John Martin has posted this article, which is forthcoming in the NYU Law Review and was awarded the AALS Election Law Section’s Distinguished Scholarship Award:

Election administration in the United States is fragmented. Instead of having one uniform system, each state governs elections under distinct rules and hierarchies. Yet, one feature remains consistent among the fifty systems: Each is led by a “chief election official.” Though some states rely on boards, most vest this authority in a single person—what this Article calls a “unitary chief election official.” 

The unitary chief election official wields immense power. They enjoy unilateral authority to render decisions affecting voter registration, voting equipment, access to voting, ballot access, ballot measures, election counting and certification, and election official training, among other things. What is seemingly a procedural office can accordingly be used to impact substantive electoral outcomes. Because of this, subversive partisan actors have made increasing attempts over the years to co-opt the position, viewing it as a means to legally sway elections in their party’s favor. 

Despite their significance, unitary chief election officials remain relatively underdiscussed in the literature. Questions remain about the precise extent of their authority, as well as what mechanisms exist to ensure that abusive officials can be held to account. This Article therefore makes a first, detailed attempt to answer these questions. To begin, the Article provides a descriptive account of the breadth of powers that the average unitary chief election official enjoys. It draws upon the election codes of eleven states to do this. 

Next, the Article considers how to best construct an accountability regime that insulates the office from partisan manipulation. Through the lens of democracy theory, the Article concludes that we should deemphasize electoral accountability, as truly neutral chief election officials must answer to democratic principles rather than popular whims. Furthermore, we should treat ex-post forms of accountability, such as lawsuits, as secondary fail-safe options rather than as primary ones. On the other hand, we should channel more resources to ex-ante legal and internal modes of accountability. By reframing accountability for unitary chief election officials, this Article offers a path to shielding the office from undue partisan capture and, in turn, strengthening the democratic process.