This is an important new study from Andrew C. W. Myers, Maria Silfa, Alexander Fouirnaies,
and Andrew B. Hall.

The paper also illustrates, though it doesn’t emphasize, the role that the rise of donations from individuals — including especially small donors — contributes to polarization. Donors have different motivations. Corporate PACs mainly donate to seek access to officeholders; as a result, they tend to give to incumbents and do so with much less emphasis on ideology. Individual donors, by contrast, are ideologically motivated. I have explored the rise of individual donors and the connection to polarization in my essay, Campaign Finance and Political Polarization.

Here’s the abstract from this new empirical paper:

Incumbents have long enjoyed a substantial fundraising advantage in American elections, but it remains unclear whether this advantage has persisted as elections have become more partisan and nationalized in recent years. Pairing a regression discontinuity design with a comprehensive dataset covering U.S. House, U.S. Senate, gubernatorial, statewide executive, and state legislative elections, we present the first systematic evidence on the evolution of the financial incumbency advantage. Overall, we find that the financial advantage enjoyed by incumbents at all levels of government has declined
25% to 50% over the last decade. This decline, however, is driven entirely by individual donors, and especially small-dollar donors; in contrast, the advantage among corporate PACs has remained stable—or even increased. Taken together, these shifts reveal a campaign finance landscape that is increasingly shaped by partisanship on one side and strategic investment on the other.

And here is part of the abstract from Campaign Finance and Polarization:

In an era I have called “hyperpolarized democracy in America,” delivering effective government has become extremely difficult. Much has been written about various institutional factors that contribute to the rise of polarization. But campaign finance has received minimal attention in these discussions. Most campaign finance discussion focuses on issues of political equality or the risks of political corruption. The failure to focus on the polarizing effects of our privately-financed elections is surprising, because one of the most robust findings in the empirical literature on campaign finance is that donors are much more ideologically extreme than other citizens. Nor has the emergence of small donors in the last several election cycles changed this pattern. Small donors are at least as ideological as large donors, perhaps more so…{This essay} then argues that, once we recognize the relationship between individual donors and polarization, there are implications for the appropriate direction of political reform.

Ohio Journal:

The women’s political organization Red Wine and Blue has sued Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose over changes to the voter registration process at the Bureau of Motor Vehicles.

Thanks to the federal “motor voter” law, car registration agencies around the U.S. have offered voter registration services to applicants since the early 1990s. New state law in Ohio requires applicants provide proof of citizenship before the bureau registers them or updates their registration.

Red Wine and Blue argued the change, passed as part of Ohio’s two-year transportation budget, “makes it harder for lawful, eligible Ohio citizens to exercise their fundamental right to vote.”

“Frank LaRose and Republicans in the state legislature should not be able to disenfranchise anyone,” she continued. “Especially not the rural Ohioans, elderly voters, students, and women who have changed their legal names through marriage and divorce who are disproportionately affected by this legislation.”

In a press release LaRose dismissed the case as a “baseless” and “activist” lawsuit. He added the state of Wyoming instituted similar changes and courts there have already upheld the policy.

“It’s common sense that only U.S. citizens should be on our voter rolls,” LaRose said. “I won’t apologize for, or back down from the work we do to ensure the integrity of our voter rolls.”

“We will win this case,” he insisted, “just like we’ve fought off the other baseless actions that such groups have brought against us.”

At root, the changes shift the burden from state agencies to individuals.

Under prior law, registrants had to attest under penalty of perjury that they are a citizen. Verification then happened behind the scenes with elections officials at the state and local level.

Brad Smith, former FEC Commissioner and (retired) professor of law at Capital University, has long been one of the major advocates for the view that much of campaign-finance regulation violates the First Amendment. In an amicus brief in the NRSC v. FEC case on party-coordinated expenditures, the Institute for Free Speech, which Brad founded and chairs, along with the Manhattan Institute, now takes the position that the Elections Clause, which is the source of Congress’ power to regulate campaign finance, does not permit Congress to regulate political campaigns at all, as opposed to the voting process itself.

The Elections Clause, located in Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, states that “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators”. Brad argues that the “time, place, and manner of holding Elections” does not include the campaign process.

I want to point some of the consequences, were this position to be accepted. Because states only have power to regulate national elections through the Elections Clause, this position would mean no government would be able to regulate the campaign process for federal elections. It would seem to mean that even congressional regulation that requires disclosure of the source of large (or any) campaign contributions would be unconstitutional. Legislatures could not ban or regulate direct contributions of unlimited amounts from the general treasury of corporations or unions (current federal law bans those contributions in federal campaigns).

I don’t think there’s much the chance the Court would endorse this position. But it’s worth considering the consequences were the Court to do so.