclude that autonomous commissions, created by and composed of citizens, provide the most effective available approach for curbing gerrymandering. The article concludes with recommendations for expanding the commission model for the 2030 redistricting cycle.