I’ve posted this new article on SSRN. Here’s the abstract:
This essay, a contribution to the Ohio State Law Journal symposium on the important new book Aligning Election Law by Nicholas Stephanopoulos, addresses the value of the alignment principle for evaluating alternative electoral systems. It discusses the challenge that social choice theory—in particular, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem—poses for the alignment principle as the guiding metric for judging electoral systems. It offers an alternative way to decide what electoral system a democracy should adopt, a way that accepts the path-dependency of electoral processes and is rooted in the idea that a constitution can choose an appropriately path-dependent electoral procedure based on constitutional values. The essay uses a distinctive version of the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” (where constitutional drafters imagine themselves choosing constitutional provisions on behalf of citizens whose specific identities they don’t know) to show how a constitution can specify a suitable path-dependent electoral procedure. The essay describes the details of one specific electoral system, Bracket Voting, that follows from this type of Rawlsian constitutional analysis. The essay also shows that Bracket Voting accords with the alignment principle for those circumstances in which Arrow’s Theorem and path-dependency are not practical problems for the polity under consideration.
I welcome comments as the essay is still in the editing process.