A few final notes about the gerrymandering articles I flagged over the last few days: First, the Election Law Journal (where three of the pieces are forthcoming) has generously agreed to make them available free of charge. The McGhee article is here; the Chen article here; and the Caughey et al. article here.
Second, all of the authors worked on amicus briefs in Whitford that built on the pieces I cited. McGhee’s brief is here; a brief representing Chen and other political geographers is here; and a brief discussing the findings of Caughey et al. is here.
And third, in a recent paper of mine, I confirmed the findings of Caughey et al. at the congressional level. I determined, that is, that a pro-Democratic (pro-Republican) efficiency gap leads to a congressional delegation with a significantly more liberal (conservative) ideological midpoint, even holding constant voters’ preferences. The key chart is below; it shows large differences in representation, for states with similar electoral environments, based on whether their congressional plans exhibit pro-Democratic, pro-Republican, or more neutral skews.