Michael Gilbert has posted this draft on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Independence empowers judges to interpret law without interference, but it also allows them to ignore law and to pursue private agendas. Recognizing this, scholars have called for a balance between independence and accountability. This paper develops a framework for identifying the optimal balance. The framework shows that under reasonable assumptions, the question of independence involves a tradeoff. Independent judges will tend to make more legalistic, and fewer non-legalistic, decisions than a dependent judge, but each non-legalistic decision will impose a high cost on society because independent judges are less congruent with the preferences of the median citizen. Dependent judges will tend to make fewer legalistic, and more non-legalistic, decisions, but each non-legalistic decision will impose a low cost because dependent judges are more congruent with the median citizen. The framework also provides insight into relationships between judicial independence and minority rights, the determinacy of law, and the value of legalism.

I always learn from Gilbert’s work!