Category Archives: voting technology

“Georgia county under scrutiny after claim of post-election breach”


A former elections supervisor in rural Coffee County, Ga., has told The Washington Post that she opened her offices to a businessman active in the election-denier movement to help investigate results she did not trust in the weeks after President Donald Trump’s 2020 defeat.

Trump had carried the conservative county by 40 points, but elections supervisor Misty Hampton said she remained suspicious of Joe Biden’s win in Georgia. Hampton made a video that went viral soon after the election, claiming to show that Dominion Voting System machines, the ones used in her county, could be manipulated. She said in interviews that she hoped the Georgia businessman who visited later, Scott Hall, and others who accompanied him could help identify vulnerabilities and prove “that this election was not done true and correct.”

Hampton said she could not remember when the visit occurred or what Hall and the others did when they were there. She said they did not enter a room that housed the county’s touch-screen voting machines, but she said she did not know whether they entered the room housing the election management system server, the central computer used to tally election results.

Voting experts said that, whether they accessed sensitive areas or not, Hampton’s actions underscore a growing risk to election security.

In the year and a half since the 2020 election, there has been steady drumbeat of revelations about alleged security breaches in local elections offices — and a growing concern among experts that officials who are sympathetic to claims of vote-rigging might be persuaded to undermine election security in the name of protecting it.

“Insider threat, while always part of the threat matrix, is now a reality in elections,” said Matt Masterson, who previously served as a senior U.S. cybersecurity official tracking 2020 election integrity for the Department of Homeland Security.

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“ES&S uses undergraduate project to lobby New York legislature”

This is insane, via Andrew Appel:

The New York State Legislature is considering a bill that would ban all-in-one voting machines–that is, voting machines that can both print votes on the ballot, and scan and count votes from the ballot, all in the same paper path. This is an important safeguard, because such machines, if they are hacked by the installation of fraudulent software, can change or add votes that the voter did not intend and never got a chance to see on paper.

One voting-machine company, Elections Systems and Software (ES&S), that makes an all-in-one voting machine (the ExpressVote XL), is lobbying hard against this bill. As part of their lobbying package, they are claiming, “Rochester Institute of Technology researchers found zero attacks*” on the ExpressVote XL, based on an article (included in ES&S’s lobbying package) from Rochester Institute of Technology entitled “RIT cybersecurity student researchers put voting machine security to the test.

If this were actually a scientific article, one could critique it as actual science. But it’s not a scientific paper: the article is written by the RIT public relations department (Scott Bureau, Senior Communications Specialist, RIT Marketing and Communications). The article describes an undergraduate student “capstone project:” The students were interviewed by ES&S, allowed ES&S to inspect their testing site, then signed a nondisclosure agreement with ES&S. The students made up two “Attack Scenarios”, then spent 10 days trying to find attacks. They found some vulnerabilities, but not one that could change votes.

The students made public a one-page poster describing their project. It’s fine for undergraduate student work–capstone projects are a really useful part of engineering education. But it’s not a scientific paper that describes their methods, the limitations placed upon them by needing permission from ES&S, nor (in any detail) their results.

Even so, the students describe enough for me to notice that they missed three of the most important attack scenarios

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“Trump allies breach U.S. voting systems in search of 2020 fraud ‘evidence'”


Eighteen months after Donald Trump lost the White House, loyal supporters continue to falsely assert that compromised balloting machines across America robbed him of the 2020 election.

To stand up that bogus claim, some Trump die-hards are taking the law into their own hands – by attempting, with some success, to compromise the voting systems themselves.

Previously unreported surveillance video captured one such effort in August in the rural Colorado town of Kiowa. Footage obtained by Reuters through a public-records request shows Elbert County Clerk Dallas Schroeder, the county’s top election official, fiddling with cables and typing on his phone as he copied computer drives containing sensitive voting information.

Schroeder, a Republican, later testified that he was receiving instructions on how to copy the system’s data from a retired Air Force colonel and political activist bent on proving Trump lost because of fraud.

That day, Aug. 26, Schroeder made a “forensic image of everything on the election server,” according to his testimony, and later gave the cloned hard drives to two lawyers.

Schroeder is now under investigation for possible violation of election laws by the Colorado secretary of state, which has also sued him seeking the return of the data. Schroeder is defying that state demand and has refused to identify one of the lawyers who took possession of the hard drives. The other is a private attorney who works with an activist backed by Mike Lindell, the pillow mogul and election conspiracy theorist.

