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The Democracy Project and the Role of Congress

Last week at NYU’s Democracy Project‘s series of 100 essays in 100 days, we featured two essays, among others, on the role of Congress in this moment.

One, from congressional expert Molly Reynolds, is titled When It Comes to its Spending Power, Congress Must Save Itself. The second, from Andy McCarthy, who is former federal prosecutor, bestselling author, and National Review contributing editor, is titled Bring Back Congress.

Here’s an excerpt first from Molly’s piece:

The threat to Congress comes not only from the executive branch directly. While, for a range of historical and institutional reasons, adjudicating spending questions is not entirely comfortable terrain for judges, the federal courts have become the primary venue in which the battle over the executive’s conduct is being fought. The decisions so far have been a mixed bag for Congress and, because they’ve mostly come from district and circuit courts, many are still winding their way through the legal process. But even if the judiciary ends up rendering decisions in favor of congressional choices—an outcome, to be clear, that’s far from certain—relying on the courts to backstop congressional power can be a dangerous business. The harm that can be done while litigation unfolds can be real, and the time to resolution can be long…

There are steps Congress can take to address this worsening imbalance of power between the branches. Moving language, for example, that has historically appeared in documents accompanying spending bills into the text of legislation might help bolster pro-Congress arguments in future litigation….

Writing new laws that seek to prevent the executive branch from overreach—while a helpful start—only goes so far when the underlying problem is that the very same executive branch is disregarding the laws Congress has already written. Any meaningful, long-term solution that restores congressional power will require members of Congress to decide for themselves to withhold support for something the executive branch cares about. In a period of unified party control and strong partisan loyalty, it is somewhat difficult to imagine the congressional majority stepping up to the plate.

Here is an excerpt from Andy’s piece:

Just as we sometimes unthinkingly laud democracy when we mean republic, so too are we apt to describe the branches of our federal government as co-equal.

No. They are peers, to be sure. Each is bound by the rudimentary principle that their powers are separate: these discrete authorities may and often should be exercised in unison (e.g., the president and Congress acting together against a foreign threat to our defense), but never by the same set of hands. The separate branches, however, are not equals.

Congress is the Article I power. As the breadth of its enumerated powers elucidates, it is primus inter pares. In a republic framed to achieve representative governance, it is the representative. Indeed, in the Constitution’s original blueprint, the House was the only component of the three branches that would be directly elected by the people – and only by the people in the jurisdiction to be represented by a congressman. (It would be a man back then, but a self-correcting republic overcomes all manner of waywardness.)

It was Congress that embodied the republic’s democratic aspirations. Our aspirations haven’t changed, but without a functioning legislative branch, they are certain to be frustrated. Our governing framework cannot be sustained in such circumstances.

We are a deeply divided country. Yet, that is our default condition historically. We’ve thrived, not self-immolated, because constitutional government through deliberative legislation by our representatives works. It provides stability even when our differences are immense. Without it, our divisions will remain but our stability will continue to erode as each presidential election portends new, contradictory extremes of government by executive order.

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What Legal Authority Does the Administration Rely on to Impose $100,000 Fees for New H1B Visas?

At the Volokh Conspiracy, Ilya Somin has a piece that provides a policy critique of this decision from his Cato colleague David Bier and then a discussion of the legal issues. Here’s some of the legal discussion:

As David Bier notes, the new $100,000 fee is likely illegal, because the statutes authorizing H-1B fees only allow for fees to recoup administrative costs and some other types expenses. They certainly don’t authorize anything remotely resembling a $100,000 fee.

Trump is trying to get around these constraints by relying on  8 U.S.C. Section 1182(f), gives the president the authority to “bar the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States” whose admission he finds “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” …

[I]t is far from clear that Section 1182(f) and Trump v. Hawaii give the president a blank check to exclude any potential immigrants for any reasons he wants, or to impose any fees he wants. In 2020, as David Bier also notes, Trump tried to impose a similar ban on new H-1B visas, but a federal district court ruled against the ban. As the court pointed out, ” there must be some measure of constraint on Presidential authority in the domestic sphere in order not to render the executive an entirely monarchical power in the immigration context, an area within clear legislative prerogative.”

The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that immigration is an area of legislative power. If so, there must be at least some constraint on how far it can be delegated to the executive.

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“Remedies in the Officer Removal Cases”

Over at Divided Argument, Sam Bray has posted this abstract of an essay he has just released. I have wondered about some of these questions, and Sam has been influential with the Court, as in the universal injunction case:

When a federal officer challenges her removal by the president, what forms of interim relief and what final remedies are available? This Article considers those questions. It shows that the appropriate remedy for a prevailing officer will typically be a declaratory one, either a declaratory judgment or quo warranto. The interim relief question is harder. The suggestion here is that if an officer sues immediately to challenge her removal, and remains the de facto officer, there should be a presumption that the district court should ensure that she remains in possession of the office during the pendency of the litigation. But if the officer fails to sue immediately, and is no longer the de facto officer, the presumption should be against any interim relief. This suggestion is subject to some qualifications, but it would prevent “flipping” back and forth during the litigation with respect to who occupies the office and exercises its powers. These presumptions are supported by historical practice with respect to preliminary injunctions and quo warranto, by equitable considerations such as laches, and by normative concerns that are especially strong in the officer-removal context.

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“Why Democrats can’t match Trump’s gerrymander push”

POLITICO reports. “Democrats trying to counter President Donald Trump’s red-state gerrymander are facing a roadblock. Fifteen roadblocks, actually.

“That’s how many Democratic-led states have a political trifecta — the same setup that helped Texas Republicans push through new maps last month.

