

**Modern American Remedies:
Cases and Materials
Concise Fifth Edition**

2023 Teachers' Update

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PREFACE

This Update includes decisions through the end of the Supreme Court's term on June 30, 2023. As in the main volume, quotations appearing in this Update remove internal quotation marks and citations without notice for ease of reading. Always check the original source before quoting material reprinted here. Unless otherwise noted, citations to statutes are as they existed in spring 2023.

Students, just as no one expects you to memorize all the information in the main volume, no one expects you to memorize all the recent decisions. But reviewing recent developments helps give you a sense of the field and its trajectory. The continuing flow of remedies litigation, especially in the Supreme Court of the United States, illustrates the continuing importance of these issues and the remarkable variety and novelty with which they appear.

We are grateful to Gennifer Birkenfeld-Malpass, Timothy Duong, Patrick Randall, David Plick, and Sammy Zeino for excellent research assistance.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

THE ROLE OF REMEDIES

Page 1. After the first paragraph, add:

The Supreme Court recently commented that “[a] ‘remedy’ denotes ‘the means of enforcing a right,’ and may come in the form of, say, money damages, an injunction, or a declaratory judgment. Black’s Law Dictionary 1320 (8th ed. 2004); see also 13 Oxford English Dictionary 584-585 (2d ed. 1991) (defining ‘remedy’ as ‘[l]egal redress’).” *Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schools*, 598 U.S. 142, 147, 143 S. Ct. 859, 863 (2023). The Court also said that “remedies” is generally, and in the case before it, synonymous with “relief.” The issue in the case was whether a statutory exhaustion requirement applied to a lawsuit seeking a remedy — compensatory damages — that was not available under the statute that required exhaustion. The Court said no, based in part on the text of the statute at issue.

CHAPTER TWO

PAYING FOR HARM: COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

A. The Basic Principle: Restoring Plaintiff to His Rightful Position

Page 13. At the end of note 2, add:

2. The rightful position. . . .

The Supreme Court endorsed the rightful position standard in *Babb v. Wilkie*, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1178 (2020): “‘Remedies generally seek to place the victim of a legal wrong . . . in the position that person would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred.’ R. Weaver, E. Shoben, & M. Kelly, *Principles of Remedies Law* 5 (3d ed. 2017).” The context was a holding that a discrimination plaintiff could not get reinstatement or damages for loss of employment unless the discrimination was the but-for cause of plaintiff losing the job.

The Restatement Third, Torts: Remedies §2 (Am. L. Inst. Tentative Draft No. 1, 2022), sets forth the rightful position standard in the context of tort claims: “A plaintiff who establishes a defendant’s liability in tort generally is entitled to a remedy or remedies that will place that plaintiff, as nearly as possible, in the position the plaintiff would have occupied if the tort had not been committed. This basic principle is implemented by more specific rules, some of which limit or extend its reach.” The casebook editors are the Reporters for this new Restatement.

B. Value as the Measure of the Rightful Position

Page 18. At the end of note 1, add:

1. The appeal. . . .

The plaintiffs eventually settled with their property insurers for \$4.1 billion and with the aviation defendants for \$95 million. The insurers also sued the aviation defendants, asserting that they were subrogated to the plaintiff’s claims against them; the insurers eventually settled with the aviation defendants for \$1.2 billion. These developments are reviewed in *In re September 11 Litigation*, 328 F. Supp. 3d 178, 181-183 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), which rejected plaintiffs’ claims to a share of what the insurers recovered from the aviation defendants. For subrogation in this context, see Notes on the Collateral-Source Rule, in the main volume at 78-81.

D. Consequential Damages

Page 45. At the end of note 5, add:

5. More analytic definitions. . . .

At its 2022 Annual Meeting, the American Law Institute approved a Tentative Draft that provides in the black letter:

(a) Distinctions between immediate and consequential damages, between direct and consequential damages, and between general and special damages are ill-defined and do not affect the availability or measurement of damages in tort.

(b) Subject to the rules of [the rest of this Restatement], a plaintiff who establishes a defendant’s liability in tort is entitled to compensation both for any harm suffered from the

immediate effects of the tortious conduct and for any harm suffered later as a further consequence of that conduct or its immediate effects.

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Remedies §4 (Am. L. Inst. Tentative Draft No. 1, 2022). The Comments to this section review the many inconsistent ways in which these terms are used. Approval by the ALI, and whether this provision will have any influence on courts, are two very different questions.

E. Limits on Damages

1. The Parties' Power to Specify the Remedy

Page 67. At the end of note 5, add:

5. Donald Trump and Stormy Daniels. . . .

Daniels (legally known as Stephanie Clifford) sued in a California court for a declaration that the hush money agreement was not enforceable. After removing to federal court, the defendants, including President Trump, signed covenants not to sue under the agreement in an effort to moot the case. The effort succeeded, and the court never addressed the enforceability of the liquidated damages provision or any other part of the agreement. The court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanded to state court defendants' claim that they were entitled to recover the \$130,000 they had paid Daniels for her silence. *Clifford v. Trump*, 2019 WL 3249597 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2019). The state court also dismissed the action as moot. It denied costs but awarded Clifford \$44,100 in attorneys' fees under a provision in the contract, as interpreted under a California statute. *Clifford v. Trump*, 2020 WL 4938460 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2020).

2. Avoidable Consequences, Offsetting Benefits, and Collateral Sources

Page 80. At the end of note 5, add:

6. Matching the collateral source with the damage. . . .

New York's highest court clarified (or limited) *Oden* in *Andino v. Mills*, 106 N.E.3d 714 (N.Y. 2018). The court in *Andino* held that a retired New York City police officer's accident disability retirement benefits were a collateral source that a court must offset against the injured retiree's jury award for future lost earnings and pension. "*Oden* does not require a direct match between the jury's damage award and the collateral source in the sense that there must be an exact dollar equivalence, but only that the collateral source replace a category of loss reflected in the jury award." *Id.* at 721. The disability pension in *Oden* did not match lost salary, because plaintiff was free to work while receiving that pension. But in *Andino*, plaintiff was not free to work while receiving a disability pension, until she reached normal retirement age. So the disability pension replaced lost salary up to normal retirement age and replaced regular pension after normal retirement age.

F. Taxes, Time, and the Value of Money

1. The Impact of Taxes

Page 114. At the end of note 2, add:

2. Payroll taxes. . . .

The Supreme Court appears to have resolved the dispute in *BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos*, 139 S. Ct. 893 (2019). Michael Loos, a BNSF employee, was injured on the job. He sued under the FELA, and a jury awarded him \$126,212.78, of which \$30,000 was attributable to wages lost during the time Loos was unable to work. The Court held that FELA damages awarded for lost wages are taxable as compensation under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §3201 *et seq.* That Act, and its companion, the Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. §231 *et seq.*, create a separate retirement system for railroad workers that substitutes for Social Security. BNSF was required to withhold \$3,765 in railroad retirement taxes from the judgment. And contrary to the assumption in note 2 in the main volume, the Court strongly implied that Social Security taxes would be treated the same way. Justices Gorsuch and Thomas dissented.

G. Damages Where Value Cannot Be Measured in Dollars

2. The Controversy over Tort Law

Page 153. Before note 1, add:

0.5. An as-applied challenge. The Supreme Court of Ohio distinguished *Arbino* as a facial challenge to Ohio’s damage caps and struck down the caps in an as-applied challenge in *Brandt v. Pompa*, 2022 WL 17729469 (Ohio Dec. 16, 2022). Plaintiff sued defendant in tort for rape and other horrendous sexual abuse committed while plaintiff was a child. On a 4-3 vote, the court held that under the state constitution’s “due course of law” clause, the cap “is unconstitutional as applied to [plaintiff] and similarly situated plaintiffs (i.e., people like [plaintiff] who were child victims of intentional criminal conduct and who bring civil actions to recover damages from the persons who have been found guilty of those intentional criminal acts) *to the extent that it fails to include an exception to its compensatory-damages caps for noneconomic loss for plaintiffs who have suffered permanent and severe psychological injuries.*” *Id.* at *10 (original emphasis). This would seem to be an application of *Morris v. Savoy*, briefly summarized in the *Arbino* opinion, which held that damage caps must contain an exception for the most severe or catastrophic injuries. The exception for such injuries in the Ohio legislation applied only to physical injuries and not to severe psychological injuries. The court also held it irrelevant that plaintiff was unlikely to collect the damages from the incarcerated defendant.

The dissenting justices pulled no punches on what they perceived as the retreat from *Arbino*: “By resolving the merits of this case, the majority opinion improperly involves the judiciary in matters that belong exclusively and fundamentally to the General Assembly. It is this type of result-oriented judicial activism that blurs the line in the public’s eye about which branch of government is truly responsible for the policies of this state. It erodes the public’s confidence in the judiciary to resolve problems within the confines of the law and places an unrealistic expectation on the members of the Ohio judiciary to resolve all society’s problems. Policy-making is not our job. If policy changes are desired, then the members of the majority opinion can take the short walk to Capitol Square to speak with their legislators—the people who are elected to create and set policy

for Ohioans. [Plaintiff’s] situation is certainly sad, but we cannot provide her with compensation simply because it may be our personal policy preference to do so. This activism from the bench needs to stop.” *Id.* at *17 (dissenting opinion).

Page 154. At the end of note 2, add:

2. Damage caps. . . .

After many failed attempts, California reformers successfully pushed the California Legislature to update its \$250,000 cap on “noneconomic” damages in medical malpractice cases. The limit had been in place since 1975, and had it been adjusted for inflation it would have risen to \$1.3 million by 2022. The limit in cases not involving death will increase to \$350,000 in 2023, and then by \$40,000 a year until it reaches \$750,000 in 2033, and then by two percent per year thereafter. In wrongful death cases, the limit will increase to \$500,000 in 2023 and then by \$50,000 a year until it reaches \$1 million in 2033, and then by two percent a year beginning in 2034. Cal. Civil Code §3333.2.

Page 176. At the end of note 2, add:

2. Proving the damages. . . .

Apart from the occasional plaintiff who succeeds in proving emotional distress, *Carey* has given rise to a large body of law that greatly favors government defendants. Government employees who are fired without the procedures they were promised, and a wide range of other plaintiffs who lose alleged rights or government benefits without a hearing, generally must prove that they would have succeeded at the hearing in order to collect more than nominal damages. A recent example is *Nnebe v. Daus*, 306 F. Supp. 3d 552, 558 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), awarding nominal damages for summary revocation of taxi-driver licenses. The Second Circuit remanded the case for the trial court to consider a question related to class certification. *Nnebe v. Daus*, 931 F.3d 66, 88 n.26 (2d Cir. 2019). The court wrote that while it did not “express [any] view on the class certification and damages issues, [it] note[s] that the deprivation of a hearing alone does not necessarily proximately cause a loss of income, since a hearing in a particular case may well have led to a continued suspension in any event.”

A few state courts have rejected *Carey* in cases of employees fired without the procedures promised in their employment contract. The Utah court feared that under *Carey*

the employer could discharge an employee summarily and then omit or delay the contractual termination procedures with impunity so long as it was in possession of evidence which, when ultimately provided, would justify the discharge. In that circumstance, the employee, without notice of the reason for his dismissal and without any opportunity to refute the charges, would remain in an indefinite and painful state of limbo, uncertain about his ultimate right to reinstatement or back pay.

Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Utah 1981). We owe these examples, and greater awareness of the volume of government-employee cases, to Stephen Yelderman, *Damages for Privileged Harms*, 106 Va. L. Rev. 1569 (2020). The idea behind the title is that the suspension in *Carey* was likely “privileged,” because unless the student could have prevailed at the hearing, the school could have inflicted that harm without violating the law. Compare Justice Frankfurter’s argument about *Bigelow*, in the main volume at 104-105.