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Susan Greenhalgh and Philip Stark: “Setting the record straight on the security review in the Georgia voting machine lawsuit”

The following is a guest post from Susan Greenhalgh and Philip Stark:

Last month, Election Law Blog highlighted a Votebeat  newsletter published January 29 by Jessica Huseman, a response to a story in the Atlanta Journal Constitution. The newsletter purported to provide missing context and expert analysis of the debate over Professor J. Alex Halderman’s court-sealed security study of Georgia’s electronic ballot marking devices in Curling et al. v. Raffensperger et al. (originally Curling et al. v. Kemp et al.)

The Votebeat piece was riddled with inaccuracies, flawed assumptions, and faulty conclusions—perhaps because Huseman did not seek comment or context from Prof. Halderman or anyone else directly involved in the plaintiffs’ side of the case.

Shortly after the newsletter was published, we contacted Votebeat. We provided evidence supporting our concerns, and requested the piece be corrected. Several weeks passed without any corrections, so we contacted Votebeat again last week. Votebeat subsequently republished the story on its website with minor corrections, without noting the story had been corrected. Many important errors remain, which is why we, as expert consultants to the Coalition plaintiffs in Curling with direct knowledge of the facts, including the content of the Halderman report, are writing to set the record straight.

The central thesis of the newsletter is that Curling and similar lawsuits challenging electronic voting machines are pointless (or worse), because, Huseman alleges, they have not convinced any Court of the merits of their claims. For support, Huseman quotes David Becker, a paid consultant for the State of Georgia in their rollout of the equipment in question—but fails to disclose Becker’s relationship with the defendant. Becker falsely claims that Curling and similar suits seeking to compel jurisdictions to stop using untrustworthy voting systems have all lost in court. Huseman argues that the allegedly fruitless lawsuits serve only to feed Big Lie conspiracists. 

To support this narrative, Huseman claims that in 2019, the state ditched its direct record electronic (DRE) touchscreen voting machines of its own initiative. This is contradicted by the facts.

Continue reading Susan Greenhalgh and Philip Stark: “Setting the record straight on the security review in the Georgia voting machine lawsuit”
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“US cybersecurity agency reviews hacking risk to Georgia voting system”


A confidential report alleging Georgia’s voting touchscreens could be hacked is now being reviewed by the federal government.

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency wrote in a court filing late Thursday it will assess potential vulnerabilities and decide whether updates or patches are needed to mitigate risks.

CISA’s action came in response to a report by a computer scientist who said someone could change voters’ ballot choices if they had physical access to Georgia’s voting touchscreens or election management computers.

Georgia election officials say the state’s voting systems are secure, and vulnerabilities discovered in a lab would be difficult to exploit in a real election.

There’s no indication that Georgia’s election computers manufactured by Dominion Voting Systems were hacked in the 2020 election, but an ongoing election security lawsuit alleges the touchscreens could be exploited in future elections. Three ballot counts and multiple investigations checked the 2020 election results.

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“The missing context in the debate about Halderman’s Dominion report”

Jessica Huseman Votebeat column:

Experts who have reviewed Halderman’s report, such as Juan Gilbert, the University of Florida’s computer science department chair, have not found it to be nearly as dire as Halderman has publicly suggested. As part of the suit, Judge Totenberg granted Halderman unfettered access to the Dominion voting system in order to inspect the security of the machines. Because of his access, Totenberg sealed the report, making it available to only the attorneys on the case and the expert witnesses. And even though the state on Thursday asked Totenberg to unseal the document so as to clear public confusion, she seemed unready to do so. 

“I’m unhappy about the course of political treatment of the report…. it’s out of hand,” Totenberg said in court. “But I’m not going to release it without seeing what is being proposed with redactions.”

Still, the general contents of the report aren’t exactly a secret. Halderman has long claimed that ballot-marking devices could be manipulated by malicious actors. In a brief no one asked him to write, Halderman made public a high-level summary of his findings in early August. Marilyn Marks, the executive director of the Coalition for Good Governance who is among the plaintiffs in the Curling case, then distributed this summary to every county in Georgia by email the day after Halderman filed his report. Votebeat was provided with a copy of the email. She called Halderman’s finding an “urgent concern,” alarming enough for counties “to reconsider their use of BMDs this fall, and instead use hand marked paper ballots with voluntary robust audits.” No county acted on her warning.

