Andrew Tutt has posted this draft on SSRN (forthcoming, Columbia Law Review Sidebar).  Here is the abstract:

People often do not vote, and those who do sometimes unwittingly vote against their interests. That is because voters have little incentive to cast intelligent votes in any given election, even though they clearly have a stake in the intelligent outcome of every election. A simple solution would be to permit voters to delegate their votes—that is, let someone else vote on their behalf in some fashion. Possible delegated voting solutions range from simply voting a “default” straight ticket on one extreme to creating a system in which fiduciaries must vote in a voter’s best interests on the other. This Essay discusses the upsides of delegated voting and the potential practical and constitutional hurdles to its realization. Ultimately, this Essay argues that permitting individuals to delegate their votes might significantly advance many of the core values at the heart of election law without the downsides associated with mandatory voting and campaign finance regulation.