CHAPTER THREE
PUNITIVE REMEDIES

A. Punitive Damages

1. Common Law and Statutes

Page 188. At the end of note 5, add:

5. Vicarious liability. . . .

A cable company employee brutally stabbed to death an elderly woman who was a customer of the company a day after a service call. Relatives sued the killer (who was serving a life sentence for the murder) and the cable company. The jury found that the company knew of the employee's erratic and desperate behavior and did not do anything to keep customers safe. It also found the company forged a document purporting to show that the woman agreed to arbitrate any disputes with the company, which would have limited her relatives' claim to \$200. The jury awarded \$7 billion in punitive damages against the company both for gross negligence in relation to the employee and for the forged documents. The relatives voluntarily remitted to just under \$1 billion. Marissa Sarnoff, [*Texas Judge Reduces Multi-Billion Dollar Verdict, But Charter Spectrum Must Still Pay Up for Cable Installer's Murder of Elderly Woman*](#), Law & Crime (Sept. 21, 2022). The case settled pending appeal. Charter Communications, LLC v. Goff, 2023 WL 4117059 (Tex. Ct. App. June 22, 2023).

2. The Constitution

Page 203. At the end of note 3, add:

3. Ratios again. . . .

A new study of 167 punitive damages awards, each over \$100 million, finds that the ratios imposed in cases such as *Campbell* give little predictability to the award of punitive damages in these cases. Benjamin J. McMichael & W. Kip Viscusi, [*Bringing Predictability to the Chaos of Punitive Damages*](#), 54 Ariz. St. L.J. 471 (2022). The authors suggest a set ratio of 3:1 except for cases involving personal injury or death.

Page 204. After note 5, add:

5.1. The Johnson & Johnson litigation. Consumer products manufacturer Johnson & Johnson has been plagued by lawsuits alleging that its baby powder causes cancer. J&J says its product is safe and that the lawsuits are based on bad science, but it has taken the product off the market in the United States and now around the world.

In *Ingham v. Johnson & Johnson*, 608 S.W.3d 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020), the court upheld \$25 million in compensatory damages for each of 20 women—\$500 million in total—who said they had used J&J's baby powder and contracted ovarian cancer as a result. The court also upheld punitives equal to 5.72 times compensatories against J&J, plus another 1.8 times compensatories against a subsidiary. The subsidiary was liable to all the plaintiffs, J&J to only some, so the total judgment is more than \$1.6 billion. Thousands of other claims remain outstanding.

The court said ratios of punitives to compensatories considerably greater than one were justified, despite the large compensatories, because J&J's behavior had been highly reprehensible,

and because J&J’s vast net worth—\$63.2 billion—made large judgments necessary to deter. The state supreme court declined to take the case, and the Supreme Court denied J&J’s cert petition. 141 S. Ct. 2716 (2021).

J&J is currently proposing to a bankruptcy court that it settle all claims for \$8.9 billion. Tiffany Hsu, [Johnson & Johnson Reaches Deal for \\$8.9 Billion Talc Settlement](#), N.Y. Times (Apr. 4, 2023).

Page 204. At the end of note 6, add:

6. Class actions. . . .

The Supreme Court again refused to hear an appeal raising due process claims related to the use of factual findings from the class action against the tobacco companies in individual follow-on cases. *Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Boatwright*, 217 So. 3d 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017), *cert. denied*, 139 S. Ct. 1263 (2019). As of early 2019, about 2,300 individual cases remained from the former *Engle* class members. Martina Barash, [Philip Morris, Other Tobacco Companies Rebuffed Again by SCOTUS](#), Bloomberg L. (Feb. 25, 2019). The Eleventh Circuit upheld as not excessive a verdict of \$15.8 million in compensatory damages and \$25.3 million in punitives, divided between two tobacco companies. *Kerrivan v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 953 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2020). The opinion collects other large verdicts in *Engle* follow-on cases for purposes of comparative review.

B. Other Punitive Remedies

2. Civil Penalties Payable to the Government

Page 216. At the end of note 4, add:

4. The Excessive Fines Clause. . . .

In *Timbs v. Indiana*, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019), the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated against the states, meaning that defendant could invoke the Clause to challenge the penalties imposed on him. The Court called the protection against excessive fines

a constant shield throughout Anglo-American history: Exorbitant tolls undermine other constitutional liberties. Excessive fines can be used, for example, to retaliate against or chill the speech of political enemies, as the Stuarts’ critics learned several centuries ago. Even absent a political motive, fines may be employed “in a measure out of accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence,” for “fines are a source of revenue,” while other forms of punishment “cost a State money.”

Id. at 689 (quoting *Harmelin v. Michigan*, 501 U.S. 957, 979 n.9 (1991)). The Stuarts were the absolutist British kings of the seventeenth century who provoked two revolutions and one regicide. Simon Jenkins, *A Short History of England: The Glorious Story of a Rowdy Nation* 132-146 (Public Affairs, 1st ed. 2011). Indiana did not argue seriously against incorporation. Instead, it argued that the Court should overrule *Austin*’s holding that in rem forfeitures fall within the Clause’s protection when they are at least partially punitive. The Court held that this question was not properly before it.

Timbs was caught transporting a small quantity of illegal drugs in his Land Rover, and he forfeited the vehicle. On remand, the Indiana Supreme Court first held that the forfeiture was at least partially punitive, and it remanded to the trial court to determine if the forfeiture was proportionate under a multifactor test. *State v. Timbs*, 134 N.E.3d 12 (Ind. 2019). On the state's ensuing appeal, the court held that forfeiture of a \$35,000 asset, which was defendant's only significant asset, was disproportionate to the offense and therefore excessive. The court agreed with Timbs that the seriousness of the offense should be measured by the sentence actually imposed rather than the statutory maximum. *State v. Timbs*, 169 N.E.3d 361 (Ind. 2021). For commentary on the appropriate test, see Wesley Hottot, [*What Is An Excessive Fine? Seven Questions to Ask After Timbs*](#), 72 Ala. L. Rev. 581 (2021).

The Supreme Court of Washington held that Seattle violated the Excessive Fines Clause when it seized a truck in which a homeless man was living. The city towed the truck for being parked in the same spot for more than 72 hours. It issued a \$44 ticket and charged \$946 for the alleged cost of towing the truck. A magistrate waived the ticket and reduced the towing fee to \$547. The Supreme Court of Washington held that the clause applied and that *Timbs* requires the court to take account of his personal financial circumstances in considering whether the fine is excessive. *City of Seattle v. Long*, 493 P.3d 94 (Wash. 2021). *Timbs* quoted Blackstone to that effect but did not decide the question. The state supreme court also quoted Blackstone.

CHAPTER FOUR

PREVENTING HARM: THE MEASURE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

A. The Scope of Injunctions

1. Preventing Wrongful Acts

Page 228. After note 3, add:

4. The continuing battle over universal injunctions. As states and other opponents of the Trump Administration sought nationwide or universal injunctions against Trump Administration policies, both Vice President Mike Pence and Attorney General Bill Barr spoke out against nationwide injunctions, and the Trump Administration asked the Supreme Court to block or limit their use. The Trump Department of Justice also issued a memorandum instructing DOJ lawyers to oppose their use. Memorandum from the Attorney General, [*Litigation Guidelines for Cases Presenting the Possibility of Nationwide Injunctions*](#) (Sept. 13, 2018).

Echoing Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in *Trump*, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, expressed serious doubts about the power of courts to issue universal injunctions:

Equitable remedies, like remedies in general, are meant to redress the injuries sustained by a particular plaintiff in a particular lawsuit. When a district court orders the government not to enforce a rule against the plaintiffs in the case before it, the court redresses the injury that gives rise to its jurisdiction in the first place. But when a court goes further than that, ordering the government to take (or not take) some action with respect to those who are strangers to the suit, it is hard to see how the court could still be acting in the judicial role of resolving cases and controversies. Injunctions like these thus raise serious questions about the scope of courts' equitable powers under Article III.

It has become increasingly apparent that this Court must, at some point, confront these important objections to this increasingly widespread practice. As the brief and furious history of the regulation before us illustrates, the routine issuance of universal injunctions is patently unworkable, sowing chaos for litigants, the government, courts, and all those affected by these conflicting decisions. Rather than spending their time methodically developing arguments and evidence in cases limited to the parties at hand, both sides have been forced to rush from one preliminary injunction hearing to another, leaping from one emergency stay application to the next, each with potentially nationwide stakes, and all based on expedited briefing and little opportunity for the adversarial testing of evidence.

This is not normal. Universal injunctions have little basis in traditional equitable practice. Their use has proliferated only in very recent years. And they hardly seem an innovation we should rush to embrace. By their nature, universal injunctions tend to force judges into making rushed, high-stakes, low-information decisions. The traditional system of lower courts issuing interlocutory relief limited to the parties at hand may require litigants and courts to tolerate interim uncertainty about a rule's final fate and proceed more slowly until this Court speaks in a case of its own. But that system encourages multiple judges and multiple circuits to weigh in only after careful deliberation, a process that permits the airing of competing views that aids this Court's own decisionmaking process.

The rise of nationwide injunctions may just be a sign of our impatient times. But good judicial decisions are usually tempered by older virtues.

Nor do the costs of nationwide injunctions end there. There are currently more than 1,000 active and senior district court judges, sitting across 94 judicial districts, and subject to review in 12 regional courts of appeal. Because plaintiffs generally are not bound by adverse decisions in cases to which they were not a party, there is a nearly boundless opportunity to shop for a friendly forum to secure a win nationwide. The risk of winning conflicting nationwide injunctions is real too. And the stakes are asymmetric. If a single successful challenge is enough to stay the challenged rule across the country, the government's hope of implementing any new policy could face the long odds of a straight sweep, parlaying a 94-to-0 win in the district courts into a 12-to-0 victory in the courts of appeal. A single loss and the policy goes on ice—possibly for good, or just as possibly for some indeterminate period of time until another court jumps in to grant a stay. And all that can repeat, *ad infinitum*, until either one side gives up or this Court grants certiorari. What in this gamesmanship and chaos can we be proud of?

Department of Homeland Security v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600-601 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant of a stay).

Justice Kagan, speaking at an event at Northwestern, expressed similar sentiments:

This has no political tilt to it . . . You look at something like that and you think, that can't be right . . . In the Trump years, people used to go to the Northern District of California, and in the Biden years, they go to Texas. It just can't be right that one district judge can stop a nationwide policy in its tracks and leave it stopped for the years that it takes to go through the normal process.

Josh Gerstein, [Kagan Repeats Warning That Supreme Court is Damaging Its Legitimacy](#), Politico (Sept. 14, 2022).

Page 232. After note 6, add:

7. Voluntary cessation to avoid a bad precedent. The Supreme Court had granted cert in *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. City of New York*, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020), to consider whether a provision of New York City gun laws violated gun owners' Second Amendment rights. After the cert grant, New York City amended its rules to allow the conduct at issue in the lawsuit, no doubt to avoid a likely adverse ruling at the Court. The Court held that the city's conduct mooted the case and remanded to the lower courts for further proceedings, including a possible damages claim. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Gorsuch and in part by Justice Thomas, dissented, accusing the majority of allowing its docket to be "manipulated." *Id.* at 1527 (Alito, J., dissenting). Alito claimed the decision was not moot for two reasons. "First, the changes in City and State law do not provide petitioners with all the injunctive relief they sought. Second, if we reversed on the merits, the District Court on remand could award damages to remedy the constitutional violation that petitioners suffered." *Id.* at 1528.

The case was a preview of things to come. The Court soon thereafter denied cert in 10 cases raising Second Amendment questions. Adam Winkler, [John Roberts May Not Be the Ally Gun-Rights Advocates Hoped For](#), *The Atlantic* (June 16, 2020). Justice Thomas, joined in part by

Justice Kavanaugh, dissented from the denial of cert in one of them. *Rogers v. Grewal*, 140 S. Ct. 1865 (2020).

After Justice Amy Coney Barrett replaced Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court heard another Second Amendment case and invalidated a different restriction, this one from New York state, on licenses for those who wish to carry concealed weapons out of the home. *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022).