Despite Judge Totenberg sealing Halderman’s assessment, the publicity campaign the plaintiffs have mounted over the report — which none of them has seen in full — has resulted in two media dustups over its contents, to the obvious discontent of Totenberg. The first was in August, when Halderman first publicized what he claimed were massive security flaws in the system, and then this week, when the Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported that the state had done nothing to unseal the report or to act on its findings. This is the exact kind of speculation Totenberg sought to prevent when she sealed the report. While the report has only been read by Halderman, the lawyers in the Curling case, and other expert witnesses, the AJC quoted multiple people who have no knowledge of the report’s details but who nonetheless implored the state to act. That’s not the responsible way to present these issues. 

The report, as far as is publicly known, does little to materially advance what Halderman has been claiming about ballot-marking devices for years. And, it’s not a surprise that he found ways to infiltrate the system. Judge Totenberg gave Halderman complete access to the machines along with passwords, and his report indicates that he did his research over 12 weeks. If you gave me access to a bank for 12 weeks, handed me the keys, and told the security guards to stand down, I’m pretty sure I could rob it. This is an unrealistic threat scenario that ignores the existence of physical security measures, machine testing, and risk limiting audits….

Allowing such unfettered access isn’t without value: If Halderman had, for example, been able to affect the ballots in a way that could not be detected and prevented by safeguards like risk limiting audits or standard quality checks, these problems should be addressed. But neither the AJC article nor those who have seen the report assert that he found such vulnerabilities. 

Still, folks are clamoring to get access to Halderman’s sealed report. The state of Louisiana, Fox News, and One America News Network have all asked Judge Totenberg to see it. Louisiana — which has already been denied access — says it wants a copy because it’s considering buying a Dominion system and would like to see what the vulnerabilities are. Fox and OANN want it because they think it might contradict Halderman’s testimony in defamation lawsuits filed by Dominion and by Eric Coomer, a former Dominion employee. In that case, Halderman testified in defense of Coomer and his work at Dominion — Coomer’s work was high quality, Halderman says, and there is no evidence that Dominion machines were compromised.

Despite what Fox News’s lawyers might hope, Halderman’s positions in each lawsuit are not necessarily contradictory. It could well be true that the 2020 election was secure — as he asserts in the Fox defamation suit — and that untapped vulnerabilities still exist in Dominion systems — as he asserts in the Curling suit.

But this is not the only time right-wing spreaders of the Big Lie have embraced the Curling lawsuit to back their false claims. A week ago, Politico reported on the text of a never-seen Trump executive order that would have dispatched the military to seize voting machines. The order, dated Dec. 16, 2020, specifically references the Curling lawsuit in justifying the federal government to “seize, collect, retain and analyze all machines, equipment, electronically stored information, and material records” from the election. The order would have given the defense secretary 60 days to release a report on the machines’ security — a move that would have thrown the election into uncertainty well into February 2021….

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AJC Must-Read: “Secret report finds flaw in Georgia voting system, but state shows no interest”

Mark Niesse for the AJC:

A confidential report alleges that hackers could flip votes if they gained access to Georgia’s touchscreens, drawing interest from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Louisiana election officials and Fox News.

One key agency hasn’t asked the court to disclose the report: the Georgia secretary of state’s office.

There’s no sign that state election officials have done anything about the vulnerability, a potential flaw dangerous enough to be kept under seal, labeled in court as “attorneys’ eyes only” six months ago.

The vulnerability hasn’t been exploited in an election so far, according to examinations of the state’s Dominion Voting Systems equipment, but election security experts say it’s a risk for upcoming elections this year. Investigations have repeatedly debunked allegations of fraud in the 2020 election.

Georgia election officials won’t say what actions they’ve taken, if any, to improve security or detect tampering. State election officials declined to answer questions about the flaw, which was discovered as part of a lawsuit aimed at forcing the state to abandon its $138 million voting system that prints out paper ballots and instead use paper ballots filled out by hand.

Several election integrity advocates said Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger shouldn’t ignore the issue, even if he believes existing protections would prevent illicit access to voting equipment.

