Justin here. I find much of the work of the UCLA Voting Rights Project to be really valuable — but I have to say, I agree with Rick’s take on their read of the California Constitution‘s provisions on redistricting. The California Constitution can be amended (as Rick says, it takes approval by the voters), but I don’t think current law permits the legislature to just draw maps on their own. And I think following the Project’s memo would end up putting the legislature in a worst-case bind.
Rick says that the memo uses a sort of “wooden textualism” — the same sort of methodology, giving overly short shrift to what drafters clearly intended, that has produced the 8th Circuit’s dead-wrong decisions on private rights to enforce the VRA. But I think it’s even less persuasive than that. The memo describes portions of the California Constitution that “retain for [the] Legislature the power to adopt ‘a statute establishing or changing boundaries of any legislative, congressional, or other election district.’” That’s not what I read those sections to be doing.
The memo cites two sections of Article IV of the California Constitution – section 8(c) and section 10(b) – as giving the legislature power to draw redistricting statutes (and override the state’s independent commission) whenever it wants. Article IV, section 8, subsection (c) is about effective dates for legislation. It has a default, a special exception (I think) for bills passed at the end of the first year of a two-year session, and an exception to the exception for redistricting statutes. Article IV, section 10, subsection (b) is about bills becoming laws without the governor’s signature if he sits on them long enough. It too has a default, and an exception for redistricting statutes.
Neither of those sections purports to assign the legislature a role in drafting redistricting statutes. It just says what the effective dates and law-without-signature timing might be for legislative redistricting statutes … if such statutes existed. And the best read of the constitution, I think, is that Article XXI just means there are none of those legislative redistricting statutes now (because the redistricting commission has the power to do that work instead). That doesn’t make these procedural bits superfluous: if the commission provisions are withdrawn or modified, they kick back in.
It’s very hard to read those small procedural exceptions in 8(c) and 10(b) to imply a giant substantive power when the much much much clearer provision on substantive power gives that power instead to the independent commission. Also, it sure seems weird for Article XXI of the California Constitution to go to all the trouble to specifically take the pen away from the legislature and prescribe a bunch of criteria for the commission to use, if a different part of the constitution just lets the legislature undo that work however they want whenever they want.
I am, of course, not a court. And maybe a court would disagree with me. But I think it’s far more likely that a court would read these provisions of Article IV as vestigial procedural caveats rather than affirmative authorization. And if that’s true, then a legislature acting on this theory (and not, say, putting a measure before the public if they really want to effectuate a retaliatory gerrymander) is putting itself in a worst-case scenario.
If the legislature draws a radically gerrymandered map on this theory, it ticks off all of the reform voters who put the commission in place in the first instance, and anyone who doesn’t love the idea of a Democratic gerrymander. And if a court (as I think most likely) then strikes the map down for lack of legislative authority, it ticks off all of the Democrats gunning for pure partisanship – because now the legislature has accomplished nothing, and it’s too late for a special election that would actually change the rules before 2026. I think this is a recipe to claiming action while actually affecting nothing, and ticking _everyone_ off in the process.