8. Another Supreme Court example. The Court relied on the voluntary cessation doctrine to reach the merits in *West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency*, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022). In the Obama years, the EPA issued a set of regulations it called its Clean Power Plan. In the Trump years, the EPA issued less demanding regulations that repealed the Clean Power Plan. Multiple litigants sued, and the D.C. Circuit vacated the Trump regulations. *American Lung Association v. Environmental Protection Agency*, 985 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2021). The EPA under the Biden Administration asked the D.C. Circuit to stay its mandate insofar as it reinstated the Clean Power Plan, and announced its intention to craft a new set of regulations. Meanwhile, West Virginia and others successfully petitioned for certiorari. The Court held that the case was not moot. The EPA had not promised that its new regulation would not include the substance of the provisions that West Virginia was challenging. The burden of proving mootness is on the party asserting mootness, and “[t]hat burden is ‘heavy’ where, as here, ‘[t]he only conceivable basis for a finding of mootness in th[e] case is [the respondent’s] voluntary conduct.’” *West Virginia*, 142 S. Ct. at 2607, quoting *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000).

2. Preventing Lawful Acts That Might Have Wrongful Consequences

Page 241. At the end of note 9, add:

9. Meeting your friends? . . .

California is moving away from the use of gang injunctions in the face of falling crime rates and criticism of their overbreadth. James Queally, [California Moving Away from Gang Injunctions Amid Criticism, Falling Crime Rates](#), L.A. Times (July 8, 2018).

4. Institutional Reform Litigation (Structural Injunctions)

Page 258. At the end of the first full paragraph on the page, add:

INTRODUCTORY NOTE: THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES . . .

For a retrospective on the 50th anniversary of the *Swann* decision, see Ann Doss Helms, [50 Years After Swann Ruling, The Legacy of CMS Desegregation Shows Up in Changed Lives](#), WFAE (Apr. 20, 2021) [<https://perma.cc/WF93-Z48V>].

C. The Rights of Third Parties

Page 300. After note 4, add:

4.1. Internet defamation. Consider *Hassell v. Bird*, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018). A disgruntled former client posted a defamatory review of the plaintiff lawyer and her firm on Yelp, a website that publishes consumer reviews of businesses. The lawyer got a large damage judgment against the former client and an injunction ordering her to remove the review. The former client ignored the injunction.

The lawyer also got an injunction ordering Yelp to remove the review. Yelp had not been a party to the case, but it now intervened to argue that it could not be enjoined. The plurality held that the injunction against Yelp violated §230 of the Communications Decency Act, which provides that websites that host material written by others shall not “be treated as a publisher or speaker of any information provided by” anyone else, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), and that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” § 230(e)(3).

Justice Kruger, concurring for the decisive fourth vote, did not reach the § 230 issue. She would have held simply that the court could not enjoin a person who had not been party to the case and who was acting independently of the defendant who had been a party. Three dissenters argued that Yelp could be enjoined because it was aiding and abetting the former client, in the language of a leading California case, or acting “in concert” with the former client and as her agent, in the language of Federal Rule 65(d)(2), which addresses who is bound by an injunction against a named defendant. See section 9.A.4 in the main volume. The dissenters equated these varied formulations.

The principal disagreement between the dissenters and Justice Kruger seemed to be more about facts than law: how to characterize the relationship between Yelp and the individuals who post on Yelp. No one relied on the federal theory that the order against Yelp was “minor and ancillary.”

CHAPTER FIVE

CHOOSING REMEDIES

A. Substitutionary or Specific Relief

2. Burdens on Defendant or the Court

Page 342. At the end of note 4, add:

4. The legal remedy: a \$31-million verdict. . . .

The White Flint mall property remains undeveloped. Bryan P. Sears, [*Erlich Wants to Replace Development Impact Fees with Targeted Tax Plan*](#), Maryland Daily Record (Jan. 31, 2022). One of Laycock’s students, who grew up in the immediate area, reports that it remains undeveloped as of spring 2023.

Lord & Taylor closed its White Flint property in 2020, Dan Schere, [*Lord & Taylor Closing in White Flint After Company Files for Bankruptcy*](#), MoCo360 (Aug. 4, 2020), and the company closed all its stores in 2021, Nathan Bomey, [*Lord & Taylor Going Out of Business: Store Closings, Liquidation Sales Begin*](#), USA Today (Aug. 27, 2020). So much for projecting the future of the mall and store out to 2042 or 2057. Even if the court had ordered specific performance of the contract, Lord & Taylor would have been able to reject the contract in its bankruptcy and release its rights under the specific performance decree.

3. Other Policy Reasons

Page 346. At the end of note 1, add:

1. Irreplaceable and hard to measure?. . . .

A divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld an injunction that barred a mother from speaking publicly about her bitter custody dispute in any way that would allow anyone to learn the identity of the child. *S.B. v. S.S.*, 243 A.3d 90 (Pa. 2020). The majority rejected the argument that the gag order violated the First Amendment. None of the opinions in the case cited *Willing*.

Constantakis v. Bryan Advisory Services, LLC, 275 A.3d 998 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022), discussed *Willing* extensively, but for its prior restraint holding, not its irreparable injury holding. Plaintiffs and defendants were in business as investment advisers; plaintiffs were the principals of an affiliate of the corporate defendant. Plaintiffs sought to separate from defendants and become an independent company; defendants accused them of wrongdoing, and included those accusations in regulatory filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These filings brought plaintiffs’ business to an effective halt.

The Court of Common Pleas found, in a two-day preliminary injunction hearing, that there was no basis for the charges of misconduct. It ordered defendants to amend the regulatory filings to conform to the court’s fact finding, and to refrain “from making false, unsubstantiated, and defamatory statements” about plaintiffs. *Id.* at 1007. The Superior Court vacated the preliminary injunction against future false statements as a prior restraint, citing *Willing*. But it affirmed the order to correct the regulatory filings, holding that this was a subsequent remedy and not a prior restraint.

The Superior Court also affirmed a finding of irreparable injury, because the false statements were destroying plaintiffs’ business; this part of the opinion had nothing of substance to say about

Willing. And it held that the right to jury trial had not been violated, because the injunction was only preliminary, and there could still be a jury trial before a final judgment. The discussion of jury trial did not appear to distinguish between a claim for damages and a claim for a permanent injunction.

Page 348. At the end of note 3, add:

3. Prior restraints against unprotected speech. . . .

John Bolton, a former National Security Advisor for President Trump, wrote a critical book, *The Room Where It Happened*, about his experiences working for the Trump Administration. Bolton clashed with the government over a prepublication security review of the material in his book, with Bolton alleging that he had satisfied all the reviewer’s objections and that the review was then held up for political reasons. After his publisher had announced that the book would soon be on sale, after the book had been shipped to bookstores around the world, and after advance copies of the book had been shared widely with the media, the government sought an order against Bolton, seeking to have him direct his publisher to stop distribution and collect all copies of the book.

A federal district court denied a TRO against publication of the book, even though it found that the government was likely to succeed in showing that Bolton violated the law by publishing the book before prepublication review was completed. The court held that the government could not show that an injunction would prevent irreparable injury, because it was too late to retrieve the book. “Reviews of and excerpts from the book are widely available online. As noted at the hearing, a CBS News reporter clutched a copy of the book while questioning the White House press secretary. By the looks of it, the horse is not just out of the barn—it is out of the country.” *United States v. Bolton*, 468 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2020).

Although the court framed its order in terms of lack of irreparable injury, it also could have written that the request was moot (see pages 230-232 in the main volume), or that it was barred by laches, a doctrine taken up in section 11.D, which allows courts to deny requests for equitable relief that come too late. The court also alluded to the First Amendment implications of the government’s requested order. “For reasons that hardly need to be stated, the Court will not order a nationwide seizure and destruction of a political memoir.” *Id.* at 6. And it concluded that it should not issue a “toothless” injunction. *Id.* at 7.

The Biden Administration abandoned the case, and it was dismissed. Michael S. Schmidt & Katie Benner, [*Justice Dept. Ends Criminal Inquiry and Lawsuit on John Bolton’s Book*](#), N.Y. Times (June 16, 2021). Before dismissal, the government was seeking a constructive trust over all of Bolton’s profits from the book, a remedy taken up in section 8.C.1. In a famous earlier case involving breach of a prepublication review requirement for books by former CIA agents, the Supreme Court approved such a constructive trust remedy. *Snepp v. United States*, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).

Page 349. At the end of note 6, add:

6. Developments in the lower courts. . . .

Professor Volokh counts 34 states and nine federal circuits that allow anti-libel injunctions in at least some circumstances. Eugene Volokh, *Anti-Libel Injunctions*, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 73, 137 app. A. (2019). As a matter of both First Amendment law and sound policy, Volokh recommends what he terms a “hybrid permanent injunction” against libelous speech. In the context of his example of Don having falsely accused Paula of cheating him, Volokh favors an injunction along

the lines of “Don may not libelously accuse Paula of cheating him.” *Id.* at 105-106 He believes that such an injunction, by including the term “libelously,” would have a “narrower chilling effect” and would not allow Don to be “punished for criminal contempt unless, at the contempt hearing, his speech is found to be libelous.” *Id.* at 77, 106. He would not allow the findings in the proceeding that issued the injunction to be claim or issue preclusive in the contempt proceeding, and he would not allow the use of imprisonment in coercive civil contempt. He would require a jury trial for imprisonment in criminal contempt, and he would require a jury trial either at the injunction stage or the contempt stage before any fines in coercive civil contempt. These safeguards would graft significant free-speech exceptions on to the existing law of contempt, briefly summarized at pages 220-221 of the main volume and explored in depth in Chapter 9.

4. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC: A New Federal Standard for Permanent Injunctive Relief?

Page 355. After note 3, add:

3.1. Congress steps in to protect trademarks. The Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 added the following sentence to 15 U.S.C. §1116(a) of the Lanham Act in relation to the availability of injunctions in trademark cases: “A plaintiff seeking any such injunction shall be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm upon a finding of a violation identified in this subsection in the case of a motion for a permanent injunction or upon a finding of likelihood of success on the merits for a violation identified in this subsection in the case of a motion for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.” Why did Congress protect only trademark holders and not patent or copyright holders?

Page 355. At the end of note 4, add:

4. A broader assessment. . . .

Elizabeth A. Rowe, [eBay, Permanent Injunctions, and Trade Secrets](#), 77 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 553 (2020), examined 150 federal trade secret cases between 2000 and 2014 with damages totaling \$2 billion. “All were successful on their trade secret claims and received damages but most did not receive a permanent injunction.” *Id.* at 578. Many plaintiffs received no injunction because they didn’t ask for one. Professor Rowe found that courts are not necessarily strictly applying the four factors from *eBay*, and that the injunctions issued and the opinions (if any) explaining the injunction decisions were generally perfunctory. In those cases where courts denied an injunction and gave a reason, the lack of irreparable harm seemed to have been the factor most often articulated as the reason for the denial. Damages for the past are not inconsistent with an injunction for the future, and damages for the past do not necessarily indicate that future damages can be reasonably proved and measured. But a large award of damages may suggest to some judges that they have granted an adequate remedy.

Colleen Chien & Mark A. Lemley, [Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest](#), 98 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (2012), found that the success rate for requests for injunctions in patent cases in which the court found liability fell from 95 percent to 75 percent in the first six years after *eBay*.

A study by Matthew Sag & Pamela Samuelson found that injunctive relief in copyright cases is also less common post-*eBay*. Matthew Sag & Pamela Samuelson, [Discovering eBay’s Impact on Copyright Injunctions Through Empirical Evidence](#), 64 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1447 (2023). Samuelson’s separate qualitative study of such cases concludes that “[i]n the past decade, courts have generally been dutifully analyzing each of the *eBay* factors and seem to be granting

injunctions less frequently now than before *eBay*.” Pamela Samuelson, [Withholding Injunctions in Copyright Cases: The Impact of eBay](#), 63 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 773, 779-780 (2022). Professor Samuelson’s solo-authored article argues that *eBay* has been beneficial on the whole in copyright cases; she thinks that copyright injunctions had become too nearly automatic before *eBay*. Assuming that she is right about that bottom line, *eBay* may be a case of reaching sound results for unsound reasons.

