Category Archives: First Amendment theory

“Assembly as Political Practice”

Columbia’s actions this past week, especially its decision to invite the NYPD onto campus, have prompted me to post a new chapter, “Assembly as Political Practice,” forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of Peaceful Assembly (Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Michael Hamilton, Thomas Probert & Sharath Srinivasan, eds.). Recent events highlight the interrelationship between protest politics and electoral politics, the rise of a new McCarthyism focused on educational institutions, its power, but also the pervasive devaluing of it as a form of politics. Most disheartening to me personally is the widespread perceived reasonableness of Columbia’s actions including among First Amendment scholars. It stems, in my view, from a misconception of assembly as a lesser form of speech and an inclination to over estimate the risks of disorder.

“[A]ssemblies come in a range of . . . forms, including annual parades, smaller political protests, and weekly gatherings of social groups. All these forms of assembly sustain and reinforce the capacity for democratic politics, and their value does not turn on their expressive ends alone. Both the possibility of effective democratic politics, and a proper construction of the right of peaceful assembly, demand that we recognize the value of assembly, as assembly, and its latent and constitutive political functions.”

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“Back into the FIRE: Hasen’s response to FIRE and Rohde: Don’t read the press clause out of the Constitution — First Amendment News 420”

I have written this reply, as Ron Collins explains:

It all started when I noticed an SSRN post of a forthcoming essay by Richard Hasen. In it, the UCLA School of Law professor took exception to some of what was offered up by FIRE in an amicus brief filed in the Ninth Circuit in TGP Communications v. Sellers. FIRE and Stephen Rohde thereafter weighed in with their responses to Hasen. 

Now, professor Hasen returns to the analytical scene with his rejoinder, which is set out below. 

A few snippets:

Neither FIRE nor Rohde address the problem, “How do you identify journalists when there is finite space or some other scarcity and decide whether to give special treatment like a media shield?” or most of my proposed solutions — such as limiting press protections to professional journalists rather than dabblers, and making the definition of “press” turn on the regularity of engaging in journalistic activities rather than on the type of technology (like a political blog) through which reporting is conveyed.

It may be that FIRE and Rohde believe all the rules that identify professional journalists, including the rules for United States Supreme Court press access that I detail in my chapter, violate the First Amendment. If so, such a ruling would not only eviscerate protection for the press contained in the First Amendment. It would also create Bedlam. Are we going to kick out reporters from The New York Times and Fox News from the White House briefing room and replace them with non-professionals who just have a personal interest in being there? Will this be done by lottery? This system would do a great disservice to the nation and to the ability of the press to serve its educational function — and to serve as a meaningful check on the government.

Are we to give everyone a press shield, essentially ending the pursuit of truth in courts? Or are we to eliminate press protections for professional journalists? Neither FIRE nor Rohde say.

Instead, they focus on only one aspect of my proposal — something which has historically not been a problem, but in the cheap speech era is increasingly becoming one: how to handle people who are professionals in the sense that they write content for websites, but they do not follow journalistic norms. Instead, they are vectors for spreading disinformation, including disinformation about elections being stolen that undermines voter confidence in the democratic process….

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“Fueling the FIRE: Responses to Richard Hasen on how the government should identify professional journalists for access and protection”

Ron Collins for First Amendment News:

Last week, I posted excerpts from Professor Richard Hasen’s essay on how the government might best identify professional journalists for access to government events, as well as the related protections afforded to journalists. In Part IV of that essay, as I highlighted in those excerpts, Hasen took issue with certain arguments tendered by FIRE in its amicus brief, which was filed in the Ninth Circuit in TGP Communications v. Jack Sellers (FIRE’s Ronnie London, counsel of record).

In the spirit of fairness and the free exchange of ideas, I invited the FIRE folks to reply, which they accepted. And to add a bit more conceptual fuel to the “FIRE,” Stephen Rohde also entered the fray with his own reply to Hasen.

Both are featured below.

The “fiery” exchange will continue next week, when professor Hasen will return with a rejoinder to his critics.

Meanwhile, let the word go out: We’re on fire here at FIRE! And expect more heat (and light too) in the days and months to come.

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“Contra FIRE: Hasen on how the government should identify professional journalists for access and protection – First Amendment News 418”

Ron Collins for First Amendment News on my new draft paper, From Bloggers in Pajamas to The Gateway Pundit: How Government Entities Do and Should Identify Professional Journalists for Access and Protection. FIRE attorneys are going to respond in the next issue, and I’m looking forward to that!

