Betrall Ross has posted this draft on SSRN, which uses the VRA as its example. Here is the abstract:

This Article argues against an approach to statutory interpretation that I call “constitutional mainstreaming.” The Supreme Court engages in constitutional mainstreaming when it interprets ambiguous statutes in accordance with the values emphasized in its constitutional jurisprudence. And in doing so, it rejects an interpretation that accords with values reflected in post-enactment statutes and agency interpretations. This interpretive approach, which is implicitly endorsed by dynamic statutory interpretation theory, undermines this theory’s own conception of legislative supremacy and its central premise that the Court should interpret statutes in a manner responsive to evolving democratic preferences. To better fulfill the mandate of legislative supremacy, the Court should resist the gravitational pull of the constitutional mainstream and look instead to the values reflected in the decisions of the institution best situated to be responsive to evolving democratic preferences, post-enactment legislatures and their delegates, the agencies. Addressing the four primary contexts in which the Court must interpret ambiguous statutes, I outline how the Court should proceed in each situation and address major objections to this approach. I conclude with a case study, which examines the Supreme Court’s constitutional mainstreaming of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in Beer vs. United States and shows how the Court should have relied instead on values reflected in the re-authorization of the Act and agency interpretations of the Act.