Page 357. After note 9, add:

10. *eBay*’s chilly reception in the states. Citing the scholarly criticism of *eBay*, the Chancery Court of Delaware rejected its application to the decision whether or not to grant or withhold a permanent injunction in state court. *In re COVID-Related Restrictions on Religious Services*, 285 A.3d 1205 (Del. Ch. 2022).

Most state courts have simply ignored *eBay*. “The most important fact about *eBay* and *Monsanto* for this Restatement is that the state courts have largely ignored them. As of March 1, 2023, *eBay* has been cited in 4969 federal cases and only 34 state cases. *Monsanto* has been cited by 1171 federal cases and nine state cases. A significant fraction of the state citations to these cases were to incidental points separate from the four-part test, or they appeared in cases of federal claims asserted in state court, or they contrasted the state rule with the federal rule. The bottom line is that *eBay* and *Monsanto* have had no significant effect on the state law of injunctions against tort.” Restatement Third, Torts: Remedies § 43, rptrs. note *h* (Am. Law. Inst. Tent. Draft No. 2, 2023).

B. Preliminary or Permanent Relief

1. The Substantive Standards for Preliminary Relief

Page 362. After the second paragraph of note 4, add:

4. A mess in the lower courts. . . .

The Eighth Circuit has adhered to its view that plaintiff need not prove “a greater than fifty per cent likelihood” of success on the merits, but only “a fair chance of prevailing.” *Jet Midwest International Co. v. Jet Midwest Group, LLC*, 953 F.3d 1041, 1044-1045 (8th Cir. 2020). It did not discuss *Winter*; it cited and quoted several of its own cases, all of which predate *Winter*.

Meanwhile the Seventh Circuit has finally taken note of *Winter*. *Illinois Republican Party v. Pritzker*, 973 F.3d 760, 762-763 (7th Cir. 2020). It noted that *Winter* had expressly disapproved of its “better than negligible” standard; it also said that *Winter* does not require proof of the merits by a preponderance of the evidence. *Id.* at 762. But probability of success “normally includes a demonstration of how the applicant proposes to prove the key elements of its case.” *Id.* at 763.

2. The Procedure for Obtaining Preliminary Relief

Page 384. At the end of note 9, add:

9. Stays and injunctions pending appeal. . . .

The Supreme Court has become much more willing to grant emergency relief, including emergency injunctions pending appeal, than it has been in the past. The Trump Administration went to the Court repeatedly for such relief, and was often successful. This emergency relief came in what is coming to be called the “shadow docket,” in which the Court issues emergency orders without oral argument and often without an accompanying opinion.

Justice Sotomayor has been especially critical of this trend: “[I]t appears the Government has treated this exceptional mechanism as a new normal.” *Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant*, 140 S. Ct. 3, 6 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). In *Wolf v. Cook County*, 140 S. Ct. 681, 683-684 (2020), Justice Sotomayor expanded on her criticism in a case involving the Administration’s changes to the “public charge” rule involving the deportation of undocumented immigrants—a rule intended to exclude immigrants who are likely to depend on government-provided welfare benefits:

Claiming one emergency after another, the Government has recently sought stays in an unprecedented number of cases, demanding immediate attention and consuming limited Court resources in each. And with each successive application, of course, its cries of urgency ring increasingly hollow. . . .

[T]his Court is partly to blame for the breakdown in the appellate process. That is because the Court—in this case, the New York cases, and many others—has been all too quick to grant the Government’s “reflexiv[e]” requests. But make no mistake: Such a shift in the Court’s own behavior comes at a cost.

Stay applications force the Court to consider important statutory and constitutional questions that have not been ventilated fully in the lower courts, on abbreviated timetables and without oral argument. They upend the normal appellate process, putting a thumb on the scale in favor of the party that won a stay. . . . They demand extensive time and resources when the Court’s intervention may well be unnecessary—particularly when, as here, a court of appeals is poised to decide the issue for itself.

Perhaps most troublingly, the Court’s recent behavior on stay applications has benefited one litigant over all others. This Court often permits executions—where the risk of irreparable harm is the loss of life—to proceed, justifying many of those decisions on purported failures “to raise any potentially meritorious claims in a timely manner.” Yet the Court’s concerns over quick decisions wither when prodded by the Government in far less compelling circumstances—where the Government itself chose to wait to seek relief, and where its claimed harm is continuation of a 20-year status quo in one State. I fear that this disparity in treatment erodes the fair and balanced decisionmaking process that this Court must strive to protect.

More recently, the Supreme Court on a 5-4 vote but without an opinion granted a stay requested by some states of a lower court’s decision issued five months earlier to vacate a rule of the Environmental Protection Agency. *Louisiana v. American Rivers*, 142 S. Ct. 1347 (2022). Justice Kagan dissented, writing for herself and the Chief Justice, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor. She argued that the states showed no irreparable harm and otherwise could not meet the *Nken* factors for a stay. The states also delayed by months in seeking emergency relief in the Supreme Court: “By nonetheless granting relief, the Court goes astray. It provides a stay pending appeal, and thus signals its view of the merits, even though the applicants have failed to make the irreparable harm showing we have traditionally required. That renders the Court’s emergency docket not for emergencies at all.” *Id.* at 1349 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

In another case, the Court stayed an order from the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration imposing a COVID-19 vaccination requirement on many employees, on the ground that the order was beyond the authority that Congress had delegated to the agency. Note that this characterization undermines the Court’s distinction between stays and injunctions pending

appeal; staying the agency’s order was roughly equivalent to enjoining enforcement of the order. More dramatically, the Court suggested that at least in this context, the balance of hardships or equities was irrelevant:

The equities do not justify withholding interim relief. We are told by the States and the employers that OSHA’s mandate will force them to incur billions of dollars in unrecoverable compliance costs and will cause hundreds of thousands of employees to leave their jobs. For its part, the Federal Government says that the mandate will save over 6,500 lives and prevent hundreds of thousands of hospitalizations.

It is not our role to weigh such tradeoffs. In our system of government, that is the responsibility of those chosen by the people through democratic processes. Although Congress has indisputably given OSHA the power to regulate occupational dangers, it has not given that agency the power to regulate public health more broadly. Requiring the vaccination of 84 million Americans, selected simply because they work for employers with more than 100 employees, certainly falls in the latter category.

National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, 142 S. Ct. 661, 666 (2022).

Justice Breyer, dissenting for himself and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor, did not think the equity question was a close call. “This Court should decline to exercise its equitable discretion in a way that will—as this stay will—imperil the lives of thousands of American workers and the health of many more.” *Id.* at 676 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority’s statement apparently abdicating equity left some commentators puzzled. Richard Re, [Did the Supreme Court Overrule Equity?](#), Re’s Judicata (Jan. 14, 2022); Will Baude, [Balancing the Equities in the Vaccine Mandate Case](#), Volokh Conspiracy (Jan. 14, 2022). It is unclear if this statement will get applied in other cases.

C. Prospective or Retrospective Relief

1. Suits Against Officers in Their Official Capacities

Page 390. After note 1, add:

1.1 Evading the core compromise. Texas enacted a sophisticated attempt to wholly prevent any judicial review of a statute that was, at the time of its enactment, flagrantly unconstitutional. The scheme and the response to it are somewhat complicated to explain, and the repudiation of any constitutional right to abortion in *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization*, 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022), has mostly mooted the dispute for now. But it is worth taking time to understand, because it reveals a serious gap in the Court’s structure for reconciling constitutional rights with sovereign immunity.

Texas prohibited all abortions after a fetal heartbeat can be detected. The law has been widely referred to as SB8; it is codified in Tex. Health & Safety Code §§171.201 et seq. and in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code §33.22.

Section 171.207 provides that no effort to enforce the law “may be taken or threatened by this state, a political subdivision, a district or county attorney, or an executive or administrative officer or employee of this state or a political subdivision against any person, except as provided in Section 171.208.” And §171.208 provides that “[a]ny person, other than an officer or employee of a state or local government entity in this state,” may sue for any actual or intended violation of the statute

for an injunction to prevent the violation, for statutory damages of not less than \$10,000, and for costs and attorneys' fees. The amount of statutory damages is not capped, but there can be no more than one judgment against the same defendant for the same abortion. Reliance on a decision valid at the time of the abortion, but later overruled (e.g., *Roe v. Wade*), is not a defense.

The genius of §171.207 is that no state official can be named as a defendant in an *Ex parte Young* action, because no state official has enforcement authority. There are nearly 8 billion potential individual plaintiffs, plus countless potential corporate plaintiffs, under §171.208, no one of whom is at all likely to file a lawsuit, and any one of whom could deny any such intention if an abortion clinic sued to enjoin enforcement of the law. Showing a ripe claim for an injunction against any particular private defendant would be difficult or impossible. And even if a plaintiff surmounted that hurdle, won on the merits, and got an injunction against enforcement on the ground that the law is unconstitutional, that judgment would not be claim- or issue-preclusive in a suit by any of the other billions of potential plaintiffs. §171.208(e)(5). Nor would reliance on that injunction be any protection if the injunction were later vacated or reversed. Such a decision would provide a measure of protection only if it were affirmed on appeal and became a binding precedent.

In theory, a clinic could obtain judicial review by continuing to perform abortions in due course and waiting to be sued. But if it took that course and then lost on the constitutional issue, it would be liable for an unlimited amount of statutory damages per abortion, for every abortion performed since the law was enacted. Especially with the widespread expectation that *Roe v. Wade* would soon be overruled, only one clinic was reported to have taken that risk. Because there was no apparent way to get judicial review, the law effectively ended nearly all abortions to which it applied, despite its plain unconstitutionality prior to *Dobbs*. Texas women continued to obtain abortions by having the procedure very early in a pregnancy, by traveling out of state, or by ordering abortifacient medications online.

A group of abortion clinics sued the state's attorney general, a state judge, a court clerk, the executive directors of the state's medical licensing boards, and a private citizen, for an injunction against enforcing the law. *Whole Women's Health v. Jackson*, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021). Plaintiffs indicated their intention to eventually seek an injunction against a defendant class of all state judges and all court clerks, ordering them not to decide or accept for filing any lawsuits under §171.208. The Court dismissed the claim against the attorney general, because he had no enforcement authority, and the claim against the private party, because he denied any intention to enforce the law. It dismissed the claim against the judge and the clerk because they do not enforce laws; they neutrally adjudicate disputes between litigants or facilitate the filing and adjudication of such disputes.

But the Court held that the claims against the directors of the medical boards could go forward. A savings clause in §171.207(b)(3) said that it did not "limit the enforceability of any other laws that regulate or prohibit abortion." Under some of those other laws, the boards could revoke the license of any medical provider who performed an illegal abortion, so despite the language elsewhere in §171.207, these boards still had enforcement authority. "[T]his is enough at the motion to dismiss stage to suggest the petitioners will be the target of an enforcement action and thus allow this suit to proceed." 142 S. Ct. at 537. Justice Thomas would have dismissed all the claims; Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concurred as to the directors of the medical boards and would also have let the case proceed against the court clerks.

On remand, Texas denied that the medical boards could enforce the law, and the Fifth Circuit certified that question to the state supreme court. 23 F.4th 380 (5th Cir. 2022). A dissenter accused

the majority of defying the Supreme Court, and the plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus against the Fifth Circuit in the Supreme Court. The Court denied the writ without comment. In *re Whole Women’s Health*, 142 S. Ct. 701 (2022). Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented; they too more or less accused the Fifth Circuit of defying the Supreme Court.

The Texas court unanimously held that the medical boards had no authority to enforce the statute. *Whole Women’s Health v. Jackson*, 642 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2022). The Fifth Circuit then remanded to the federal district court with instructions to dismiss the complaint. 31 F.4th 1004 (5th Cir. 2022).

No federal court stayed enforcement of the law at any point in this saga; Texas was allowed to run out the clock in anticipation of *Roe’s* overruling. The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that lower courts should not anticipate overrulings of Supreme Court cases, and must wait until the Court itself says that one of its decisions has been overruled. The Texas law was unconstitutional until *Dobbs* was decided, but it remained in effect the entire time.