“But of those 15, only California has made a serious effort to respond in kind — and even that initiative may fail at the ballot box. Leaders in 14 other states with a Democratic governor and state legislature find themselves unable to move forward, hampered by reasons ranging from constitutional limitations, legal deadlines and maps that can’t be gerrymandered anymore. In perhaps an acknowledgment of these hurdles, Democrats have turned to the courts to try stopping Republican efforts.

“’It’s no doubt the case that it’s harder for Democrats to do this right now than Republicans,’ said All About Redistricting author and researcher Douglas Spencer, an expert in election law at the University of Colorado.”

Read on for more details.

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“In Assault on Free Speech, Trump Targets Speech He Hates”

Peter Baker in The NY Times details all the ways Trump’s attacks on dissent differs from his predecessors. A few paragraphs in this piece, all of which is well worth reading, struck me in particular:

“’Donald Trump is hardly the first president to crack down on the press and cause controversy by doing so,’ said Harold Holzer, author of ‘The Presidents vs. the Press,’ the definitive history on the subject. ‘But he is the first to do so in what is not a national emergency.’

“Mr. Trump has increasingly shown his willingness to invoke government reach to go after those who openly question or criticize him. When former Gov. Chris Christie of New Jersey, a Republican and estranged ally, said on television last month that Mr. Trump ‘doesn’t care’ about maintaining separation between his office and criminal investigations, the president proved the point by threatening a criminal investigation of Mr. Christie.

“On Tuesday, Mr. Trump erupted at Jonathan Karl of ABC News for asking about Ms. Bondi’s plan to target ‘hate speech.’ She would ‘probably go after people like you,’ he snapped, ‘because you treat me so unfairly.’ When Mr. Karl revisited the subject in the Oval Office on Friday, Mr. Trump berated him again. ‘You’re guilty, Jon,’ he said.”

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Good for Ted Cruz

N.Y. Times reports on Senator Cruz’s condemnation of FCC Chair Carr’s pressure on ABC over Kimmel:

‘“He says, ‘We can do this the easy way, or we can do this the hard way.’” Mr. Cruz said on his podcast “Verdict with Ted Cruz,” quoting Mr. Carr verbatim. “And I’ve got to say, that’s right out of Goodfellas. That’s right out of a mafioso coming into a bar going, ‘Nice bar you have here, it’d be a shame if something happened to it.’”’

Cruz went on to say that Carr’s comment was “‘dangerous as hell.””

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Future of Third Circuit’s Ruling on Misdated Ballots?

The National Law Review has just published a story about the Third Circuit’s decision last month to invalidate on Anderson-Burdick grounds Pennsylvania’s law requiring the rejection of timely submitted mailed ballots that are misdated by the voters. Will a cert petition be filed in the case? If so, will it be granted? Although in January SCOTUS declined to consider a case that challenged the same rule under the statutory materiality provision, that case sustained the validity of the rule against the statutory challenge. Given instead that in this case the rule was invalidated and specifically on Anderson-Burdick grounds–and given especially that there has been some interest among judges in revisiting the Anderson-Burdick balancing test–what’s the possibility that SCOTUS would take this case for the specific purpose of that revisiting?

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Fusion Voting in Wisconsin

The University of Wisconsin Law School, in conjunction with other organizations, is hosting what looks like will be a great event. Parties, Power, and Possibility: Revisiting Fusion Voting in Wisconsin will be held on Friday, November 14, 2025. It has a superb lineup of participants:

If the goal of fusion voting is to counteract polarization and the election of more extreme candidates, I’m personally skeptical of its potential to achieve those benefits–at least in a state like Ohio, with which I’m most familiar. For example, I don’t think fusion voting would have made a difference in Ohio’s US Senate elections in either 2022 or 2024. In other words, even if Tim Ryan in 2022 and Sherrod Brown in 2024 had appeared on the ballot as the nominee of a “moderate” party as well as being a Democrat, I doubt that the outcome of either election would have been any different. In each case, the Trump-endorsed Republican nominee (Vance in 2022, Moreno in 2024) still most likely would have won in my judgment.

But Wisconsin is a different state than Ohio, purple instead of red. It seems more likely that fusion voting might have made a difference in Wisconsin’s 2022 US Senate election. Ron Johnson won that race by only one percentage point, 50.41% to 49.41%, and Mandela Barnes, the Democrat. If Barnes had been co-nominated by a “moderate” party, that might have been enough to cause him to pull ahead of Johnson.

In any event, I think it’s great that there is a Wisconsin-specific conference focusing on the possibility of fusion voting in that state. I’ll be especially interested to hear if any empirical data is presented at the conference to shed light on what potentially effect it actually would have.

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“The Australian to Save American Democracy -And America’s Potential to Return the Favour”

The written version of my Miegunyah Lecture has been published and posted on SSRN. Here’s the abstract:

This is the text of US constitutional and election law scholar Professor Edward B. Foley’s Miegunyah Distinguished Visiting Fellow Lecture delivered at the University of Melbourne on 30 July 2025. In the lecture, Professor Foley advocates for ‘centripetal’ forms of voting to be used to help depolarise the intense partisan competition that is experienced in the United States. Professor Foley’s lecture draws on University of Melbourne’s Professor E.J. Nanson’s pioneering methods of preferential voting, outlined in pamphlets such as Methods of Election (1882) and The Real Value of the Vote (1900), that were proposed at the turn of the twentieth century, and which proposed greater centripetal power than the current preferential voting methods used in Australia. You can also find a recording of the lecture at this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ucbAxL7W0w.

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