“It’s really concerning that the Georgia secretary of state and Dominion are kind of putting their head in the sand,” said Susan Greenhalgh, an election security consultant for plaintiffs suing over Georgia’s voting system. “Common sense would say you would want to be able to evaluate the claims and then take appropriate action, and they’re not doing any of that.”….

he vulnerability was first alleged in sealed court documents in July by Alex Halderman, a computer science professor at the University of Michigan. As an expert for plaintiffs in the election security lawsuit, Halderman gained access to Georgia voting equipment for 12 weeks and produced a 25,000-word secret report.

Halderman found that malicious software could be installed on voting touchscreens so that votes are changed in QR codes printed on paper ballots, which are then scanned to record votes, according to court documents. QR codes aren’t readable by the human eye, and voters have no way to know whether they match the printed text of their choices.

The vulnerability could be exploited by someone with physical access to a voting touchscreen, such as a voter in a polling place, or by an attacker who used election management system computers, Halderman said. A hacker in a polling place could only target one touchscreen at a time, limiting the number of votes that could be changed, but an attack on election management systems could have a broader impact.

“It is important to recognize the possibility that nefarious actors already have discovered the same problems I detail in my report and are preparing to exploit them in future elections,” Halderman wrote in a September declaration. Halderman has said there’s no evidence that Dominion voting machines changed votes in the 2020 election.

Georgia election officials have previously said their security precautions keep elections safe, though they won’t discuss Halderman’s findings in the ongoing court case….

An expert for the state, University of Florida computer scientist Juan Gilbert, said Georgia’s election audit process, which reviews the printed text of voters’ choices, would expose inconsistencies between QR codes and the text. Gilbert declined to comment on Halderman’s allegation but has previously addressed protections from hacking.

“If QR codes are inconsistent with the human-readable portion of the ballot, this will be detected during the (risk-limiting audit) and may signal a full manual recount,” Gilbert wrote in a November 2019 court declaration. “The general statement that computers can be hacked is no justification to remove all computers from any type of interaction with voting and election systems.”

But others say audits would be inadequate because they might not detect fraud on a small number of ballots that could swing a close election.

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“USPS built and secretly tested a mobile voting system before 2020; Such systems are widely considered insecure against hacking”


The U.S. Postal Service pursued a project to build and secretly test a blockchain-based mobile phone voting system before the 2020 election, experimenting with a technology that the government’s own cybersecurity agency says can’t be trusted to securely handle ballots.

The system was never deployed in a live election and was abandoned in 2019, Postal Service spokesman David Partenheimer said. That was after cybersecurity researchers at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs conducted a test of the system during a mock election and found numerous ways that it was vulnerable to hacking.

The project appears to have been conducted without the involvement of federal agencies more closely focused on elections, which were then scrambling to make voting more secure in the wake of Russian interference in the 2016 contest. Those efforts focused primarily on using paper ballot so the voter could verify their vote was recorded accurately and there would be a paper trail for auditors — something missing from any mobile phone or Internet-based system.

The secrecy of the Postal Service’s mobile voting project alarmed election security officials and advocates who fear it could spark conspiracy theories and degrade public faith in the democratic process. Those concerns have grown immensely since the 2020 election, bolstered by baseless claims of election fraud by former president Donald Trump and his supporters.

Matt Masterson, who was then a senior adviser to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and the federal government’s chief liaison to state and local election officials, said he was never aware of the Postal Service program while in office.

“If you’re doing anything in the election space, transparency should be priority number one. There should be no guessing game around this,” Masterson said.

“It’s scandalous for a government entity to conduct research into the security of blockchain online voting, which shows how insecure it is, but then hide the results and deprive the public and officials of these findings for over two years,” said Susan Greenhalgh, senior adviser on election security for Free Speech for People, which advocates for election security and opposes mobile voting.

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“Experts call for rigorous audit to protect California recall”


A group of election security experts on Thursday called for a rigorous audit of the upcoming recall election for California’s governor after copies of systems used to run elections across the country were released publicly.

Their letter sent to the secretary of state’s office urges the state to conduct a type of post-election audit that can help detect malicious attempts to interfere.

The statewide recall targeting Democratic Gov. Gavin Newsom, set for Sept. 14, is the first election since copies of Dominion Voting Systems’ election management system were distributed last month at an event organized by MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell, an ally of former President Donald Trump who has made unsubstantiated claims about last year’s election. Election offices across 30 states use the Dominion system, including 40 counties in California.