Meanwhile, a state trial judge declared the private enforcement provisions of §171.208 unconstitutional on state law grounds. *Van Stean v. Texas Right to Life*, <https://reason.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Van-Stean-v-Texas-Right-to-Life-order-12-9-21.pdf> (Travis Cnty. Dist. Ct. Dec. 9, 2021). The court held that authorizing damages to persons who had not been harmed violated the state’s Open Court Clause, that the statutory damages awarded to persons who had not been harmed were punishment without due process, and that the delegation of state enforcement authority to private citizens who had not been harmed violated the separation of powers. Defendants moved to have the case dismissed on a collateral issue, and when that motion was denied, took an immediate interlocutory appeal. The state’s Third Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of that motion. *Texas Right to Life v. Van Stean*, 2023 WL 3687408 (Tex. App. Ct. May 26, 2023). The case appears to be back in the trial court, which has indicated its intention to sever the decided issues from any remaining issues, which will permit an immediate appeal on the merits.

What is to stop any legislature from using the Texas technique to eliminate judicial enforcement of any constitutional right it dislikes? Chief Justice Roberts, concurring in part and dissenting in part in the Supreme Court’s case, said that the “clear purpose and actual effect of SB8 has been to nullify this Court’s rulings. . . . The nature of the federal right infringed does not matter; it is the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system that is at stake.” 142 S. Ct. at 545. Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined this opinion.

Justice Sotomayor, in a separate opinion for herself and Justices Breyer and Kagan, described the Texas law as “a brazen challenge to our federal structure.” *Id.* at 550. She compared it to John Calhoun’s antebellum claims that states could “nullify” federal law, and she argued that *Ex parte Young* must be expanded as necessary to address such schemes. If the whole purpose of the *Young* fiction is to make judicial review possible, doesn’t it have to expand to fit that purpose?

The Texas law further deterred litigation with unusual provisions for attorneys’ fees. Prevailing plaintiffs suing to enforce SB 8 are entitled to fees; prevailing defendants are not. §§ 171.208(b)(3) and 171.208(i). Any person who sues to prevent enforcement of any Texas law regulating or restricting abortion, including both plaintiffs and their attorneys, is jointly and severally liable for a prevailing defendant’s fees. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code §30.22(a). And such a defendant is prevailing if judgment is entered in his favor, *or* if any one of plaintiff’s claims is dismissed, whether or not on the merits, and even if plaintiff prevails on all other claims and judgment is entered for plaintiff. §30.22(b). These rules are designed to deter parties from suing and to deter attorneys from representing anyone brave enough to sue. They are carefully explored in Rebecca

Aviel & Wiley Kersh, [*The Weaponization of Attorney's Fees in an Age of Constitutional Warfare*](#), 133 Yale L.J. 2048 (2023).

One-way fee shifting is common under statutes designed to *encourage* litigation and assertion of rights, especially in contexts where most defendants have greater financial resources than most plaintiffs. See section 10.A and especially pages 928-932 in the main volume. The far more draconian Texas provisions are designed to *deter* litigation and assertion of rights. Awards under the older provisions for one-way fee shifting are required to be “reasonable,” a limitation omitted from the Texas law, and unlike the explicit provisions of the Texas law, fee awards under the older laws are proportioned to the extent to which a plaintiff prevailed.

California enacted gun control legislation with provisions, closely modeled on the Texas law, to prevent constitutional challenges. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22949.60-22949.71 and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.11. These provisions lapse if the Texas law is invalidated by the U.S. or Texas Supreme Court. Cal. Bus. & Prof Code §22949.71. A federal court held the California attorneys’ fees provisions unconstitutional in *South Bay Rod & Gun Club, Inc. v. Bonta*, 2022 WL 17811113 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2022). The court entered a final judgment on March 20, 2023, the state has not filed a notice of appeal, the time for doing so has expired, and nothing on the docket sheet indicates any motions that would have extended the deadline.

Pro-life groups are said to be drafting model legislation to prohibit women from leaving their home state to get an abortion, to be enforced only on the model of the Texas law to evade judicial review. Caroline Kitchener & Devlin Barrett, [*Antiabortion Lawmakers Want to Block Patients From Crossing State Lines*](#), Wash. Post (June 30, 2022).

One way to provide judicial review of a statute on the Texas model is to simply ignore the problem. See *Oklahoma Call for Reproductive Justice v. State*, 2023 WL 3735829 (Okla. May 31, 2023). The court issued a declaratory judgment invalidating an Oklahoma statute that stringently restricted abortion. Plaintiffs named as defendants the state of Oklahoma and the court clerk of each Oklahoma county. The court recited that no state agent could enforce the law, but that the law created a cause of action enforceable by any person not a state agent. Then it went directly to the merits and never mentioned the enforcement provisions again.

2. Suits Against Officers in Their Personal Capacity (and the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity)

Page 405. After note 6.a.iii., add:

a. Specificity. . . .

iv. The Court continues to apply qualified immunity aggressively. In *City of Escondido v. Emmons*, 139 S. Ct. 500 (2019), the Court unanimously granted a cert petition and summarily reversed in part and vacated and remanded in part a Ninth Circuit decision holding that two police officers, who had been sued for use of excessive force, were not entitled to qualified immunity. As to one of the officers, the Ninth Circuit had offered no reasoning for its holding. *Id.* at 502. As to the other officer, the Ninth Circuit had applied the clearly established law test at too high a level of generality in deciding whether the officer used excessive force in taking down a suspect during a call for a domestic disturbance:

The Court of Appeals should have asked whether clearly established law prohibited the officers from stopping and taking down a man in these circumstances. Instead, the Court

of Appeals defined the clearly established right at a high level of generality by saying only that the “right to be free of excessive force” was clearly established.

Id. at 503.

In October 2021, the Supreme Court issued unanimous per curiam opinions summarily reversing two more cases in which appeals courts had rejected qualified immunity for police officers. *Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna*, 142 S. Ct. 4 (2021); *City of Tahlequah v. Bond*, 142 S. Ct. 9 (2021).

More recently, Justice Sotomayor dissented from cert in two cases in which circuit courts relied upon the clearly established law prong of qualified immunity to reject lawsuits based upon excessive use of force by police. In one case, she argued that the prong “can pose a very high bar for plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their rights. . . . When taken too far, as here, this requirement allows lower courts to split hairs in distinguishing facts or otherwise defining clearly established law at a low level of generality, which impairs the ability of constitutional torts to deter and remedy official misconduct.” *Lombardo v. City of St. Louis.*, 2023 WL 4278467, at *2 (U.S. June 30, 2023) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). She added that a “court may grant qualified immunity based on the clearly established prong without ever resolving the merits of plaintiffs’ claims. This inhibits the development of the law.” *Id.* In the other case, Justice Sotomayor lamented the “dual mistakes—resolving factual disputes or drawing inferences in favor of the police, then using those inferences to distinguish otherwise governing precedent—[that] have become the calling card of many courts’ qualified immunity jurisprudence.” *N.S. v. Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners*, 2023 WL 4278468, at * 3 (U.S. June 30, 2023) (Sotomayor J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). She added: “The result is that a purportedly ‘qualified’ immunity becomes an absolute shield for unjustified killings, serious bodily harm, and other grave constitutional violations.” *Id.* Justice Jackson also voted to granted cert in *Lombardo* but she did not join Justice Sotomayor’s statement.

Page 405. At the end of note 6.b., add:

b. Obvious applications. . . .

Despite repeatedly questioning the whole doctrine of qualified immunity (see note 11 in the main volume and this Update at 408), Justice Thomas was the sole dissenter (without explanation) in a rare Supreme Court case holding that a lower court erred in granting qualified immunity to a government official. In *Taylor v. Riojas*, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020), the Court held that the Fifth Circuit erred in accepting a claim of qualified immunity in a case with egregious facts. A Texas prison inmate alleged that “for six full days in September 2013, correctional officers confined him in a pair of shockingly unsanitary cells. The first cell was covered, nearly floor to ceiling, in ‘massive amounts of feces’: all over the floor, the ceiling, the window, the walls, and even ‘packed inside the water faucet.’ Fearing that his food and water would be contaminated, Taylor did not eat or drink for nearly four days. Correctional officers then moved Taylor to a second, frigidly cold cell, which was equipped with only a clogged drain in the floor to dispose of bodily wastes. Taylor held his bladder for over 24 hours, but he eventually (and involuntarily) relieved himself, causing the drain to overflow and raw sewage to spill across the floor. Because the cell lacked a bunk, and because Taylor was confined without clothing, he was left to sleep naked in sewage.” *Id.* at 53 (quoting *Taylor v. Stevens*, 946 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2019)).

The Fifth Circuit agreed that this was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, but it held that “[t]he law wasn’t clearly established” that “prisoners couldn’t be

housed in cells teeming with human waste” “for only six days.” The Supreme Court thought otherwise: “no reasonable correctional officer could have concluded that, under the extreme circumstances of this case, it was constitutionally permissible to house Taylor in such deplorably unsanitary conditions for such an extended period of time.” Justice Alito concurred, but wrote that the Court should not have taken the case for simple error correction purposes. One might respond to Justice Alito that *Taylor* shows that there is a bar (however low) below which government officials may not go, and that this is a lesson that the Fifth Circuit and other courts need to learn. The Court cited *Lanier*; some idea of applications too obvious to have been previously litigated appears to survive.

Page 406. At the end of note 6.e, add:

e. Places outside the law? . . .

The Supreme Court took up the case again in *Hernández v. Mesa*, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020), rejecting a *Bivens* claim in the context of a cross-border shooting. See this Update to Page 442-444.

6.1. It’s not just police officers and prison officials. The great bulk of these cases involve law-enforcement officers, but the qualified-immunity rules apply to all government officials except those few with absolute immunity. Recall that defendants in the leading case before *Harlow* were members of a school board. The Eighth Circuit recently held that officials at the University of Iowa do *not* have qualified immunity for a free-speech violation. *Business Leaders in Christ v. University of Iowa*, 991 F.3d 969 (8th Cir 2021).

The University requires all student organizations to commit to nondiscrimination on the basis of a long list of protected categories, including race, sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity. *Business Leaders in Christ (BLinC)*, an organization of conservative Christian business students, provides that LGBTQ students can be members of the organization but cannot hold leadership positions. A gay student who aspired to a leadership position complained to the University, which revoked BLinC’s status as a registered student organization.

When BLinC pointed out that other student groups had been approved with constitutions requiring members or officers to be of a particular race, ethnicity, sex, or sexual orientation, the University undertook a review of all student organizations. All or most were required to sign a nondiscrimination statement, but secular organizations with such requirements in their constitutions were approved without change. BLinC and some other religious organizations were disapproved. The court held that this was viewpoint discrimination in violation of clearly established law, resting on Supreme Court cases, Eighth Circuit cases, and persuasive authority from other circuits, and that the relevant university officials could be liable in damages. BLinC also brought a free-exercise challenge, but the court held that that law was not clearly established.

Page 408. At the end of note 11, add:

11. The new attacks on qualified immunity: originalism. . . .

Justice Thomas again attacked the qualified immunity doctrine in a dissent from a denial of cert in *Baxter v. Bracey*, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020). The undisputed facts proved that police unleashed a dog that bit the plaintiff, who had already surrendered after being caught in the act of burglary. The plaintiff brought a §1983 claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit held the claim barred by qualified immunity, and the Supreme Court refused to hear the case. Justice Thomas in dissent argued that the qualified immunity doctrine lacked support in the text of §1983. He also asserted that “[t]here likely is no basis for the objective inquiry into

clearly established law that our modern cases prescribe. . . . [W]e at least ought to return to the approach of asking whether immunity ‘was historically accorded the relevant official in an analogous situation at common law.’” *Id.* at 1864.

He has also questioned why qualified immunity is a “one-size-fits-all doctrine.” “[W]hy should university officers, who have time to make calculated choices about enacting or enforcing unconstitutional policies, receive the same protection as a police officer who makes a split-second decision to use force in a dangerous setting?” *Hoggard v. Rhodes*, 141 S. Ct. 2421, 2422 (2021) (statement of Thomas, J., on denial of certiorari).

