John M.P. De Figueiredo and Beth Garrett have posted Paying for Politics. Here is the abstract:

Even in the wake of the most sweeping campaign finance reform law to be enacted in three decades, further significant reform is inevitable. Special interest money continues to flow through loopholes in the Act, and the Presidential Election Campaign Fund is near collapse. The next reform should encourage broader participation in the political process by individual citizens, both to dilute the power of special interests and to serve independent democratic values that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has identified as vital to meaningful reform. We propose adopting a refundable tax credit of $100/taxpayer for political contributions to federal candidates and national parties; the credit would be targeted to lower- and middle-income Americans. A refundable tax credit is equivalent to giving each eligible citizen up to $100 annually to use for political contributions. We also present data about the relative importance of political contributions by special interests (corporate, labor and other PACs) and individuals that undermine many of the assumptions on which past reform has been based and that have not been discussed in the legal literature. The data clearly show that small contributions by individuals are the dominant source of money in campaigns, and that the influence of special interest money is subtle, appearing to purchase benefits like access, a place on the agenda, and minor policy details. Working from an accurate picture of who really pays for politics, and drawing from the experience at the federal and state levels with similar tax refund programs, we present the tax credit as a reform that is simple, easy to administer, and likely to improve political participation by average Americans. Thus, our proposal, unlike the complicated voucher plan with anonymity put forward by Ackerman and Ayres, is likely to be adopted by Congress; moreover, it will appeal to a bipartisan consensus because it mixes public funding with a decentralized allocation mechanism using a tax subsidy.

Gregory Klass has posted The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right of Compelled Subsidization. Here is the abstract:

On March 24, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Veneman v. Livestock Marketing Associations, Docket No. 03-1164, which presents the question of whether mandatory assessments on beef producers used to fund generic beef advertising violate the First Amendment rights of dissenting industry members. The Court undoubtedly decided to hear the case to resolve the sharply diverging reasoning in its two earlier decisions on industry-association advertising, Glickman v. Wileman Brothers and Elliot, 521 U.S. 457 (1997), and United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
This article discusses the compelled subsidization doctrine, which holds that there is a First Amendment right not to subsidize the speech of others. The Supreme Court has considered the First Amendment rights of dissenters in the context of mandatory union dues, bar association payments, state university student fees, and industry-association advertising. This article argues that the Court has failed in these cases to formulate a clear, universally applicable test for deciding when the right against compelled subsidization is violated, and that this failure results from the lack of a coherent account of what First Amendment interests are at stake in compelled subsidization. It also recommends an alternative account of wherein the right lies, which is the danger of covert state subsidization of one side or another in public debate on contentious political or ideological issues. From this account follows a new general test: The compelled subsidization of the speech of others violates the First Amendment just when the funds collected are used to promote the message of an identifiable viewpoint or interest in debate on a controversial political or ideological issue.
In addition to making specific recommendations on how Veneman should be decided, the article briefly describes the connections between the compelled subsidization doctrine and the Court’s recent rulings on campaign finance regulation, particularly McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 124 S.Ct. 619 (2003). Not only do both lines of cases raise the question of whether money is ever speech, but both also turn on the extent to which the First Amendment protects not only individual expressive rights, but the integrity of public political debate.