Election security experts have said the breaches, from a county in Colorado and another in Michigan, pose a heightened risk to elections because the system is used for a number of administrative functions — from designing ballots and configuring voting machines to tallying results. In the letter, the experts said they do not have evidence that anyone plans to attempt a hack of the systems used in California and are not casting blame on Dominion.

“However, it is critical to recognize that the release of the Dominion software into the wild has increased the risk to the security of California elections to the point that emergency action is warranted,” the experts wrote in their letter, which was shared with The Associated Press.

The eight experts signing the letter include computer scientists, election technology experts and cybersecurity researchers.

Jenna Dresner, a spokeswoman for Secretary of State Shirley Weber, said the 40 counties in California using Dominion employ a different version of the election management system that meets various state-specific requirements. She outlined numerous security measures in place to protect voting systems across the state. That includes regular testing for vulnerabilities, strict controls on who has access, physical security rules and pre-election testing to ensure that no part of the system has been modified.

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“G.O.P. Election Reviews Create a New Kind of Security Threat”


Late one night in May, after surveillance cameras had inexplicably been turned off, three people entered the secure area of a warehouse in Mesa County, Colo., where crucial election equipment was stored. They copied hard drives and election-management software from voting machines, the authorities said, and then fled.

The identity of one of the people dismayed state election officials: It was Tina Peters, the Republican county clerk responsible for overseeing Mesa County’s elections.

How the incident came to public light was stranger still. Last month in South Dakota, Ms. Peters spoke at a disinformation-drenched gathering of people determined to show that the 2020 election had been stolen from Donald J. Trump. And another of the presenters, a leading proponent of QAnon conspiracy theories, projected a portion of the Colorado software — a tool meant to be restricted to election officials only — onto a big screen for all the attendees to see.

The security of American elections has been the focus of enormous concern and scrutiny for several years, first over possible interference or mischief-making by foreign adversaries like Russia or Iran, and later, as Mr. Trump stoked baseless fears of fraud in last year’s election, over possible domestic attempts to tamper with the democratic process.

But as Republican state and county officials and their allies mount a relentless effort to discredit the result of the 2020 contest, the torrent of election falsehoods has led to unusual episodes like the one in Mesa County, as well as to a wave of G.O.P.-driven reviews of the vote count conducted by uncredentialed and partisan companies or people. Roughly half a dozen reviews are underway or completed, and more are being proposed.

These reviews — carried out under the banner of making elections more secure, and misleadingly labeled audits to lend an air of official sanction — have given rise to their own new set of threats to the integrity of the voting machines, software and other equipment that make up the nation’s election infrastructure….

Security experts say that election hardware and software should be subjected to transparency and rigorous testing, but only by credentialed professionals. Yet nearly all of the partisan reviews have flouted such protocols and focused on the 2020 results rather than hunting for security flaws….

Christopher Krebs, the former head of the federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, said such reviews could easily compromise voting machines. “The main concern is having someone unqualified come in and introduce risk, introduce something or some malware into a system,” he said. “You have someone that accesses these things, has no idea what to do, and once you’ve reached that point, it’s incredibly difficult to kind of roll back the certification of the machine.”…

Pulling compromised machines out of service and replacing them is not a foolproof solution, however.

The equipment could have as-yet-undiscovered security weaknesses, Mr. Halderman said. “And this is what really keeps me up at night,” he said. “That the knowledge that comes from direct access to it could be misused to attack the same equipment wherever else it’s used.”

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“Experts Warn Recent ‘Insider’ Theft, Leak of Vote System Software Imperils CA Recall Election: ‘BradCast’ 8/18/2021”

Brad Blog:

We’ve been covering this story in detail over the past week, as both the national media and California media haven’t covered it at all. But they should. Colorado media finally jumped in, a bit, this week after their Sec. of State on Monday announced that Mesa County Clerk Tina Peters — who appeared on stage several times at Lindell’s forum last week — was behind the theft and copying of two hard drives at the Mesa County Election Division containing Dominion Voting’s Election Management System (EMS) software.

