Category Archives: Supreme Court

My New One at MSNBC Opinion: “Trump started a redistricting war. Only Congress can stop it.”

I have written this piece for MSNBC Opinion. It begins:

A sudden war over redistricting has broken out in Texas and looks to spread across the country, with California, New York and elsewhere considering tit-for-tat Democratic partisan gerrymanders to negate the Republican hardball in Texas. Congress, rather than the courts, is in the best position to stop the upcoming race to the bottom. But even though it’s in everyone’s interest that Congress act, don’t hold your breath….

It is possible the courts will block some of these gerrymanders if it can be shown, for example, that they violate the Voting Rights Act. But the Supreme Court just signaled that it may further weaken or kill Voting Rights Act claims in redistricting cases. With that red flag, and with the court’s decision to allow unlimited partisan gerrymandering, the courts are not likely to get the country out of this vicious cycle.

Congress can stop the madness at any point. The Constitution gives Congress the power in Article I to “make” or “alter” state rules for running congressional elections, including redistricting. Congress could outlaw mid-decade redistricting, require the use of commissions, or set a standard barring the most egregious partisan gerrymanders.

In the current polarized atmosphere in Congress, and with Trump (who would have to sign such legislation) looking to impose “maximum warfare, everywhere, all the time” to preserve Republican power, a bipartisan deal to avoid a redistricting war seems most unlikely. But as the Cold War taught us, détente is better than mutually assured destruction for all the parties. Those who suffer the most are the voters, who should not be packed in or cracked out of districts simply because their party is in the minority.

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My New One at Slate on the Supreme Court Potentially Killing the Remaining Pillar of the Voting Rights Act: “The Supreme Court Just Signaled Something Deeply Disturbing About the Next Term”

I have written this piece for Slate. It begins:

Reading the tea leaves from cryptic Supreme Court orders can be perilous business because the justices are not bound by the questions they ask at oral argument, the offhand comments they make at a judicial conference, or even their monumental “shadow docket” rulings on emergency petitions that have become all too common. But a technical briefing order in a long pending case out of Louisiana, posted on the Supreme Court’s website after 5 p.m. on a Friday in August, was ominous. The order was likely intended to obscure that the court is ready to consider striking down the last remaining pillar of the Voting Rights Act, known as Section 2. Such a monumental ruling, likely not coming until June 2026, would change the nature of congressional, state, and local elections, all across the country, and likely stir major civil rights protests as the midterm election season heats up….

We waited weeks for the court to issue its rescheduling order and when it came this past Friday it was a doozy. The court pointed specifically to a set of pages in plaintiffs’ brief which argue that Section 2 is unconstitutional, at least as applied in this case, and that the Voting Rights Act cannot serve as a compelling interest to defeat a racial gerrymandering claim when race predominates. “The parties are directed to file supplemental briefs addressing the following question raised [in that brief]: Whether the State’s intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution.”

Although the court’s order did not explicitly mention Section 2 or even the Voting Rights Act more generally—unquestionably to obscure things further—there is no doubting what’s going on here. The court is asking the parties to consider whether Louisiana’s compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by drawing a second majority-minority district—as the earlier Ardoin case seemed to require—was unconstitutional under a view of the Constitution as requiring colorblindness.

If the Supreme Court moves forward with this interpretation it would be a sea change to voting rights law. A reading of the Constitution as forbidding race-conscious districting as mandated by Congress to deal with centuries of race discrimination in voting is at odds with the text of the Constitution, with the powers granted directly to Congress to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and with numerous precedents of the Supreme Court itself. It would end what has been the most successful way that Black and other minority voters have gotten fair representation in Congress, state legislatures and in local bodies. It would be an earthquake in politics and make our legislative bodies whiter and our protection for minority voters greatly diminished. Even if the court less drastically says that Section 2 could not be used to require the second congressional district in this case, such a superficially more minimal ruling would mean the quick unraveling of most Section 2 districts because if the facts in Louisiana don’t justify drawing a second district, most other Section 2 claims would fail too….

Court conservatives likely thought teeing up the issue of overruling Section 2 on a hot summer weekend would avoid public notice. But that’s a short term strategy. Come next June, any decision to strike down what’s left of the Voting Rights Act could kick off the start of a new civil rights movement and more serious talk of Supreme Court reform in the midst of crucially important midterm elections. A court fundamentally hostile to the rights of voters places the court increasingly at odds with democracy itself.

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Breaking: Supreme Court, in Order Asking for Additional Briefing in Louisiana Voting Case, Appears to Put the Constitutionality of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act into Question

The Supreme Court just issued this order:

Louisiana had to create that second majority-minority district in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act, as it had been found to face Section 2 VRA liability for not creating that district. What the Court seems to be asking, without directly saying it, is whether Section 2 of the VRA, at least as to how it has been applied to require the creation of majority-minority districts in some circumstances, violates a colorblind understanding of the Constitution.