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My New One at Slate: “2016 Election Fraudster ‘Ricky Vaughn’ Might Finally Be About to Face the Music”

I have written this piece for Slate. it begins:


On Friday, a federal appeals court in New York will consider a case with key implications for the 2024 election. At issue is whether it violates federal law to trick people on social media and elsewhere about when, where, or how to vote, and whether such a law is consistent with the First Amendment. A ruling favoring the government would go a long way toward protecting voters.

Back in 2016, a man named Douglass Mackey, tweeting under the name “Ricky Vaughn,” repeatedly directed messages to Black voters encouraging them to vote by text for Hillary Clinton. The intent was to trick these voters out of their franchise; of course, votes sent by text don’t count. Thousands sent texts to vote. We don’t know how many of them later did not attempt to vote in a permissible way.

Mackey was convicted by a jury of violating a Reconstruction-era law, 18 U.S.C. § 241, that made it a crime for “two or more persons [to] conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person … in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” The federal government’s theory was that Mackey conspired with others to deprive voters of their right to vote.

On expedited appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, Mackey concedes that, “at worst,” his tweets containing false information about how to vote “were calculated to cause voters to send futile text messages and then stay home on election day.” But, he argues, Section 241 does not apply to conduct such as his, he was not on fair notice that Section 241 applied to conduct like his, and even if it covered this conduct, Section 241 would apply to so much protected speech that it would violate the First Amendment’s protection for freedom of speech.

In an amicus brief supporting the federal government, Protect Democracy, the Yale Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic, and I take issue with Mackey’s first and third arguments….

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“It Depends Who’s Doing the Jawboning”

I’ve got a new post up at Lawfare about a crucial piece missing from the discussion around Murthy v. Missouri, the SCOTUS case about jawboning the social media platforms. Plenty of the Justices had welcome real-world executive experience that came through in last Monday’s argument — but they didn’t recognize that their experiences were also different in ways that should matter. The governing philosophy and structure of different Administrations are distinct, and that context is really important in assessing the potential for coercion.

Or, if you prefer:

Happy Administrations are all alike; unhappy Administrations are each unhappy with social media platforms in their own way.

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My New Paper: “From Bloggers in Pajamas to The Gateway Pundit: How Government Entities Do and Should Identify Professional Journalists for Access and Protection”

I have posted this draft on SSRN. I will be presenting it at a May 3 Knight Columbia conference, and it is forthcoming as a book chapter in THE FUTURE OF PRESS FREEDOM: DEMOCRACY, LAW & THE NEWS IN CHANGING TIMES (Cambridge U. Press, RonNell Andersen Jones and Sonja R. West eds. forthcoming 2025). Here is the abstract:

This paper examines how government entities determine who is a journalist to allocate resources under conditions of scarcity and to assure that the press can conduct their functions without undue government regulation and interference. Using a new dataset of 172 laws, rules, and procedures that different government entities have used to define the press, it describes the most common tests government entities use for identifying journalists and compares them to each other. Most of the definitions appear aimed at identifying the class of professionals who regularly gather, report, and disseminate news. The paper then describes the relatively rare, reported litigation around these journalist-defining rules, teasing out the potential dangers of relying on particular definitions of journalists. Much of the litigation easily distinguishes between professional and non-professional journalists, and a few have dealt with the exclusion of journalists for permissible reasons, such as disruptive behavior. But not every issue is easy. Using the example of litigation over Maricopa County, Arizona’s decision to exclude a faux journalist for The Gateway Pundit from an area where ballots were being tabulated following the 2022 elections, It focuses particularly on the line between unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination and permissible extension of the press exemption only to those who engage in legitimate professional journalism. The paper then makes four normative recommendations about the tests government entities should use to define journalists. First, government entities should have explicit and meaningful standards for press exceptionalism. Second, most press exceptionalism should be limited to professional journalists who regularly produce news stories or commentary. Third, press exceptionalism should not turn on the type of technology used to communicate. Fourth, government entities should continue to have the power to grant press exceptionalism to “bona fide correspondents of repute in their profession” so long as they do not engage in viewpoint discrimination.

