I wrote this column for the Washington Post on the surprising trend of depolarization in last month’s election. If it holds, this trend has enormous implications for American politics.
Here’s a shocker: One of the unnoticed themes of the recent election was depolarization. The electoral chasms between groups of voters shrank compared with four years earlier. This was true across several axes and is mostly attributable to traditional Democratic constituencies moving to the right. If these trends endure, they promise a new political era.
. . . This combination of minority voters shifting rightward and White voters staying put resulted in the lowest level of racially polarized voting in a generation. The Black-White gap in Trump support declined from 47 percentage points in 2020 to 40 points in 2024. The Latino-White gap fell from 20 points to 13 points.
. . . The gap between the youngest and the oldest voters’ choices therefore plummeted from 15 percentage points in 2020 to four points in 2024.
. . . Accordingly, after decades of divergence, urban and rural areas edged closer to each other politically. . . .
What explains this convergence? The superficial answer is that historically Democratic groups swervedto the right while long-standing Republican constituencies didn’t budge. Minority members, young people, city dwellers and women — they’ve all been Democratic stalwarts, and they allmoved toward Trump. The only major Democratic cohort that didn’t shift rightward was people with at least a college degree. Conversely, White, old, rural and male voters are pillars of the modern Republican coalition. Surprisingly, they mostly resisted the pro-Trump swing among the rest of the electorate. . . .
Yet depolarization could also benefit Democrats by facilitating the translation of their votes into political power. At the presidential level, the tipping-point state that gave Trump his electoral college majority in 2024 — Pennsylvania — was just 0.6 percentage points more Republican than the national popular vote. By comparison, the tipping-point state in 2020, Wisconsin, was 3.8 points more Republican than the country as a whole. . . .
Similarly, the House of Representatives is on track to be less skewed, in aggregate, than at any time since the early 1990s. A common measure of the House’s bias compares the election result in the median House district with the national popular vote. In the coming Congress, the median House district will have almost the same partisan slant — a slight Republican tilt — as the country as a whole. And again, some of the credit is due to depolarization. . . .