I’ve been following Snyder v. United States closely, not only because I am interested in bribery and illegal gratuities law but also because I based my Legislation course final exam on the case.

To me, it presents a fascinating and close question, and I’m not sure how I would have voted had I been asked what to do. Both the text and legislative history arguments can point in either direction. It is notable, however, that the conservative majority that usually rejects legislative history as unreliable relies on legislative history here to describe the purpose of an amendment to the statute. Majority opn. at 4-5 (“In 1986, Congress amended §666 and thereby avoided the law’s “possible application to acceptable commercial and business practices.” H. R. Rep. No 99–797, p. 30 (1986); see 100 Stat. 3612–3613.”). See also dissent at The House Report the majority quotes as explicating §666 confirms that §666 was meant to track §215—not §201(b), as the majority claims. See H. R. Rep. No. 99–797, at 30, n. 9.”).

How did THIS get by the textualists on the Court (including J. Kavanaugh, who wrote the decision)?

On the merits, this case is likely to increase state and local graft on the margins. Those who engage in outright bribery and take federal funds can still be prosecuted for bribery under section 666. But those who take illegal gratuities and avoid the magic words of a quid pro quo are more likely to be off the hook. Putting this case together with other recent ones, like McDonnell, it’s becoming harder and harder for federal prosecutors to pursue graft at the state and local level.