And in footnote 2 of *Baxter*, he indicated an openness to reconsidering a line of cases beginning with *Monroe v. Pape*, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), holding that §1983 applies even when state officials engage in action not authorized by state law. Reversing *Monroe* would mean an end to most §1983 claims, because state laws say, or could be rewritten to say, that unauthorized use of force and any other unconstitutional conduct are contrary to state law.

Page 409. At the end of note 12, add:

12. The new attacks on qualified immunity: empirical evaluation. . . .

Consistent with Professor Schwartz’s research, a *Washington Post* investigation found that the 25 largest police departments paid \$3.2 billion over ten years to settle 40,000 claims of police misconduct. And that was with qualified immunity in place. Much of this money (a majority in Chicago), was paid on account of a small number of officers who were the subject of repeated claims. There are five officers with more than 100 settled claims each. Keith L. Alexander, Steven Rich, & Hannah Thacker, [*The Hidden Billion-Dollar Cost of Repeated Police Misconduct*](#), *Wash. Post* (Mar. 9, 2022).

Professors Nielson and Walker offer a defense of qualified immunity on federalism grounds, pointing to what they consider to be extensive reliance by state and local governments on the doctrine. They also believe that eliminating the doctrine would curtail experiments within states in crafting alternative remedies for deprivation of civil rights. Aaron Nielson & Christopher Walker, [*Qualified Immunity and Federalism*](#), 109 *Geo. L.J.* 229 (2020). They contend that eliminating qualified immunity would greatly harm the finances of state and local governments.

Professor Schwartz responds in Joanna C. Schwartz, [*Qualified Immunity and Federalism All the Way Down*](#), 109 *Geo. L.J.* 305 (2020). She disagrees that eliminating qualified immunity would have ruinous financial consequences for state and local governments and contests the reliance points. She further argues that governments can use indemnification to avoid adverse consequences and that eliminating qualified immunity would greatly improve civil rights litigation.

In the wake of the George Floyd protests in the spring and summer of 2020, national attention focused strongly on the role of qualified immunity in leaving victims of police misconduct uncompensated. An extensive report from Reuters detailed how Supreme Court qualified immunity doctrine has shielded police officers in egregious cases of police brutality. Andrew Chung, Lawrence Hurley, Jackie Botts, Andrea Januta, & Guillermo Gomez, [*For Cops Who Kill, Special Supreme Court Protection*](#), *Reuters* (May 8, 2020). Multiple bills were introduced in both houses of Congress to abolish or reform qualified immunity, but they reportedly faced stout Republican opposition in the Senate. Luke Broadwater & Catie Edmondson, [*Police Groups Wield Strong Influence in Congress, Resisting the Strictest Reforms*](#), *N.Y. Times* (June 25, 2020). None of the bills were enacted.

In Joanna C. Schwartz, *Qualified Immunity's Boldest Lie*, 88 U. Chi. L. Rev. 605 (2021), Professor Schwartz examined police training materials and found that police officers are not trained about the specific holdings of Supreme Court cases, so they never learn what constitutes “clearly established law” and cannot rely on it.

Professors Nielson and Walker’s latest contribution to the debate is *Qualified Immunity’s 51 Imperfect Solutions*, 17 Duke J. Const. Law & Pub. Pol’y 321 (2022) (arguing for state level experimentation on qualified immunity). The article is part of a symposium on the topic, as the literature and public interest on this topic explodes.

Scott A. Keller, *Qualified and Absolute Immunity at Common Law*, 73 Stan. L. Rev. 1337 (2021), argues that nineteenth century law offered some forms of immunity for public officials, but that the approach looked quite different from current law on qualified immunity.

Alex Reinert, *Qualified Immunity on Appeal: An Empirical Assessment*, https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3798024 (Mar. 16, 2021), found that appeals courts were more likely to reverse trial court decisions denying qualified immunity than decisions granting qualified immunity, and the results unsurprisingly differed by circuit and the ideology of the judges. See also F. Andrew Hessick & Katherine C. Richardson, *Qualified Immunity Laid Bare*, 56 Wake Forest L. Rev. 501 (2021), arguing that the Court has increasingly protected elected officials against victims of constitutional violations rather than protecting those victims from unconstitutional government action.

CHAPTER SIX

REMEDIES AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

A. More on Governmental Immunities

1. Consented Suits Against the Government

Page 421. At the end of note 6, add:

6. What is *not* a discretionary function these days? . . .

The Supreme Court granted cert in *Thacker* but only on the question of the scope of TVA's sovereign immunity. It reversed the lower court's determination that "TVA remains immune from all tort suits arising from its performance of so-called discretionary functions," because the legislation creating the TVA says that it can sue and be sued. This is a far more general waiver of sovereign immunity than the Tort Claims Act (see note 7 in the main volume at 424), and the exceptions in the Tort Claims Act are not exceptions to a sue-and-be-sued clause. Instead, "the TVA is subject to suits challenging any of its commercial activities. The law thus places the TVA in the same position as a private corporation supplying electricity." *Thacker v. Tennessee Valley Authority*, 139 S. Ct. 1435, 1438-1439 (2019).

But even with a sue-and-be-sued clause, "the TVA might have immunity from suits contesting one of its governmental activities, of a kind not typically carried out by private parties." The Court emphasized that this judicially implied exception is narrow, available only when allowing the suit to proceed would cause "grave interference" with a governmental function. It remanded the case for further consideration, but it is hard to see how fishing an electric line out of the water could be anything different from what would have to be done by "a private corporation supplying electricity." On remand, the Sixth Circuit briefly summarized the Court's new exception to sue-and-be-sued clauses and remanded the case to the district court. 773 F. App'x 598 (11th Cir. 2019).

Page 422. At the end of the second paragraph of note 2, add:

2. The Federal Tort Claims Act. . . .

In *Daniel v. United States*, 139 S. Ct. 1713 (2019), the Supreme Court denied cert in a case asking the Court to overrule *Feres*. Justices Ginsburg and Thomas dissented. Justice Thomas, writing only for himself, quoted an earlier statement of Justice Scalia that "*Feres* was wrongly decided and heartily deserves the widespread, almost universal criticism it has received." *Id.* at 1713 (internal citation omitted) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The decedent in the case was a Navy Lieutenant who died from complications of childbirth in a naval hospital.

Justice Thomas again dissented in a case applying *Feres* to bar a former West Point cadet from suing for an alleged sexual assault by a fellow cadet. "Perhaps the Court is hesitant to take up this issue at all because it would require fiddling with a 70-year-old precedent that is demonstrably wrong. But if the *Feres* doctrine is so wrong that we cannot figure out how to rein it in, then the better answer is to bid it farewell. There is precedent for that approach." *Doe v. United States*, 141 S. Ct. 1498, 1499 (2021) (Thomas J., dissenting).

Congress has fixed *Feres*, but only for medical malpractice, and only for the service member, not for family members treated by military doctors. 10 U.S.C. § 2733a. The former green beret who lobbied Congress for the change in law still had his claim denied after the U.S. Army Claims

Service found that any negligent delay in diagnosing his cancer did not affect his prognosis or chance of survival. Ian Shapira, [*A Green Beret's Cancer Changed Military Malpractice Law. His Claim Still Got Denied*](#), Wash. Post (Mar. 29, 2023).

2. Suits Against Officers—Absolute Immunity

Page 431. At the end of note 2, add:

2. Investigative activities. . . .

The Fifth Circuit held that a prosecutor had acted in an investigative capacity, and thus had only qualified immunity, when, allegedly, he repeatedly met with a detective and a witness to coerce that witness into testifying to a fictional story invented by the prosecutor and the detective. *Wearry v. Foster*, 33 F.4th 260 (5th Cir. 2022). The plaintiff’s conviction for capital murder had earlier been vacated, for failure to turn over exculpatory evidence, in *Wearry v. Cain*, 577 U.S. 385 (2016).

Page 434. At the end of note 2.c, add:

2. Judicial immunity. . . .

c. Judicial act. . . .

A Missouri judge hearing a child custody dispute ordered that the children spend 30 days with their mother. The children protested vigorously, and the judge personally took them to jail and had them locked up. He returned an hour later, asked if they were ready to cooperate, and had them released. The federal court held that personally taking them to jail was not a judicial act. But it suggested, without deciding, that he might have held the children in contempt and ordered a marshal or other official to take them to jail. *Rockett v. Eighmy*, 2023 WL 4113303 (8th Cir. June 22, 2023).

A month later, in the same case, the judge issued a “pick up order” after the children failed to appear at a hearing. He sent the order to Louisiana, where the children were now living. Louisiana officers picked up the children, gave them *Miranda* warnings, and had them confined in solitary confinement in a juvenile detention facility. Issuing the pick up order was a judicial act, and the judge was absolutely immune from suit. *Id.* The children were soon released after their father got a writ of prohibition from the Missouri Supreme Court.

Page 437. At the end of note 4, add:

4. Presidential immunity. . . .

Waiting until after Trump left office, the Supreme Court granted cert and then remanded the case to the Second Circuit to dismiss it as moot. *Biden v. Knight First Amendment Institute*, 141 S. Ct. 1220 (2021). The suit was against Trump in his official capacity, so Biden was substituted as the defendant. But Biden was not going to continue the challenged practice, which was really personal to Trump. The case nicely illustrates how changes in administration can render an official-capacity case moot. Justice Thomas issued a separate concurring opinion, discussing the tangential question whether social media platforms such as Twitter may be required, consistent with the First Amendment, to carry content from users.

In *Saget v. Trump*, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2019), a federal district court, distinguishing *Knight* and other cases, issued a universal preliminary injunction against government defendants, including the President in his official capacity, barring them from terminating a designation of “Temporary Protected Status” granted to Haitian nationals in the wake of a 2010 earthquake. The

designation allows the Haitians to stay in the United States until the government properly revokes this status. The court held that defendants likely had not followed proper procedures in revoking the status and may have been motivated by animus against non-white immigrants. “Here, injunctive relief against the President does not invade the province of executive discretion . . .; rather, enjoining the President and other executive officials from violating the TPS statute is akin to performing a ministerial duty and ensuring executive officials follow the laws enacted by the Congress.” *Id.* at 335.

In *Trump v. Vance*, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020), the Court held that the President has no categorical or absolute immunity that entitles him to block a subpoena from a *state* prosecutor, directed to his accountants and demanding his financial records. But he might have as-applied defenses if particular demands interfered with performance of his presidential duties; any issues of that sort were left open on remand. On remand, the lower courts rejected all such arguments. *Trump v. Vance*, 977 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2020). Trump promptly filed a motion in the Supreme Court for an emergency stay, but the Court did not treat the motion as an emergency. It held the motion for more than four months before denying it without opinion. *Trump v. Vance*, 141 S. Ct. 1364 (2021).

In the companion case, *Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP*, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020), the Court held that lower courts had given insufficient attention to separation of powers concerns arising from a House of Representative’s subpoena for the President’s financial records. The House did not say that it needed the records to consider impeachment; it said it needed them to consider legislation. The Court rejected the President’s argument that the subpoena should be subject to the same standards of necessity as the subpoena for records of the President’s conversations with close aides in *United States v. Nixon*, and it rejected the House’s argument that it had essentially unlimited power to gather information. It said the House could not subpoena records for law enforcement purposes, or simply to expose private wrongdoing, because that is not a legislative function. The lower courts should “carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose warrants the significant step of involving the President and his papers,” *id.* at 2035, and three more specific factors that appeared to help implement this overarching factor.

On remand, the chair of the House committee filed a detailed memorandum explaining possible legislation and the relevance of the President’s financial records. The district court rejected the subpoena for some papers, and ordered it enforced for others, based on varied judgments about the relevance of the papers sought to various legislative purposes. *Trump v. Mazars USA LLP*, 560 F. Supp. 3d 47 (D.D.C. 2021).

