More on Separate Vote Requirement

Following up on this post, a few readers have e-mailed to ask whether (or argue against the idea that) the separate vote requirement would bar two legislative constitutional amendments, subject to separate votes by the people, but that each provides that neither amendment becomes effective unless they both become effective. (This apparently was how Propositions 57 and 58 were structured. There was no separate vote challenge then, and in any case the analysis might be different because 57 was not a constitutional amendment.)
There’s no law on this (in California, at least), but I think an argument can be made that such linking still violates the separate vote requirement (at least as I understand the requirement). If the separate vote requirement’s purpose (or one of its purposes) is to prevent the Legislature from adding sweeteners or packaging “good” amendments to get “bad” amendments passed, then a court could say that the linking strategy is an impermissible end run around the requirement. It is true that the “bad” measure would be more salient, because it is presented to voters separately. But it still can coerce voters to vote for bad to get good. For example, suppose I love redistricting reform but hate loosening term limits. Or I love loosening term limits but hate redistricting reform. There are likely to be lots of Republicans in category 1 and lots of Democrats in category 2. The ads for the two amendments will say vote yes on both, and someone who really supports one may feel coerced to vote for the other, the very evil the separate vote requirement was arguably included to prevent.

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