On February 4, a unanimous per curiam panel of the Fourth Circuit concluded the federal courts should abstain from involvement in the Griffin v. Riggs election dispute. The court cited Pullman abstention:

Pullman abstention may be applied when “there is (1) an unclear issue of state law presented for decision (2) the resolution of which may moot or present in a different posture the federal constitutional issue such that the state law issue is potentially dispositive.” Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93, 101 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quoting Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Md. State Bd. for Higher Educ., 710 F.2d 170, 174 (4th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, federal courts have discretion to refrain from resolving a case pending in federal court that involves state law claims and potential federal constitutional issues if the resolution of those unsettled questions of state law could obviate the need to address the federal issues. However, under Pullman abstention, the federal court retains jurisdiction of the federal constitutional claims while the state court issues are addressed in state court. . . .

Applying the requirements of Pullman abstention, the state law issues involved in the case removed from the Superior Court of Wake County are unsettled. The parties advance diametrically opposed interpretations of the North Carolina statutes that are the subject of Griffin’s challenges. And neither provide authority from North Carolina appellate courts making the resolution of that conflict about those state law issues abundantly clear. What’s more, the resolution of those issues of North Carolina law could avoid the need to address the federal constitutional and other federal issues the Board raised in removing the case. For example, if the Board prevails in Wake County on the state law issues, the resolution of the federal claims may not be necessary. Thus, this case satisfies the elements of Pullman abstention. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to abstain from exercising federal jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman (1941) explains the reasons why a court might abstain:

But no matter how seasoned the judgment of the district court may be, it cannot escape being a forecast rather than a determination. The last word on the meaning of Article 6445 of the Texas Civil Statutes, and therefore the last word on the statutory authority of the Railroad Commission in this case, belongs neither to us nor to the district court but to the supreme court of Texas. In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication. The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court. The resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication.

In this case, however, the “friction” worried about in Pullman cuts the other way.

Legitimate federal claims were raised in a federal forum. The federal court held the case. The federal court hoped the state court would avoid needless friction. But instead, the state court created the friction by issuing a decision that was ultimately inconsistent with the federal court’s holding with respect to federal law. And the federal court was placed in the unenviable position of ordering a state official to certify a state election, after a state supreme court had reached a contrary conclusion.

It’s a reason the 11th Circuit in Siegel v. LePore (2000) found Pullman abstention inappropriate in the parallel litigation to Bush v. Gore:

Plaintiffs claim that Florida’s manual recount provision is unconstitutional because the statute does not provide sufficient standards to guide the discretion of county canvassing boards in granting a request for a manual recount or in conducting such a recount. There has been no suggestion by Defendants that the statute is appropriately subject to a more limited construction than the statute itself indicates.

Our conclusion that abstention is inappropriate is strengthened by the fact that Plaintiffs allege a constitutional violation of their voting rights. In considering abstention, we must take into account the nature of the controversy and the importance of the right allegedly impaired. . . . Our cases have held that voting rights cases are particularly inappropriate for abstention.

Hindsight is 20/20, of course, but it’s worth reflecting how the aspirations of abstention do not always pan out in the federal courts.