The stakes here are enormous; I was worried the Court would put the VRA’s constitutionality into question when there was this great delay in the Court ordering supplemental briefing. Something big was happening behind the scenes. And now we know.

This Court is more conservative than the Court that in 2013 struck down the other main pillar of the Voting Rights Act in the Shelby County case. This is a big, and dangerous, step toward knocking down the second pillar.

There was a LOOOOONG delay in SCOTUS issuing the supplemental briefing order, burying it after 5 pm on a Friday in August rather than at the end of the Supreme Court term when everyone was paying attention.

UPDATE: Page 36-38 of appellees’s brief, referenced in the order above, make it clear that Section 2’s constitutionality is being put into question:

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“Montana Initiative to File Bold Blueprint to Challenge Citizens United; New Amendment Would Use Corporate Law to Ban Political Spending”

Press release via email:

 The Transparent Election Initiative, a Montana organization, today released the public draft of a historic constitutional amendment that takes direct aim at Citizens United—and the corporate and dark money it unleashed into Montana’s politics. The amendment will be officially filed with the Montana Secretary of State’s office on Friday, August 1. 

The 1,000-word amendment takes an innovative new approach by using Montana’s corporate chartering authority to no longer grant its corporations and similar entities the power to use money to influence candidate campaigns or ballot measures. By redefining the powers granted to corporations under Montana law, the measure aims to undo the practical effects of Citizens United within the state. 

“This is the first step in a process to place this amendment on the November 3, 2026 general election ballot,” said Jeff Mangan, former Commissioner of Political Practices and leader of the initiative effort. “Montana has a history of ensuring that citizens lead its elections, not corporations. With The Montana Plan, we continue that tradition.” 

The amendment’s legal structure, reviewed extensively by legal scholars and government leaders and crafted to withstand judicial scrutiny, uses a “reset and re-grant” framework that reaffirms only those powers necessary for legitimate business or charitable activity—explicitly excluding political spending. 

Rather than regulating political conduct, The Montana Plan redefines corporate powers at their source. Mangan explained that corporations only have the powers the state gives them—and Montana is choosing not to give them the power to spend in politics. This principle applies equally to out-of-state corporations, which under Montana law may only exercise powers that in-state corporations may exercise. As a result, Montana’s politics would be free of all corporate electioneering—whether by in-state or out-of-state entities. 

The measure would also eliminate “dark money” in Montana’s politics by no longer granting political-spending power to 501(c)(4) nonprofit corporations. Political committees organized exclusively for electioneering would still be allowed, but only if they claim no special privileges other than limited liability. …

You can find the text of the proposed initiative here.

Count me as highly skeptical that this approach around Citizens United would be accepted at the current Supreme Court.

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Breaking: 8th Circuit, Following Earlier Decision Holding Private Plaintiffs Cannot Sue to Enforce Section 2 of Voting Rights Act, Now Says No Right to Sue under Voter Assistance Provisions Either [Corrected]

Via Hansi Lo Wang comes this order finding no private right of action under section 208 of the VRA. The fate of this case will likely follow the fate of what the Supreme Court will do with the Section 2 case likely to be before the Supreme Court later this year.

An earlier headline of this post referred to language provisions, which are in section 203, not 208.

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Waiting for Callais

Earlier today, Rick Pildes flagged the Court’s inexplicable month-long delay in issuing a re-argument order in Louisiana v. Callais, last Term’s—and now next Term’s—major Shaw case. I agree with Pildes’s concerns and want to add a few points.

First, to further speculate, it is possible the Court wants to pair Callais with a Section 2 case. Indeed, the Alabama redistricting case—known to blog readers as Allen v. Milligan—is heading back to the Court soon. Recall that in May the three-judge district court found that Alabama’s 2023 redistricting plan was enacted with discriminatory intent. Coincidentally(?), Alabama filed its notice of appeal from that injunction on June 6, 2025. That notice of appeal is available on the district court docket, but I have been unable to locate a jurisdictional statement on the Supreme Court’s electronic docket. There’s also a bail-in hearing in Milligan scheduled for this Tuesday—about which I will have a preview post on Monday. This would further raise the stakes in Milligan. And if we add the Eighth Circuit implied cause of action/Section 1983 case to the docket, the October 2025 Term could be a monumental one for voting rights.

Second, assuming that the Court will order supplemental briefing, this case could be delayed well into the fall. Of course, supplemental briefs might be on a shorter timetable than normal merits briefs. But it seems counter-productive to push a case that proved impossible for the Court to decide in one Term even deeper into the next.

