A federal district court judge in Washington, DC just issued a decision in New York v. Biden (originally filed as New York v. Trump). Here are excerpts of New York’s claim under the Elections Clause, filed back in October 2020 (with some omissions):

Finally, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the Postal Policy Changes violate the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution because they impair—and were intended to impair—Plaintiffs’ administration of the elections process in their states. As one court recently explained, “[a]lthough the Constitution allows Congress to override a State’s authority regarding its elections, it does not extend the same authority to the Postal Service—an agency of the federal executive branch.” . . .

. . . Congress’s role in legislating for congressional elections is a narrow one as a practical matter. The Elections Clause provides that Congress may “make” its own regulations or “alter” those established by the states. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. In other words, “[t]he Clause is a default provision” that “invests the States with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections.” Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997). Congress may, pursuant to its power, “pre-empt state legislative choices” with regard to congressional elections. Id. Thus, for example, where Congress has mandated that states “accept and use” a particular voter registration form or provide a voter registration opportunity in connection with a DMV transaction, the congressional command controls. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 12-14 (2013). But, in our system, except to the extent preempted by the Congress, the states play the central role in administering congressional elections. . . .

Given the centrality of state election administration in this constitutional structure, a court cannot lightly infer that Congress empowered the Postal Service to take any action for the purpose, and with the effect, of interfering with the core state power of election administration. . . .

In light of these basic constitutional and statutory principles, it violates the Elections Clause . . . for the Postal Service to take actions that are intended to, and do, have the effect of hampering state election administration.

An agency has “no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers powers upon it.” Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986). Congress conferred no power to interfere with elections to the Postal Service. Nothing in the governing statutes provide any textual support, let alone a clear statement, that Congress intended to confer on the Postal Service the power to take actions that interfere with elections. All of the policy goals of the PRA, and many of the express provisions of the PRA, show that Congress wanted a system that effectively and efficiently delivered the mail on time—including election mail. Indeed, Congress designed the Postal Service as it did to insulate it—to the greatest extent possible—from political influence. . . .

Moreover, when Congress acts pursuant to the Elections Clause to regulate congressional elections, it says so expressly—including in provisions regarding use of the mail to effectuate voter registration. See, e.g., Arizona, 570 U.S. at 5-6 (describing provision requiring states to “establish procedures for registering to vote in federal elections ‘by mail application,’” and to “‘accept and use’ a standard federal registration form”); see also 52 U.S.C. § 20503 (referred to as “motor voter” provision). That reality makes it all the more implausible that Congress intended the PRA or other organic statutes of the Postal Service to grant power to intentionally interfere with election administration. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Civ. Aeronautics Bd., 257 F.2d 229, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (noting, in light of grants of power in other statutes, that “when Congress wishes to confer such authority, it says so”).

Yet the Postal Policy Changes are hampering state election administration, just as evidence indicates they were intended to do. . . .

Simply put, the Elections Clause requires congressional action for the federal government to intentionally interfere with state administration of federal elections. There is no indication—clear, express, or implied—from the governing statutes that Congress conferred such power on the Postal Service. Because the Postal Service has nevertheless taken such actions, those actions violate the Elections Clause and associated reservations of power to the states.

New York’s claims here look something like a hybrid between a non-delegation doctrine claim, and a Legislature Thereof Clause claim akin to Moore v. Harper (but on the congressional side). Here’s how the district court explained its rejection of this claim:

Next, Plaintiffs contend that “the Postal Policy Changes violate the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution because they impair—and were intended to impair—Plaintiffs’ administration of the elections process in their states.” Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 60 at 44.5

The Elections Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 4, cl. 1, provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 4, cl. 1. “In practice, the Clause functions as ‘a default provision; it invests the States with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections, but only so far as Congress declines to pre-empt state legislative choices.’” Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 9 (2013) (quoting Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997)); see also Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001) (“[T]he Elections Clause grants to the States ‘broad power’ to prescribe the procedural mechanisms for holding congressional elections.”(quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986))); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832 (1995) (“The Framers intended the Elections Clause to grant States authority to create procedural regulations . . . .”).

The Postal Service, in implementing the Postal Policy Changes, has not violated the Elections Clause. As the Supreme Court has explained, the “function contemplated by [the Elections Clause] is that of making laws.” Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932). Though the implementation of the Postal Policy Changes contributed to the delay in mail deliveries nationwide, see generally Grimmer Suppl. Decl., ECF No. 59-23, which in turn risked a delay in the delivery of mail-in ballots during an election season, USPS’s actions do not amount to voting regulations that override the States’ existing regulations, nor do they alter the States’ existing regulations, see Foster, 522 U.S. at 69 (calling it “well settled” that Congress has the authority to “override state regulations by establishing uniform rules for federal elections” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)). It is undisputed that Plaintiffs’ regulations remain intact.

Neither do Plaintiffs cite to any case law supporting their position that the Elections Clause grants protection to State legislatures from federal policies that do not “make or alter” voting regulations. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366, 368 (explaining that the Elections Clause “involves lawmaking in its essential features” and that “limitation[s]” to State legislatures are not “incongruous with the grant of legislative authority to regulate congressional elections”). The Court therefore declines to read the Elections Clause more expansively than either its language or precedent dictates. See Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 570 U.S. at 8 (stating that the Elections Clause has only “two functions”: granting the States the duty to “prescribe the time, place, and manner” of elections, and granting Congress the “power to alter those regulations or supplant them altogether”).