Casey Schmidt has written this student note for the Virginia Law Review. Here is the abstract:

The Purcell Principle—the doctrine that courts should refrain from changing election rules during the period of time close to an election—has long been misconstrued. Where the Principle operates, it creates a near-categorical bar to federal judicial relief in the upcoming election cycle; the provisions of federal law that would normally safeguard voting rights, govern redistricting, and supervise how a state can conduct its elections are paralyzed until after election day. Born and raised on the shadow docket, the Principle has been underdeveloped by the Supreme Court. The Court has provided little guidance as to what triggers the Principle or how it will be applied in future cases. And, in recent years, the doctrine has become increasingly powerful in shaping election law. With the 2024 elections quickly approaching, this Note seeks to shed light on Purcell.

The goals of this Note are twofold. First, I suggest that courts and scholars have been thinking about Purcell incorrectly. I argue that Purcell cannot be justified on the grounds of preventing voter confusion—as the case law and scholarship have suggested—but instead is better explained by federalism. Under this conception, the Court’s historic applications of the doctrine make more sense. Second, I provide a new framework for understanding what triggers Purcell. In deciding whether the Purcell Principle should be applied, courts would reach more consistent, analytically sound results by asking whether judicial intervention would disrupt a state’s administration of its elections. I provide four conditions for courts to consider in determining whether injunctive relief is disruptive. But these conditions can also provide insight to future litigants making decisions about where, when, and how to bring their election claims to avoid running into Purcell’s snare.