Third, I want to highlight something odd about Justice Thomas’s dissent from the Court postponing the case to next Term. Characteristically, he calls for a complete re-assessment of the Court’s voting rights jurisprudence and lambasts Section 2 of the VRA. What is striking is the complete absence of his change-of-face in his Alexander concurrence from 2024. Indeed, he doesn’t even cite it. If, as Thomas claimed in Alexander, racial gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable political questions, then Callais seem like an odd vehicle to invalidate Section 2 of the VRA. Moreover, Thomas’s questions at the Callais oral argument memory-holed the Alexander concurrence. I’ve previously written about how Thomas failed to reconcile his new position on Shaw claims with the VRA’s constitutionality, and his Callais dissent only raises more questions.

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Toobin: “The Line Trump Crossed by Accusing Obama of Treason”

Jeffrey Toobin in NYT on President Trump’s assertion that former President Obama engaged in “treason” in connection with the investigation into Russian efforts to influence the 2016 election:

President Trump’s history of intemperate remarks has earned him a perverse kind of immunity; the more outrageous his statement, the faster it is often dismissed. But Mr. Trump doesn’t deserve this bloviator’s privilege. He’s not just the president, but, more to the point, he’s the overseer of an unusually compliant Justice Department, and his offhand condemnation of his predecessor is as significant as it is chilling. . . .

The absurdity of this investigation is underlined, too, by the fact that Mr. Obama is almost certainly immune from prosecution — thanks to Mr. Trump and the Supreme Court. In its decision last year in Trump v. United States, the court held that there was a presumption that former presidents could not be prosecuted for any “official” conduct during their time in office. The preparation and dissemination of intelligence findings are certainly official functions of the presidency, and accordingly, they would be off limits as the bases for any criminal charges.

But pointing this out seems almost unfair to Mr. Obama; it suggests that he would escape prosecution only because of the lamentable technicality established by the Supreme Court in the Trump case. The more important reason is simpler: Mr. Obama committed no crime.

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“Justice Kagan Urges Supreme Court to Explain Itself in Emergency Decisions”

NYT:

Justice Elena Kagan said Thursday that the Supreme Court was shortchanging the public and lower court judges by failing to explain its reasoning in rulings on cases that come before the court on an emergency basis, including challenges to the Trump administration’s efforts to transform the federal government.

“I think as we have done more and more on this emergency docket, there becomes a real responsibility that I think we didn’t recognize when we first started down this road, to explain things better,” Justice Kagan said. “I think that we should hold ourselves, sort of on both sides, to a standard of explaining why we’re doing what we’re doing.” . . .

Her comments came during an appearance in Monterey at an annual meeting of federal judges and lawyers from the Ninth Circuit. . . .

“I think we should be cautious about acting on the emergency docket,” Justice Kagan said. “Sometimes we have to, but I think we should be cautious.”

Decisions on that docket, known by critics as the shadow docket, are typically not fully briefed and argued before the court. Often, emergency docket decisions do not provide any description of the court’s reasoning, leaving lower court judges to decipher the meaning.

Politico has more on Justice Kagan’s remarks, including her thoughts on judicial independence and defiance of federal court orders.

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Crum: “The Curiously Minor Role of Minor v. Happersett”

Along with my co-authors (Professor Susan Appleton and Hannah Keidan (WashU Law ’25)), I have posted this draft on SSRN. It is part of a symposium that will be published later this summer in the Washington University Law Review. It is a short Foreword, but it should be of interest to anyone who wants to learn more about legal history, election law, women’s rights, law school pedagogy, or the history of St. Louis–where Minor v. Happersett was initially filed. The abstract is below:

This Foreword introduces a symposium marking the 150th anniversary of Minor v. Happersett, a Supreme Court decision unanimously holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause did not enfranchise women. Notwithstanding its impact on the women’s suffrage movement and the subsequent ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, Minor presents a puzzle: it is a relatively obscure precedent that remains deeply relevant to contemporary legal debates. To elucidate this point, this Foreword juxtaposes Minor with two notorious Supreme Court decisions: Dred Scott and Dobbs.

Like Dred Scott, Minor pairs a morally repugnant result with legalistic reasoning. But whereas Dred Scott is the quintessential anti-canon case, Minor is a footnote in legal education. On the flip side, Dred Scott was overturned by the Fourteenth Amendment, but Minor remains good law. The Nineteenth Amendment merely adopted an anti-discrimination workaround to Minor’s holding that suffrage is not a privilege or immunity of citizenship.

More recently, the Court’s decision in Dobbs demonstrates Minor’s continuing resonance. Indeed, Dobbs and its aftermath demonstrate that the issues contested in Minor in 1875 remain hotly debated today: the rights of citizenship, the role of women in society, and the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

Finally, this Foreword briefly summarizes the interdisciplinary papers presented at the conference, covering diverse topics such as election law, feminist studies, legal history, and substantive due process.

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