Democratic CO Sec. of State Jenna Griswold’s office, in a news release Monday night, explained how Peters pulled off the heist with two accomplices in the middle of the night back in May, before the software was released into the wild during last week’s symposium. Since then, we have reported on this show about the concerns expressed by voting system and cybersecurity experts like Harri Hursti, who warns that the release of the critical software “lowers the barrier for attack planning and therefore increases the likelihood of future attacks.” That, just after another top expert in the field, University of Michigan’s J. Alex Halderman, filed a 50,000 word report in a long-running federal lawsuit in Georgia, which seeks to ban Dominion’s unverifiable touchscreen voting systems. The report, which he says [PDF] details disturbing, newly discovered vulnerabilities in those systems, which reportedly could allow votes to be changed without detection, has now been sealed by the federal judge due to its sensitivity — even from the plaintiffs and defendants in the case!

Dominion’s vulnerable touchscreens are used in several large jurisdictions in California, even as the recall is now ongoing, including San Diego County, San Francisco and Riverside County. Their EMS software — released to the Internet and downloaded by thousands just last week — is used to tabulate votes, both hand-marked paper ballots and touchscreen votes, in every county where Dominion’s systems are used. The software is used broadly in enough counties here that it could easily effect the computer-tallied results of the Recall election.

Another top expert who is worried about all of this joins us on today’s program to explain why, and what can now be done about this serious security breach. University of California-Berkeley Professor PHILIP STARK is an expert witness in the Georgia case, the inventor of the post-election Risk-Limiting Audit protocol, and currently serves on the Board of Advisors of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.

He joined Hursti this week in telling me that they were both dubious about vague claims from the CO Sec. of State’s office that the U.S. Cyber Security and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) was not particularly concerned about the leak of the Dominion software.

“It is a serious risk,” Stark makes clear today. “The best metaphor I’ve been able to come up with is, if I were trying to break into a bank, how helpful would it be to have blueprints of the bank and the bank vault? How helpful would it be for me to have an actual exact copy of the bank, completely at my disposal, to try different ways of breaking in and so forth? Not even a scale model, but literally the exact same thing, just in a different place. That’s what having a copy of these disks amounts to.”

“To the extent that these systems were not that secure in the first place, this doesn’t make the systems more vulnerable. But it gives a would-be evil-doer lots of help and information to plan an attack, figure out what’s going to work, which then can be conducted later by someone with less technical skill,” Stark warns.

He explains that “these Election Management Systems are used, among other things, to configure the ballot marking devices” as well as “results from the precinct-based scanners” and the high-speed centralized scanners used to tabulate Vote-by-Mail ballots. “The release of the EMS code gives someone a blueprint for how to write malware to infect the ballot marking devices, etc., when they’re configured using these systems.”

We go on to discuss what can and should now be done by California in regards the ongoing Recall election (as well as other jurisdictions, with elections coming up in November, where Dominion systems are used in more than a dozen states) to ensure that results are accurately tabulated and reported, and can be known by the public, after the election, as such. His recommendations include the use of both hand-marked paper ballots and a far more robust post-election audit process than is currently mandated by CA state law.

Moreover, he cites a critical lesson that should be learned from Tina Peters, the Republican County Clerk in Mesa, CO who is alleged to have brought accomplices into the Elections Division in the middle of the night on May 23rd, and turned off the security cameras in order to steal the software and copy it for release into the wild. (She is now under criminal investigation and has been relieved of her duties by CO’s Secretary Griswold.) “This is a very clear reminder that insider threats are real,” observes Stark. “This is a wake-up call. It is very difficult to mitigate insider threats.”

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“Dominion Sues Newsmax, One America News Network, Others Over Election Claims”

Wall Street Journal on the latest Dominion lawsuit:

One of the largest voting-machine companies in the U.S. on Tuesday sued two conservative media networks and a businessman it said had defamed it by spreading accusations that it rigged the 2020 election for President Biden.

Dominion Voting Systems filed suits against Newsmax Media Inc. and Herring Networks Inc.’s One America News Network. Dominion also sued Patrick Byrne, the former chief executive of Inc., an online seller of furniture and other goods.

Dominion accused the two networks of defaming the company and its products by airing false reports that its machines switched votes from President Donald Trump to Mr. Biden. The company also said Mr. Byrne repeatedly and falsely alleged that Dominion rigged vote tallies to steal the 2020 presidential election for Mr. Biden. In each of the three lawsuits, Dominion is seeking more than $1.6 billion in damages, citing lost profit and other costs.

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