The D.C. Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. *Trump v. Mazars LLP*, 39 F.4th 774 (D.C. Cir. 2022). It required the disclosure of all documents from 2014-2018 indicating “any undisclosed, false, or otherwise inaccurate information” or concerns about information that might be “incomplete, inaccurate, or otherwise unsatisfactory,” all documents from November 2016 to 2018 relating to the Trump’s lease of the Old Post Office in Washington for conversion into a luxury hotel or relating to the Trump entity that held that lease, and all documents from 2017 to 2018 relating to any “financial relationships, transactions, or ties” between any Trump entity and any foreign government, or any federal or state government, or any government official.

Mazars turned over some documents to the House and ended the litigation in September 2022. Luke Broadwater, [Trump’s Former Accounting Firm Begins Turning Over Documents to Congress](#), N.Y. Times (Sept. 17, 2022). Once Republicans took control of the House after the 2022 midterm elections, they stopped the investigations of Trump and refused to enforce the settlement agreement with Mazars. Luke Broadwater & Jonathan Swan, [House Republicans Quietly Halt Inquiry into Trump’s Finances](#), N.Y. Times (Mar. 13, 2023).

B. Creating Causes of Action

Page 442. At the end of note 1.b, add:

1. The scope of *Bivens*.

b. *Bivens* as a claim-by-claim possibility. . . .

Wilkie arose on an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine (see note 9 at page 407 of the main volume), which effectively makes any recognition of a *Bivens* claim immediately appealable. Bryan Lammon writes that in light of *Wilkie* and other developments described below, “nearly every civil-rights suit against a federal official will require addressing the *Bivens* question both in the district court and, if the district court holds that a *Bivens* remedy exists, in an interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal.” Bryan Lammon, [Making Wilkie Worse: Qualified-Immunity Appeals and the Bivens Question after Ziglar and Hernandez](#), U. Chi. L. Rev. Online (July 24, 2020).

In *Hernández v. Mesa*, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020), further described in the main volume at page 406, the Supreme Court refused to extend *Bivens* in the context of a cross-border shooting—one with the shooter in the United States and victim in Mexico. The Court cited separation of powers concerns. “Unlike any previously recognized *Bivens* claim, a cross-border shooting claim has foreign relations and national security implications. In addition, Congress has been notably hesitant to create claims based on allegedly tortious conduct abroad. Because of the distinctive characteristics of cross-border shooting claims, we refuse to extend *Bivens* into this new field.” *Id.* at 739.

Professor Stephen Vladeck, who was counsel of record in *Hernández*, traced the pre-*Bivens* history of federal officials being held liable for damages in state courts under state tort law. Stephen I. Vladeck, [Constitutional Remedies in Federalism’s Forgotten Shadow](#), 107 Calif. L. Rev. 1043 (2019). A symposium on *Bivens* appears in Volume 96, No. 5 of the Notre Dame Law Review (May 2021).

Page 444. At the end of note 7, add:

7. Is *Bivens* worth the trouble? . . .

Professors Pfander, Reinert, and Schwartz used Freedom of Information Act requests to identify successful *Bivens* actions over a 10-year period. They found that in over 95 percent of the cases, “individual defendants contributed no personal resources to the resolution of the claims. Nor did the responsible federal agency pay the claims through indemnification.” James E. Pfander, Alexander A. Reinert, & Joanna C. Schwartz, [The Myth of Personal Liability: Who Pays When Bivens Claims Succeed](#), 72 Stan. L. Rev. 561, 561 (2020). Instead, judgments were paid from the Judgment Fund, money that Congress appropriates each year to pay judgments against the United States. These findings mean that the risk of liability creates no significant deterrence either against individual employees or against the agency that employs them.

Page 444. At the end of note 8, add:

8. Creeping ever closer to repudiation? . . .

In *Egbert v. Boule*, 142 S. Ct. 1793 (2022), the Court refused to recognize a *Bivens* claim for alleged excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the defendant was a Border Patrol agent. The Border Patrol was a new context.

Special factors counseling hesitation became any factor “indicating that the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.’” *Id.* at 1803 (quoting *Ziglar v. Abbasi*, 582 U.S. 120, 136 (2017)). “If there is even a single ‘reason to pause before applying *Bivens* in a new context,’ a court may not recognize a *Bivens* remedy.” *Id.* (quoting *Hernández v. Mesa*, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020)). Each partial quote was substantially beefed up with new language: “at least arguably,” and “even a single.” And it is not enough that a claim closely parallels the claim in *Bivens* itself, or in *Passman* or *Carlson* (see note 1.a at 558-559), unless the claim “also satisfies the ‘analytic framework’ prescribed by the last four decades of intervening case law.” *Id.* at 1809.

Justice Gorsuch, concurring in the judgment, thought that there are always reasons to think that Congress is a better judge than the Court, and that the Court should say so.

Justice Sotomayor dissented in part for herself and Justices Breyer and Kagan. But these three Justices concurred on narrower grounds in dismissing a claim that the agent had retaliated against plaintiff for his speech. They said that such claims might be raised against nearly any federal official in a wide range of contexts, and Congress was in better position to judge the impact of such claims on the federal service.

Professors Mascott and McCotter argue that *Egbert* “puts squarely on Congress the future question of the extent to which monetary damages recovery must be available against individual federal officials for unconstitutional acts not directly governed by *Bivens* and its several follow-on cases.” Jennifer L. Mascott & R. Trent McCotter, [Egbert v. Boule: Federal Officer Suits by Common Law](#), 2021-2022 *Cato Sup. Ct. Rev.* 111, 113.

Page 446. At the end of note 4, add:

4. The reach of *Gonzaga*. . . .

But the Court has now held that plaintiffs can sue under §1983 for at least some violations of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396r, which provides minimum standards and a set of patient rights for nursing homes that receive federal money under Medicaid, a program that provides medical care for the poor. *Talevski v. Health & Hospital Corp.*, 143 S. Ct. 1444 (2023). The Court held that the Act had sufficient rights-creating language focused on individual patients, and that its provisions for government inspections and enforcement were not inconsistent with a § 1983 remedy. The Court implied, but did not quite say, that only statutory remedies that can be invoked by an individual plaintiff are inconsistent with a § 1983 remedy. The Court rejected defendant’s argument, based on a contested history of nineteenth-century contract doctrine, that §1983 should never be available to enforce any statute that imposes conditions on recipients of federal funds. This decision may have limited scope; the Court noted that most nursing homes are privately owned and therefore not subject to §1983. But it broader implications for the survival of §1983 remedies for statutory violations.

4.1. *Miranda*. In *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court held that criminal suspects in custody must be advised of their rights before they are questioned. The case has been made famous by countless television shows. It was reaffirmed in *Dickerson v. United States*, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), but it has been riddled with exceptions and limited remedies.

Now the Court has held that *Miranda* cannot be enforced with a suit for damages under §1983. *Vega v. Tekoh*, 142 S. Ct. 2095 (2022). In the process, the Court appears to have created a narrow new category of §1983 exceptions. The Court said, not for the first time, that *Miranda* is a prophylactic rule rooted in the Constitution, and thus binding on the states, but that a *Miranda* violation is not itself a constitutional violation. Therefore, there is no §1983 claim for violating the

Constitution. *Miranda* may or may not be a federal “law,” but there is no §1983 claim for violating the laws unless the Court decides that the advantages of a damage remedy outweigh the costs. And for *Miranda*, they do not. Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Breyer and Sotomayor.

The structure of the opinion implies, but never quite says, that *Gonzaga* does not apply to constitutional claims. That is, it appears that §1983 still provides a remedy for all constitutional violations, and that *Gonzaga*’s statement equating §1983 claims with implied rights of action applies only to statutory violations.

Page 446. After note 5, add:

5.1. “Appropriate relief.” The Religious Freedom Restoration Act provides that a victim of a violation of the act “may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.” 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(c). “Government” is defined to include federal officials and any person acting under color of federal law. The Court unanimously held that the statute authorizes damages against federal employees. *Tanzin v. Tanvir*, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020). Muhammad Tanvir and other plaintiffs alleged they were put on the federal “No Fly” list for their refusal to serve as informants against their religious communities, and that doing so violated RFRA. The Court agreed that the case could go forward. “In the context of suits against Government officials, damages have long been awarded as appropriate relief. . . . A damages remedy is not just ‘appropriate’ relief as viewed through the lens of suits against Government employees. It is also the *only* form of relief that can remedy some RFRA violations. For certain injuries, such as respondents’ wasted plane tickets, effective relief consists of damages, not an injunction.” *Id.* at 491-92.

CHAPTER SEVEN

PREVENTING HARM WITHOUT COERCION: DECLARATORY REMEDIES

A. Declaratory Judgments

1. The General Case

Page 471. At the end of note 4, add:

4. When is a declaratory judgment “appropriate”? . . .

In *California v. Texas*, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2116 (2021), the Supreme Court suggested that a plaintiff has no standing for Article III purposes to seek a declaratory judgment if plaintiff would not be entitled to other relief (whether or not such relief is actually sought). That requirement seems to reject the idea that declaratory judgments have a lower standard of constitutional ripeness than claims for injunctions. It is at odds with the statute, which authorizes declaratory judgments “whether or not further relief is or could be sought.”

But the Court’s statements made sense as applied to its unusual context. Plaintiffs were seeking a declaration that an extra tax of zero percent on the income of persons who failed to buy medical insurance was unconstitutional. Absolutely nothing turned on such a declaration; plaintiffs would pay zero percent whether they did or did not buy insurance. Setting the tax rate at zero had been an indirect way of repealing the requirement to buy insurance. There was clearly no case of controversy here, and any broader statement was dictum. But of course, lower courts take Supreme Court dicta very seriously.

Page 472. After the first paragraph of note 5, add:

5. Claim and issue preclusion. . . .

The Court reemphasized the preclusive effects of declaratory judgments in *Haaland v. Brackeen*, 143 S. Ct. 1609 (2023). “Without preclusive effect, a declaratory judgment is little more than an advisory opinion.” *Id.* at 1639. But it also emphasized that the judgment is binding only on the parties.

2. The Special Case of Interfering with State Enforcement Proceedings

Page 487. At the end of the first paragraph of note 2, add:

2. The myth of mildness. . . .

In Ohio litigation during the 2020 election season, a trial court issued a declaratory judgment stating that the Ohio Secretary of State’s interpretation of Ohio law to limit the use of drop boxes to deposit mail-in ballots was contrary to Ohio law. The Ohio Secretary of State refused to abide by the declaratory judgment, and the court promptly followed it up with an injunction.

[T]he court purposely did not include an injunction because the court understood the Secretary favored allowing additional ballot drop boxes and would follow a legal ruling recognizing them as lawful. . . . However, public statements of a “spokesperson” for the Secretary after the Opinion issued as reported by news media (and now in the record) that the Secretary would not comply with the declaratory judgment without also being under an injunction required the court to reevaluate the matter. On the morning of September 16, the

court ordered the Secretary to explain his position. In response, the court has been advised the Secretary will not abide by the declaratory judgment alone. The Secretary urges the court to grant an injunction so that he may appeal.

Ohio Democratic Party v. LaRose, 2020 WL 5580378, at *1 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 16, 2020). The court did so, the Secretary appealed, and the injunction was reversed on the merits. 159 N.E.3d 1241 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020).

It is not clear why the court issued only a preliminary injunction after an apparently final declaratory judgment, or why the Secretary thought that the declaratory judgment was not appealable. Perhaps the court considered the declaratory judgment to also be preliminary; there are references to such a thing in Ohio cases. Whatever the answer to these puzzles, the case highlights that litigants who are not at all scofflaws may flout a declaratory judgment if they gain some procedural or substantive advantage from being enjoined.

D. Declaratory Relief at Law

Page 503. At the end of note 1, add:

1. Nominal damages as a way to reach the merits. . . .

The Supreme Court resolved this dispute against mootness in *Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski*, 141 S. Ct. 792 (2021). Campus police stopped plaintiff from distributing religious literature outside a college’s “free-speech zone.” Plaintiff sued for an injunction and damages; the college abandoned its restrictive policy. The lower courts held that the claims for an injunction and nominal damages were moot, and that plaintiff had not adequately pleaded compensatory damages. The cert petition presented only the nominal damages claim, and specifically the question whether a plaintiff loses standing if all that remains is a nominal damages claim for retrospective relief.

