The Court had the case on its conference docket for today, but it is possible these supplemental briefs will further delay disposition of the case.
|Jun 19 2018||Second supplemental brief of appellees Common Cause, et al. filed. (Distributed)|
|Jun 20 2018||Supplemental brief of appellees League of Women Voters of North Carolina, et al. filed. (Distributed)|
|Jun 20 2018||Supplemental brief of appellants Robert A. Rucho, et al. filed. (Distributed)|
I discussed in my recent Slate piece about Gill how the North Carolina case could be the next vehicle to consider these issues, though it might face a remand to reconsider standing questions in light of Gill.
Paul Clement, defending the state general assembly, has been arguing that there’s a standing problem (and therefore remand in light of Gill is appropriate). But here’s his “To be sure” paragraph that makes his argument tough:
To be sure, the district court concluded in the alternative that “Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the 2016 Plan as a whole … [e]ven absent statewide standing, because Plaintiffs reside in each of the state’s thirteen districts and have all suffered injuries-in-fact.” JS.App.45; see also JS.App.40-41 n.9. But just like the plaintiffs in Gill, the plaintiffs here did not “meaningfully pursue their allegations of individual harm”; instead, they “rested their case … on their theory of statewide injury.” Gill, slip op. 18. Indeed, the League plaintiffs have never suggested that they had an individualized theory; they have just adamantly defended their statewide theory, insisting that “it would be incongruous to force challenges to the Plan to proceed district-by-district.” LWV.Mot.27; see also CC.Mot.15 (“the League of Women Voters plaintiffs proceeded only on a statewide theory’’ (alteration omitted)).
Bottom line: The Court can kick the case back or take it as it wishes, meaning a lot rides on Justice Kennedy for a change.