April 20, 2009

California Supreme Court Decides Important Case Involving Government Support for Ballot Measures

The opinion in Vargas v. City of Salinas is here. It considers the earlier standard set forth in the influential Stanson v. Mott decision. Here is the introduction to the Vargas opinion:

    Plaintiffs--proponents and supporters of a local ballot measure that proposed the repeal of a utility users tax imposed by the City of Salinas--filed this lawsuit against the City of Salinas (the City) challenging the validity of a number of actions taken by the City relating to the ballot measure. In Stanson v. Mott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 206 (Stanson), we explained that because of potential constitutional questions that may be presented by a public entity’s expenditure of public funds in connection with a ballot measure that is to be voted upon in an upcoming election, there is a need to distinguish between (1)"campaign" materials and activities that presumptively may not be paid for by public funds, and (2)"informational" material that ordinarily may be financed by public expenditures. We noted in Stanson that although there are some communications or activities that clearly fall within one of these categories or the other, under some circumstances it may be necessary to examine the "style, tenor, and timing" of a communication (id. at p. 222 & fn. 8) in order to determine whether it should be characterized as permissible or impermissible.


    In the present case, the Court of Appeal concluded that in light of a statutory provision enacted subsequent to Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, a municipality's expenditure of public funds on a communication relating to a ballot measure is permissible whenever the communication does not "expressly advocate" a position with regard to the ballot measure. The appellate court held that so long as a communication avoids this prohibition on "express advocacy"-- a term of art originating in the context of regulations relating to private campaign contributions and expenditures, and referring to a limited and narrowly defined category of statements-- there is no need to consider the communication's "style, tenor, and timing" in determining the validity of the use of public funds on the communication. Because plaintiffs conceded that the materials challenged in the present case did not (within the meaning of the express advocacy standard) expressly advocate a position regarding the ballot measure, the Court of Appeal on that basis alone concluded that plaintiffs' legal challenge lacked merit and consequently upheld the trial court's order striking plaintiffs' action under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, California's anti-SLAPP statute.


    We granted review primarily to consider whether the Court of Appeal correctly identified the legal standard applicable to publicly funded, election-related communications made by a municipality, and further to determine whether, under the appropriate standard, plaintiffs' legal challenge to the City's expenditure of public funds in this case should have been permitted to go forward.


    For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the statute relied upon by the Court of Appeal was not intended, and should not be interpreted, to displace the analysis and standard set forth in our decision in Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206. We further conclude that a municipality's expenditure of public funds for materials or activities that reasonably are characterized as campaign materials or activities-- including, for example, bumper stickers, mass media advertisement spots, billboards, door-to-door canvassing, or the like-- is not authorized by the statute in question, even when the message delivered through such means does not meet the express-advocacy standard. At the same time, we also conclude that the challenged actions of the City, here at issue, as a matter of law do not constitute improper campaign materials or activities under the standard set forth in Stanson. Accordingly, although we disagree with the legal standard applied by the Court of Appeal, we conclude that it correctly upheld the trial court's ruling in favor of defendants and thus that the judgment of the Court of Appeal should be affirmed.

Posted by Rick Hasen at April 20, 2009 10:08 AM