Nate Ela (Temple Beasley School of Law) has posted a new article in relation to the state constitutional challenges to anti-fusion laws that are currently underway. Building on the work of Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Miriam Seifter, Ela argues that many state constitutions distinctly favor popular sovereignty and small-d democracy in ways that counsel for applying strict scrutiny, rather than the interest-balancing approach used in the federal courts when assessing the constitutionality of bans on fusion candidacies. Ela also seeks to remind state courts that they are not constrained by the federalism concerns that drive the U.S. Supreme Court’s reluctance to strike down state election laws.

Ela’s is a very timely intervention not only because the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of NJ will hear oral arguments in the first of these challenges on December 10, but also because, as our two-party system has become polarized and vulnerable to authoritarianism, it is critical to consider structural reforms with the capacity to address the dissatisfaction that drives many voters, including those that reject both parties. Arizona and Nevada, for example, have roughly as many independents as registered Democrats and Republicans. Fusion offers an eminently feasible reform for bringing such voters into the democratic fold in a productive way. Let’s hope that state court judges recognize that they do not need to follow Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party (1997), which has been almost uniformly criticized by legal academics and which completely misunderstood the burdens fusion places on parties as organizations and associations.

From the abstract:

“By barring candidates from accepting the nomination of more than one party, anti-fusion laws violate a range of state constitutional provisions: the grounding of government in popular sovereignty; the right to vote; the right to free, equal, and open elections; the right to assemble, consult for the common good, and instruct elected representatives; and the freedom of political association. Rather than adopting the deferential approach of Timmons, state courts should rigorously and realistically review the true burdens of anti-fusion laws, and the actual, partisan interests they serve.”

Part II of the Article is particularly interesting. Among other things, Ela argues that the correct baseline for assessing the burdens of anti-fusion laws is the system that existed before fusion was banned–a system in which minor parties could name their standard bearers, present themselves to voters on that basis, and use their vote share to demonstrate support and exert influence over policymaking. The question, he argues, should be: How have anti-fusion laws undermined third parties in such efforts?