Tag Archives: Independent State Legislature Doctrine

“Bucks County board chair says comment about violating election law has been misinterpreted”

Philadelphia Inquirer reports that Diane Ellis-Marseglia, the Bucks County Commissioner, has apologized for the “upset and confusion” caused by her defiant comments last week in which she said:

“People violate laws any time they want,” she added. “So, for me, if I violate this law it’s because I want a court to pay attention. There’s nothing more important than counting votes.”

It is perhaps worth reminding everyone that the intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania held that not counting the misdated ballots was a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Supreme Court has not upheld that decision, but the defiance was to an order directing that the implications of that decision were not to be experimented with during the 2024 Election. No doubt one reason for that order is the overhang of the U.S. Supreme Court’s rather aggressive stance toward state courts under the new independent state legislature doctrine.

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A Justice’s Perspective on Moore v. Harper

Justice Scott Kafker of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and his co-author Simon Jacobs have published a new article, The Supreme Court Summons the Ghosts of Bush v. Gore: How Moore v. Harper Haunts State and Federal Constitutional Interpretation of Election Laws, 59 Wake Forest L. Rev. 61 (2024).

There is a dangerous lack of clarity in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Moore v. Harper, which held that state supreme courts’ interpretations of their state election laws are subject to review and reversal in federal court when “they transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review such that they arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislature to regulate federal elections.” By resurrecting the reasoning of Bush v. Gore, with particular emphasis on the concurrence by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court risks unleashing the same chaotic reaction to the judiciary caused by the original decision.

But this is not necessary. In our view, the original understanding of the Elections Clause provides for a very limited form of additional federal oversight. The provision does not authorize the Supreme Court to substitute its judgment for state courts on the meaning of state election statutes or state constitutions, as Chief Justice Rehnquist did in Bush v. Gore. Nor does it authorize an open-ended inquiry into what it means to transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review, as there is no consensus on the Supreme Court or other courts on what that means. It also does not prevent state courts from providing greater protection of voting rights than that provided by state legislatures or the federal Constitution when such rights are granted by the state constitution. Nor does it impose a particular interpretive methodology on state courts in interpreting their constitutions or the federal constitutional conception of separation of powers or stare decisis. It only prevents state courts from performing the function of state legislatures, as the state legislatures are expressly responsible under the federal Constitution for prescribing the time, place, and manner of elections, subject to state constitutional review. Justice Souter’s dissent in Bush v. Gore encapsulates the overreach at issue. State courts may not create new election laws untethered to the legislative act or state constitutional provision in question. Such fundamental rewriting of the election laws, and usurpation of the legislative function is forbidden.

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The Profound Ahistoricism of Moore v. Harper

The Supreme Court will hear arguments tomorrow about the scope of state legislative authority to determine “the time, place, and manner” of federal elections. Petitioners’ position is that state legislatures are freed from state constitutional constraints when they make decisions about where polling places are located, how many hours polls have to be open, the terms on which early or absentee voting is available, and—most importantly—how congressional districts are drawn. In making these choices, state legislatures, they argue, do not need to abide by state supreme court decisions interpreting their state constitutions.

Election lawyers, constitutional scholars, and interest groups from across the political spectrum have raised significant questions about this interpretation of the Elections Clause. They have questioned the practicality of this so-called Independent State Legislature Theory, and they have raised doubts about the evidence supporting Petitioners’ textualist and originalist claims. Petitioners have been chastised for relying on fake historical documents and for cherry picking quotes from famous nineteenth-century legal commentators.

Few, however, have highlighted the more profound ahistoricism of Petitioners’ position. Petitioners make much of the dearth of evidence of state court decisions striking down state legislation regulating federal elections. But they present no information about how elections were administered for much of the nineteenth century.

Indeed, a reader of the briefs—an earnest law clerk, for example—could easily be left with the impression that elections in the early nineteenth century worked essentially like they do today. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The kind of time, place, and manner regulation at the heart of Moore v. Harper largely did not exist until the late nineteenth century.

Elections through the late nineteenth century were shockingly informal by modern standards. While state constitutions set voter qualifications and residency requirements, there was very little by way of what we would call time, place, and manner regulations. Early elections were festive occasions in which voting took places over the course of several day, often with free drinks. In the early 1800s, states did intervene to replace viva voce voting with written ballots, and by 1868, American Legal Treatise writer, Thomas M. Cooley would assert that “[t]he mode of voting in this country, at all general elections, is almost universally by ballot.” Still, the process of voting was extremely rudimentary.

