I’m pleased to welcome Bob Bauer to the ELB Book Corner, writing about his new book, The Unraveling. Here is the third of three guest posts:
In a chapter about impeachment in The Unraveling, I single out the late Kenneth Starr for criticism of his performance as independent counsel in the Clinton case. He took on a constitutional controversy laden with unusual elements of run-away partisanship—an impeachment directed at a president’s conduct of his personal life— and made it, on that score, far worse. The chapter detailed the ways in which Starr failed to exercise the particular ethical responsibilities of a lawyers in an exquisitely sensitive public role.
But my larger concern is the well noted increase in partisan appetite for impeachments when a loss at the polls is unthinkable.Those concerned about this trend may have all the more cause for worry now that the Supreme Court has established significant levels of presidential immunity from criminal prosecution. Even before that decision, immunity figured into the pressures for impeachment: Because presidents could claim immunity from prosecution while office, impeachment was the only source of formal accountability in that period. With the zone of immunity now expanded, advocates for an impeachment can dismiss the suggestion that Congress should stay its hand, respecting the voters’ choice and leaving the president to answer to the legal system after his or her term ends. The President may now get a pass for a wide range of alleged misconduct, and, of course, Congress must impeach and convict before considering a vote on disqualification from holding future office.
For this reason, I make the case that the House and Senate should formally revise the rules governing impeachment processes. While there are some standing rules and often-cited standards, these are largely made up on the fly in each individual case of impeachment. This is a mistake, as it only encourages the engineering of different processes with the actual or perceived purpose of enhancing the prospect of one result or the other. A bipartisan institutional reform exercise while there is no particular impeachment pending could focus attention on what an impeachment process most appropriately should be– with no president at imminent risk of risk benefitting or suffering from the particular choices made.
Among the issues that could be addressed: Is the Senate obligated to hold the trial if the House impeaches? Must it at least consider a Motion to Dismiss—or can it just ignore the House action? On what schedule must the House transmit articles of impeachment? What are precisely the “due process“rights of a president defending against an impeachment in a House or a Senate trial? None of these questions need to be answered so definitively that every conceivable procedural issue is settled before a particular impeachment. There is, however, a major advantage, in substance and credibility, to a “veil of ignorance” establishment of clear rules.
In the book, I note the motion to dismiss filed by the late Senator Robert Byrd to end Senate consideration of the Clinton impeachment. The constitutional remedy of impeachment had deteriorated into spectacle, including “hallway press conferences and [a] battle of press releases that are contributing to the division of our parties and our nation.” As a well-respected institutionalist, Byrd rightly warned that the impeachment process was inflicting more damage on the democracy than the conduct for which President Clinton was impeached.
The House and Senate could collaborate on bipartisan internal reforms to address these dangers of an impeachment process unconstrained by settled standards and processes, overly vulnerable to the worst partisan opportunism. Action may be unlikely, but the cost of inaction is no less predictable.