I am pleased to welcome Karen Sebold to ELB Book Corner, writing about her new book, Evaluating Campaign Finance Oversight: An Assessment of the Federal Election Commission. (Use that link with code LXFANDF30 for a 30 percent discount). Here is the third of three posts:
I want to thank Rick Hasen for the opportunity to post about my new book, “Evaluating Campaign Finance Oversight: An Assessment of the Federal Election Commission.” My posts discuss the main themes of the book using edited excerpts from the book.

Today’s post examines one of the book’s primary themes: how to improve the Federal Election Commission (FEC). President Trump pledged to rid the political system of corruption during the 2016 presidential election, but by 2017, many Americans perceived the situation as worse than before he entered the White House (Norris, Cameron, and Wynter 2019). Instead, Trump and the Republican led Senate kept the FEC shut down for most of Trump’s first term by refusing to appoint commissioners to lead the agency. As of May 2025, it remains shut down again due to a lack of a quorum (four commissioners out of six must be present), following the exit of two Republican commissioners, Sean Cooksey and Allen Dickerson, and the firing of a Democratic commissioner, Ellen Weintraub, by Trump. The only silver lining of the FEC shutting down again is that it stops the Republican commissioners from killing the investigations against Trump. According to Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW), the GOP commissioners blocked 29 investigations or taking action against President Trump (https://www.citizensforethics.org/reports-investigations/crew-investigations/gop-commissioners-have-single-handedly-blocked-fec-action-against-trump-29-times/).
The exploitation of the campaign finance system and the FEC’s failure to hold violators accountable are evident in the frequent news stories of improper use of campaign funds by politicians recently, and make it clear that campaign finance laws and rules are not self-executing and require a functioning agency. Yet, the agency is hobbled by a lack of resources, and the process of appointing commissioners has become politicized. The budget and full-time employees have not kept up with the astronomical growth of election finance activities. The rate of campaign spending doubles with each passing election cycle, resulting in a corresponding increase in the workload of the FEC. From processing the campaign finance reports to serving the number of filers of these reports, the work of the FEC is increasing tremendously as campaign finance activities increase at a phenomenal pace. In my new book, I illustrate how a decrease in full-time staff and budget at the FEC corresponds with a decline in fines and penalties. To effectively oversee the significant amount of campaign finance activities in the U.S., the FEC requires additional resources and the timely appointment of commissioners. Lastly, the political gridlock at the FEC must also be reduced.
One possible solution to achieving this goal is to increase the number of commissioners on the panel to seven while retaining the same requirement of four commissioners for quorum decision-making. Given the immense workload of the FEC, there is a legitimate case for adding more commissioners. Increasing the number of commissioners allows the panel to absorb the loss of a commissioner due to an untimely appointment or recusal. The extra commissioner could also be an independent to help reduce polarization. Adding one more commissioner to the panel makes this proposed reform to the FEC one of the politically easiest to pass. It requires little cost and does not change how decisions are made. It would allow the commissioner panel to proceed with agency business more flexibly when one or more commissioners are unable to vote or unwilling to agree with a decision. Additionally, if the president and Congress are unable to replace an FEC commissioner in a timely manner, perhaps the FEC could appoint an interim commissioner to serve until a commissioner is confirmed. However, given that the president and Congress are the primary targets of FEC investigations, it is unlikely that they will fulfill their responsibilities and repair the FEC.
References:
Norris, Pippa, Cameron, Sarah, and Thomas Wynter. 2019. Electoral Integrity in America: Securing Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.