I’ve posted this paper on SSRN. Originally presented as part of a symposium on “The Constitution and Democratic Erosion,” it will be published by the Drake Law Review.

Here’s the abstract:

The Madisonian premises of the Constitution need modernization.  This modernization, ironically, requires drawing upon the insights of Madison’s fellow Enlightenment Era political theorist, the Marquis de Condorcet. A Condorcet-based electoral system would enable the election of the candidate who is most preferred by a majority of voters, while simultaneously reducing the risk of electing authoritarian candidates who are preferred by only a minority of voters and, if given the opportunity to take power, would work to subvert the democratic choice of voters in future elections.  

Not all Condorcet-based electoral systems are equally vulnerable to strategic manipulation.  Given the possibility that authoritarian candidates would seek victory through an organized campaign of strategic voting, while pro-democracy candidates and voters would endeavor to defeat these authoritarian candidates by sincerely voting their preference to protect democracy, it should be recognized that some Condorcet-based electoral systems are more capable than others of foiling this kind of anti-democratic strategic voting and thereby allowing the sincere pro-democracy preferences to prevail.  While the topic of “asymmetrical strategic voting” (where some candidates and voters vote strategically, while others vote sincerely) requires more development, the analysis here provides a foundation and framework for further investigation of this topic in the particular context of how best to safeguard Madisonian republicanism from present and future threats. 

I very much welcome comments, because this paper both will continue to undergo editing and is one part of a larger project that will provide additional opportunities for exploration of what electoral system, or systems, would best serve the goals of constitutional democracy.