Sam Wang and Zacharia Sippy have posted this draft on SSRN (forthcoming, Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy). here is the abstract:

In the last decade, redistricting commissions have proliferated across the United States as a means of reducing partisan gerrymandering. This article provides a comprehensive evaluation of their performance through both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Drawing on redistricting data from all fifty states between 2021 and 2024, we analyze how different commission designs impact partisan fairness, competitiveness, and adherence to traditional principles like compactness and preservation of communities of interest. Our analysis reveals that autonomous commissions with final map-drawing authority, balanced bipartisan processes with multiple non-partisan actors, and binding judicial review consistently produced redistricting plans with lower partisan bias and higher electoral competition. These successful commissions were typically established through popular ballot initiatives. Conversely, commissions serving only in an advisory role or lacking clear judicial oversight frequently saw their work undermined by legislatures pursuing partisan advantage. We conclude that autonomous commissions, created by and composed of citizens, provide the most effective available approach for curbing gerrymandering. The article concludes with recommendations for expanding the commission model for the 2030 redistricting cycle.