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“Law School clinic files brief to combat intentionally false statements about voting”

Yale Daily News:

Yale Law School’s Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic filed an amicus brief on Feb. 12 in United States v. Mackey, a case currently at the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The case involves an influential social media user convicted of attempting to convince voters to believe they could cast their votes through a false voting mechanic. 

The case centers on claims that Douglass Mackey, a social media influencer on X, formerly known as Twitter, made during the 2016 presidential election campaign. Mackey, who was known to his 58,800 followers as Ricky Vaughn, repeatedly tweeted false claims to supporters of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton LAW ’73 that they could cast their ballots via text message in the weeks leading up to the election.

Mackey was convicted by a New York jury in March 2023, ordered to pay a $15,000 fine and charged with violating Section 241, which prohibits conspiring to “injure” individuals’ federal rights or privileges, including the right to vote. He was sentenced to seven months in prison and appealed his conviction to the Second Circuit.

The YLS Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic filed its amicus brief in collaboration with Protect Democracy, a nonpartisan anti-authoritarian organization, on behalf of election law expert and UCLA School of Law professor Richard Hasen. The brief argues that a Reconstruction-era civil rights law can be utilized to prosecute deliberate misinformation regarding voting procedures, while still upholding the First Amendment’s right to freedom of speech….

“I really appreciated the opportunity to work on this case because I think combating election disinformation is going to be key to preserving our democracy, this year and beyond,” Victoria Maras LAW ’25, an MFIA clinic member who worked on the brief, told the News. “As a former Field Organizer, I know how important it is to get the right information out to voters, and, by the same token, how harmful it can be when misinformation spreads.”

Maras said she was grateful that this brief can show how people who conspire to spread false election information can be held accountable without threatening First Amendment free speech rights.

Another MFIA clinic member, Ben Menke LAW ’25, told the News that delving into the history of Section 241, which was passed in 1870, led him to examine transcripts of debates in Congress during that time. Through this research, Menke said that he uncovered the motivations of the legislators who first enacted the law, as well as the legal opinions of the judges who applied Section 241 at the time.

“Our brief offers clarity on the proper way to construe Section 241, and we show that the law is consistent with the First Amendment,” Menke told the News. “Bad actors are finding it easier to spread knowingly false information to interfere with the right of the people to vote. Enforcing Section 241 is one way the federal government can respond to this threat.”

In a statement to the News, James Lawrence, Mackey’s attorney, said that their core argument in defense of Mackey is that he did not have fair notice, required by the Fifth Amendment, that his conduct violated “clearly established” law.

Lawrence claimed that the amicus brief uses a Supreme Court case about a different law to argue that a rarely used legal concept, not accepted in many state courts and never applied in New York, should be turned into a federal crime for misleading election information.

“If a team of federal prosecutors never came up with this convoluted argument after pursuing this case for more than three years … how could Douglass Mackey be expected to know his conduct violated Section 241 in 2016?” Lawrence wrote in the statement. 

The MFIA clinic declined to comment on Lawrence’s statement….

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“At worst [Douglas Mackey’s tweets containing false information about how to vote] were calculated to cause voters to send futile text messages and then stay home on election day.”

Pretty remarkable statement in Douglas Mackey’s reply brief in his criminal appeal before the Second Circuit. To me, the “at worst” it seems pretty bad!

As a reminder, Protect Democracy and the Yale Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic filed this Second Circuit amicus brief (with me as client and co-counsel) in United States v. Mackey.

Mackey was convicted “under 18 U.S.C. § 241 for conspiring “to use Twitter to trick American citizens into thinking they could vote by text and stay at home on Election Day—thereby suppressing and injuring those citizens’ right to vote.” Gov’t Br. 2. Mackey has argued that section 241 does not cover such a scheme and that the law is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it punishes too much protected speech.

In our brief, we explain that the statute, properly construed, both bars lies about when, where or how people vote intended to deprive people of their right to vote and that limiting section 241 to such empirically verifiable false speech assures that the law does not violate the First Amendment.

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Our Amicus Brief in United States v. Mackey: Lying About When, Where or How People Vote Violates Federal Law (18 USC 241) and Prosecution is Consistent with the First Amendment

Protect Democracy and the Yale Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic filed this Second Circuit amicus brief (with me as client and co-counsel) in United States v. Mackey. Mackey was convicted “under 18 U.S.C. § 241 for conspiring “to use Twitter to trick American citizens into thinking they could vote by text and stay at home on Election Day—thereby suppressing and injuring those citizens’ right to vote.” Gov’t Br. 2. Mackey has argued that section 241 does not cover such a scheme and that the law is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it punishes too much protected speech.