The first written ballots were simply pieces of paper upon which one recorded a vote. More importantly, even when handwritten written ballots were replaced with printed ballots, it was the political parties who handed them out to voters. Factions of the same party would provide different slates of candidates to voters on their competing paper ballots, and the state played no role in monitoring the process. A few cities eventually required parties to use a single-color paper when distributing ballots. Before 1870, even voter registration requirements were exceedingly rare. Where they existed, they simply required local officials to keep a list of eligible voters.

It was only in the late nineteenth century that state legislatures began in earnest to pass time, place, and manner regulations as we know them. State courts were quickly asked to review the constitutionality of the new laws by partisans. When they did, state courts applied the provisions of their state constitutions–and they did so without distinguishing between the applicability of their rulings to state as compared to federal elections.

An earnest reader of the briefs could just as easily come away with the impression that, like today, Congress was divided into single-member districts in the early nineteenth century and that states diligently redistricted each decade, as required by the Constitution. But it was not until the Apportionment Act of 1842 (yes 1842!) that single-member congressional districts were mandated. At the time of its enactment, there were twenty-six states in the Union. 10 states used at large voting for House elections. Petitioners offer no information about how often states actually redistricted before 1842 (or after). This silence is particularly glaring given that in the period prior to Baker v. Carr, despite the constitutional requirement, states frequently did not redraw their state or congressional maps. In the absence of such information, what exactly can be made of the fact that no state court appears to have invalidated a state legislature’s congressional map on substantive state-constitutional grounds?

Finally, this same earnest reader—this law clerk without a lot of historical background—could easily miss a very basic historical fact: Federal courts did not exercise general federal question jurisdiction, as we know it, until 1875—the end of Reconstruction. This is why state courts were the primary forum for resolving disputes in the nineteenth century.

Petitioners may have answers to the implications of these many historical differences. No doubt their fallback position to the last is that the critical issue is not which court exercised jurisdiction but what constitutional law they apply. But the fact that they have felt free to submit tens of pages of briefing with no mention of the profound institutional changes to the practicalities of our electoral and judicial systems since 1789 is telling about the fundamental flaws of the law office history that drives originalism today.

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“Voting Without State Checks and Balances? A Close Look at the Independent State Legislature Theory”

The New York City Bar Association hosted this excellent panel discussion, co-sponsored by the Brennan Center, in advance of next week’s oral arguments in Moore v. Harper. The panel featured Carter Phillips (Sidley Austin LLP, Counsel of Record for Amicus Curiae Conference of Chief Justices), Tom Wolf (Deputy Director with the Brennan Center’s Democracy Program), and Professor Carolyn Shapiro (author of The Independent State Legislature Theory, Federal Courts, and State Law (forthcoming in the U. Chicago Law Review)). It was moderated by my colleague, Anil Kalhan and spearheaded by Marcy L. Kahn, Chair of the Rule of Law Task Force of the City Bar Association.

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Previewing the democratic casualties sure to accompany SCOTUS OT 23

In advance of next week, Politico offers a thorough preview of the two election law cases on the Supreme Court’s docket this term. Both cases, it notes, are appeals from lower court decisions that threw out political maps drawn by GOP-controlled legislatures. Doctrinal nuances aside, as a practical matter, “the results of the cases could open the door to even more gerrymandering by legislators around the country, and they could also give legislatures even more power within their states to determine rules for voting — including how, when and where voters could cast their ballots.”

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How and Why Justice Breyer (and Other Justices) Should Weigh in on the Independent-State-Legislature Notion Before Breyer Retires

Vik Amar has this piece for Verdict. From the article:

As I noted last week and major news outlets have also reported, the United States Supreme Court is poised next week to consider taking up the North Carolina partisan-gerrymandering case involving the so-called Independent-State- Legislature (ISL) theory. As I have explained at length, the theory—which holds that elected state legislatures, when regulating federal elections under Articles I and II, are free from state-court enforcement of state constitutional limits on legislative power—is belied by the well-understood meaning of “state legislatures” in 1787, the grammar and syntax of Articles I and II themselves, the clear actions by states right before and right after the founding, the enactments of state legislatures themselves over the course of American electoral history, and unbroken Court precedent from the early 1900s through the last decade. But so far, the bulk of the discussion of the theory’s merits by any of the Justices has come from conservative members of the Court who in the past few years seem open to embracing it. Justices Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas, and Neil Gorsuch in particular have been adept at using the device of the dissental—a term melding “dissent” and “denial” to describe the practice of noting and explaining a dissent from a denial of emergency relief or a denial of certiorari—to lay out why they (wrongly) think that acceptance of ISL notions is required to make meaningful the language in the Constitution. (See, e.g., here and here.)

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