Yesterday, the three-judge district court in the Alabama congressional redistricting litigation declined to bail-in the State to the VRA’s preclearance regime. You can find the district court’s decision here.
Recall that the district court had previously found that Alabama’s 2023 defiance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen v. Milligan constituted intentional discrimination. Based on the district court’s obvious frustration with Alabama’s recalcitrance, it appeared that the State was a prime candidate for bail-in under Section 3(c) of the VRA. Moreover, plaintiffs’ bail-in request was limited: only for congressional redistricting and only through the post-2030 redistricting map. Bail-in was designed to stop the game of whack-a-mole that was Southern defiance of federal court decrees. Unfortunately, Alabama dodged the hammer once again.
For prior analysis of bail-in in this case, see here, here, and here. Here’s some takeaways from the district court’s opinion and recent bail-in litigation overall:
1. The district court’s fifteen-page opinion is mostly a summary of the litigation and last week’s bail-in hearing. Its analysis of the bail-in issue is cursory. The court sidestepped contentious questions about whether multiple constitutional violations are necessary for bail-in; whether Shaw violations count; and whether constitutional violations by political subdivisions are part of the inquiry. Instead, the district court relied heavily on its retention of jurisdiction over the case through the 2030 redistricting cycle and its injunction that Alabama must use the Special Master’s remedial maps. It observed that this “largely obviate[d]” the need to delve into the “intrusive waters” of preclearance. Indeed, the district court’s approach recalls the Fourth Circuit’s minimal analysis of the bail-in question in McCrory, the North Carolina voter-suppression case.
Furthermore, the district court appears to conflate the question of retaining jurisdiction and bail-in. For example, the district court’s opinion could be read to express concern about dealing with the case through the entire 2030 redistricting process—that is, through 2041. But that is emphatically not how bail-in under Section 3(c) would have worked. Alabama would have been required to preclear the first map that it drew after the 2030 Census. So long as Alabama met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it had not intentionally discriminated and had not retrogressed Black voting strength, the bail-in would have ended. Any Section 2 or Shaw claims would have been heard by a separate court. And the bail-in would not have applied to a 2030 mid-decade redistricting either.
To be clear, some of this confusion could be attributable to plaintiffs’ back-up request for the court to retain jurisdiction. But the substantive standard and process for how preclearance would work under Section 3(c) is distinct from how the same court hearing a potential Section 2 case in the 2030s would work.
2. Although the district court declined to bail-in Alabama, it did mandate that it use the Special Master’s remedial map until the 2030 redistricting cycle. Thus, for now, Alabama cannot take part in the potential wave of mid-decade redistricting that might occur. However, Alabama has appealed the underlying merits determination to the Supreme Court, and with the Callais re-argument next Term, it is possible Alabama may be freed from this permanent injunction.
3. The lightning bolt of the Callais re-argument order looms large here. The short time frame between last week’s hearing and yesterday’s decision hints at a district court that thinks it’s gone as far as it can go without being rebuked by the Supreme Court.
4. Finally, one cannot help but wonder what might have been in these post-Shelby County bail-in suits if the Supreme Court had not become considerably more conservative during the first Trump administration. Put differently, if the Senate had not successfully blockaded Merrick Garland or if Justice Ginsburg had retired in a timely manner, the preclearance regime might have been partially rebuilt. We have seen district courts issue intentional discrimination findings against two States that were previously fully covered (Alabama and twice against Texas) and two States that were previously partially covered (Florida and North Carolina). But when it came to pull the trigger on Section 3(c) relief, the lower courts blinked.
Perhaps one upshot of yesterday’s decision is that bail-in’s constitutionality will continue to escape Supreme Court review. Although I still believe that this is the best post-Shelby County vehicle for addressing Section 3(c)’s constitutionality, one need not look far for other voting/civil rights cases—such as Brnovich—in which an aggressive litigation posture ended up backfiring. We will have to wait and see what remains of the Voting Rights Act after next Term, which is shaping up to be monumental.