In our brief, we explain that the statute, properly construed, both bars lies about when, where or how people vote intended to deprive people of their right to vote and that limiting section 241 to such empirically verifiable false speech assures that the law does not violate the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has already stated that the government “may prohibit messages intended to mislead voters about voting requirements and procedures” consistent with the First Amendment. Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1889 n.4 (2018). Further, as explained in Protect Democracy’s blog post on the filing:

The primary question before the Second Circuit in Mackey’s appeal is whether the federal civil rights statute he was convicted under – which bans conspiring to “injure” any person in their exercise of federal rights – actually bars conspiracies to circulate false information about voting mechanisms and procedures. Professor Hasen’s amicus brief explains why intentionally false statements about voting mechanisms and procedures violate federal law, and why such speech can be punished without running afoul of the First Amendment’s protections.

In particular, to establish the applicability of Reconstruction-era civil rights protection to internet memes, the brief tracks the history of legal actions protecting the right to vote back to England in 1703. That history shows, among other things, a three-century-long recognition among judges that an intentional deprivation of the right to vote constitutes an “injury” for which the law provides a remedy. As a result, the brief argues, Mackey’s conduct clearly constituted a conspiracy to “injure” under long-recognized legal principles, even if the Reconstruction Congress would have had no idea what an internet meme is.

You can find the introduction to our brief below the fold, which relies heavily on common law tort principles protecting the right to vote and its explanation in the Restatement (2d) Torts section 865.

Continue reading Our Amicus Brief in United States v. Mackey: Lying About When, Where or How People Vote Violates Federal Law (18 USC 241) and Prosecution is Consistent with the First Amendment
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“Wisconsin Judge Dismisses Felony Charge in ‘Ballot Selfie’ Case”

NYT:

A Wisconsin judge on Monday dismissed a felony charge against a school board candidate who had posted a photograph on Facebook of a ballot with his name filled in.

In his ruling, the judge, Paul V. Malloy of Ozaukee County, threw out the count of voter fraud against the man, Paul H. Buzzell, 52, a former school board member in Mequon, a suburb of Milwaukee, who was voted back onto the board during an election in April, online court records show.

Judge Malloy ruled on a motion to dismiss by Mr. Buzzell’s lawyers, who argued that the state law prohibiting so-called ballot selfies was overly broad and violated the constitutional guarantee of free expression.

“What is at stake is branding a politician a felon for declaring to the world that the politician displayed” a marked ballot “showing a vote for himself in an election,” the motion said. Mr. Burrell would have faced a maximum possible sentence of three and a half years in prison and a $10,000 fine had he been convicted. He would also have been barred from running for elected office.

The case reflects the debate among states over selfies of ballots and of people showing how they vote. Some legislators have argued that public displays of marked ballots can be used to influence voters in an election or to promote vote buying. Others, including the American Civil Liberties Union, say such laws banning voting selfies on social media restrict free spee….

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ELB Podcast 5:3: The Trump Prosecutions, the First Amendment, and Election Interference (Genevieve Lakier and Eugene Volokh)

New ELB Podcast:

Do gag orders against presidential candidate Donald Trump in his civil or criminal trials violate the First Amendment?

What should we make of Trump’s claims that his actions to overturn the results of the 2020 elections are protected free speech?

How should we assess the dangers of government “jawboning” of social media platforms to remove objectionable conduct?

On Season 5, Episode 3 of the ELB Podcast, we delve into these issues with First Amendment experts Genevieve Lakier and Eugene Volokh.

You can subscribe on SoundcloudApple Podcasts, and Spotify.

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How Big a Risk is Government “Jawboning” Where Government Pressures Media or Platforms to Include, Remove, or Demote Content?

The Knight First Amendment institute has a first-rate set of papers on this topic that just posted. And it couldn’t be more timely with Friday’s quick cert. grant in the Murthy v. Missouri case.

I was struck in my conversation for SDP last week with Genevieve Lakier and Eugene Volokh about jawboning that this is a cross-partisan issue: just as the right is worried about pressure from the Biden administration, shouldn’t the left be worried about pressure from a future Trump or Trump-like administration?

This case should produce some interesting briefs and perhaps interesting constellations of Justices.

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