Vincent G. Moscardelli and Moshe Haspel have written this article for American Politics Research. Here is the abstract:

If the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 banned the use of soft money–the only source of funds in which Democrats approached parity with Republicans–why did the Republican congressional leadership revile the bill and the Democratic congressional leadership embrace it? We address this puzzle by modeling competing electoral, partisan, and policy motives that guided members’ decision making on the vote for final passage of this bill. Our solution lies in the fact that members believed that BCRA would reduce the role of the national parties in congressional elections. Although the parties may behave similarly under a fixed electoral regime, we find that the BCRA vote is consistent with two parties that prefer different sets of electoral rules. Specifically, Democrats appear more sympathetic to changes that enhance the role of candidates and outside groups, whereas Republicans appear to prefer stronger national parties.

Beginning on page 867 of my recent Wisconsin Law Review article, Bad Legislative Intent, I discuss my disagreement with Rick Pildes over whether Congress’s decision to pass BCRA showed a bad legislative purpose or not.