On an 8-1 vote, the Court held that the claim for nominal damages was not moot, and that seeking nominal damages satisfies the redressability requirement of Article III standing. Citing this casebook for the proposition that nominal damages were an early way of obtaining a form of declaratory judgment, Justice Thomas for the Court noted that there was no dispute that nominal damages could provide a predicate for seeking prospective relief. “For example, a trespass to land or water rights might raise a prospective threat to a property right by creating the foundation for a future claim of adverse possession or prescriptive easement.” *Id.* at 798. But there is a greater dispute in the historical record on whether nominal damages may be used for purely retrospective relief, such as damages. The Court held that the better reading of the history was to allow retrospective claims.

A contrary rule would have meant, in many cases, that there was no remedy at all for those rights, such as due process or voting rights, that were not readily reducible to monetary valuation. See D. Dobbs, *Law of Remedies* §3.3(2) (3d ed. 2018) (nominal damages are often awarded for a right “not economic in character and for which no substantial non-pecuniary award is available”); see also *Carey v. Piphus* [p. 171 of the main volume—EDS.] (awarding nominal damages for a violation of procedural due process). By permitting plaintiffs to pursue nominal damages whenever they suffered a personal legal injury, the common law avoided the oddity of privileging small-dollar economic rights over important, but not easily quantifiable, nonpecuniary rights.

Id. at 800.

Chief Justice Roberts dissented, and Justice Kavanaugh in a concurring opinion suggested that a defendant could moot a claim for nominal damages by offering plaintiff a dollar. Would such a gambit work? “Time will tell.” Douglas Laycock, [Supreme Court Says a Claim for Nominal Damages Avoids Mootness—But When Does That Matter?](https://perma.cc/P5G5-PTH6), ALI Adviser (Mar. 22, 2021) [https://perma.cc/P5G5-PTH6]. For an argument against allowing this strategy because it would undermine the vindication purpose of some nominal damages awards in §1983 litigation, see Michael L. Wells, *Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, Nominal Damages, and the Roberts Stratagem*, 56 Ga. L. Rev. 1127 (2022).

On remand, defendants attempted to deposit \$1.00 with the court and have the case dismissed as moot. The court denied these motions, citing a number of cases rejecting similar efforts to moot class actions by depositing with the court enough money to compensate the named plaintiff. The opinion on remand is *Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski*, 2021 WL 6752235 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 2021). The case then settled for nominal damages plus attorneys’ fees totaling more than \$800,000. See the account from plaintiff’s lawyers at <https://perma.cc/G84A-UWQE>.

CHAPTER EIGHT

BENEFIT TO DEFENDANT AS THE MEASURE OF RELIEF: RESTITUTION

A. Restitution from Innocent Defendants—and Some Who Are Treated as Innocent

1. Introducing Restitution—Mistake

Page 510. Replace note 9.a with the following:

9. Law and equity. . . .

a. Why no constructive trust? The main volume says that plaintiff did not seek a constructive trust, but that is not quite right. It asked for one in its pleadings, but it made no effort thereafter to prove the essential facts that might entitle it to one.

There are important restitutionary remedies that originated in equity, including constructive trust. Plaintiff needs a constructive trust when she seeks to recover a specific asset from a specific fund. Blue Cross sought a constructive trust, but the court denied that relief, because Blue Cross didn't allege the existence of specific property from a specific fund upon which to impose a trust. Blue Cross instead got a simple money judgment in restitution to be collected from defendants' general assets in the same legal way as a damage judgment would be collected. On these facts, Blue Cross got a legal remedy that could simply be described as a judgment in restitution or a judgment in unjust enrichment.

B. Recovering More Than Plaintiff Lost

1. Disgorging the Profits of Conscious Wrongdoers

Page 537. After note 9.c, add:

9.1. Reforming the SEC's version of disgorgement. In *Liu v. Securities & Exchange Commission*, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020), the Court took up the issue it had reserved in *Kokesh*. The statute authorized the SEC to seek and obtain "equitable relief," which the statute did not define or specify. 15 U.S.C. §78u(d)(5). The defendant fraudsters argued that *Kokesh* had held disgorgement to be a penalty, that equity does not enforce penalties, and that therefore, disgorgement is not equitable relief and is unavailable to the SEC. The SEC argued that equitable relief is vaguely defined and capable of expansion, and that it could include joint and several liability for the gross receipts of all conspirators, with no credit for expenses.

The Court held, in an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, that disgorgement is basically a new name for the equitable remedy traditionally known as accounting for profits. And that remedy, with modest exceptions, is limited to net profits, not gross receipts. And again with modest exceptions, each wrongdoer is liable only for his own net profits, not the profits received by others. And the SEC cannot just keep the profits for itself; it must make reasonable efforts to distribute any money recovered to the defrauded investors. So interpreted and so limited, disgorgement is equitable relief authorized by the statute. It may still be a penalty for statute of limitations purposes; the Court did not address that question.

Justice Thomas dissented. He seemed to think that disgorgement is not just a new name, but a new remedy, not historically available and therefore not included within the phrase "equitable relief." He also thought that it is poorly defined and broader than the historic scope of accounting

for profits. In places, he seemed to think that accounting for profits is more limited than it has been in most of the cases. Accounting for profits is taken up in the next principal case and in the main volume at 542-543.

The SEC responded by persuading Congress to amend §78u. It now expressly authorizes disgorgement, but it does not define disgorgement. Courts of appeals are now trying to decide whether the amendment codifies or repudiates *Liu*. A forthcoming article finds this question difficult, but concludes that the statute requires unjust enrichment and therefore precludes joint and several liability and is limited to net profits, but that it does not require the SEC to try to pass the recovered profits on to the defendant's victims. Andrew N. Vollmer, *Liu and the New SEC Disgorgement Statute*, 15 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=4416500.

Section 78t, which was not amended, says that persons who control violators (most commonly, the officers and directors of a corporation) are jointly and severally liable with the controlled violator under §78u. There's a good chance that no one in Congress focused on this, but that appears to mean joint and several liability in disgorgement for some defendants. The Vollmer article does not consider the §78t issue.

The amendments to §78u also addressed *Kokesh*, providing a ten-year statute of limitations for violations involving scienter, a securities law term for knowing violations.

9.2. Injunctions to pay restitution? The Court addressed a similar but distinct issue in *AMG Capital Management, LLC. v. Federal Trade Commission*, 141 S. Ct. 1341 (2021). Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §53(b), authorizes the Commission to obtain a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction, whenever it has reason to believe that any person "is violating, or is about to violate" any law that the FTC enforces. These injunctions have long ordered violators to refund money wrongfully taken from consumers.

But of course, "injunction" is a narrower term than "equitable relief," and the Court held that the statute does not authorize restitution of ill-gotten gains. It noted that injunctive relief is forward looking, to prevent future harms, and restitution is backward looking, to redress past wrongdoing. More important, other sections of the FTC Act do expressly authorize monetary redress to consumers. Those sections include more safeguards for defendants and require the FTC to go through its administrative process first; under §13(b), it can avoid those safeguards and go directly to court.

Pre-merger equity courts long granted restitution as incidental relief accompanying an injunction. The Court did not acknowledge that long tradition, but it did acknowledge two mid-twentieth century cases applying it. It said that those cases did not announce a universal rule for every statute, and that here, the statutory structure clearly implied that "injunction" meant only that, and did not carry incidental monetary relief with it. Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Page 543. At the end of note 4.a, add:

4. Remedies for infringement of intellectual property. . . .

a. Trademark. . . .

The Supreme Court resolved a six-six circuit split over whether the current version of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1117(a), allows for the recovery of a defendant's profits when there has been no showing of willful trademark infringement. *Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc.*, 140 S. Ct. 1492 (2020). The statutory language reads:

When . . . a violation under section 1125(a) or (d) of this title [covering trademark infringement and cyberpiracy of trademarks respectively], or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title [covering trademark dilution], shall have been established in any civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled . . . subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.

The Court refused to read a willfulness requirement into the statute, but suggested willfulness may still be relevant to the award of profits. Justice Gorsuch, offering a textualist interpretation for the majority, emphasized that the relevant part of the Lanham Act contains no express willfulness requirement, while other parts of the Lanham Act do have such a requirement or other rules about mental states. 140 S. Ct. at 1495. The Court also rejected Fossil’s argument that the provision in Section 1125 that courts should decide such cases consistent with “principles of equity” required a willfulness requirement: “[I]t seems a little unlikely Congress meant ‘principles of equity’ to direct us to a narrow rule about a profits remedy within trademark law.” *Id.* at 1496. As stated, that seems right. But “principles of equity” should have directed the Court to the much broader principle that restitution of profits is generally available only against conscious wrongdoers and defaulting fiduciaries.

Surveying the complex history of courts’ awarding of profits in pre-Lanham Act cases, the Court concluded that a defendant’s mental state “is relevant to assigning an appropriate remedy.” *Id.* at 1497. Justice Alito, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, concurred, calling willfulness “a highly important consideration in awarding profits under §1117(a), but not an absolute precondition.” *Id.* Justice Sotomayor, concurring in the judgment, went further, arguing that “a district court’s award of profits for innocent or good-faith trademark infringement would not be consonant with the ‘principles of equity’ referenced in §1117(a) and reflected in the cases the majority cites.” *Id.* at 1498.

C. Restitutionary Rights in Specific Property

2. Tracing the Property

Page 592. Make the following corrections to Problem 8-3:

In line 1, Scum sells 100 shares of Walmart from **his** mother’s account . . .

In line 4, General Electric drops to \$10, so the **300** shares are now worth \$3,000.

D. Defenses and the Rights of Third Parties

2. Payment for Value

Page 613. After note 9, add:

10. A billion-dollar example. Revlon, a manufacturer of cosmetics, borrowed nearly \$1 billion from a group of banks and hedge funds, each of which held a fractional share of the total loan. Such an arrangement is usually called a syndicated loan. Citibank was the Administrative Agent for this loan, meaning that it received payments from Revlon and distributed the cash to the various creditors.

On August 11, 2020, Citi attempted to pay \$7.8 million in interest on the loan. Instead, it paid the entire interest and principal. It paid the interest with \$7.8 million from Revlon, and it paid nearly \$900 million in principal with its own money. Citi discovered the error the next day and requested refunds from all the creditors, some of whom voluntarily returned the extra money. Other creditors refused, and Citi sued them. The loan agreement provided that New York law applied, and the federal district court held that the creditors could keep the money under *Banque Worms*. In re Citibank August 11, 2020 Wire Transfers, 520 F. Supp. 3d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Some issues were clear. Citi could ordinarily recover money paid by mistake, but not if the payment went to a creditor who was actually owed the money and received it without notice of the mistake. Citi argued that it was enough that the creditors had notice before they credited the payment to Revlon's account and discharged the debt, citing cases from Illinois, Kentucky, and the District of Columbia. But under New York law, the creditors were protected unless they had notice before or simultaneously with receiving the money. Citi had caught its mistake one day later, but in *Banque Worms*, the paying bank had asked for the money back only two hours after sending it, and before the close of business, so likely before the receiving bank had settled its accounts for the day. *Banque Worms* was controlling, and in any event, the court thought that it would be unworkable to litigate in every case just when the creditor receiving a mistaken payment had applied it to the debtor's account.

The court agreed with Citi, and with the Restatement (Third), that constructive notice is enough. But witnesses from all the creditors testified that they had assumed that Revlon had decided to prepay its loan. They swore that it never occurred to them that a sophisticated institution like Citibank had made a blunder of such magnitude. The court found this testimony credible and persuasive.

The Court of Appeals reversed. *Citibank, NA v. Bridge Capital Management, LP*, 49 F.4th 42 (2d Cir. 2022). The court convincingly argued that the creditors were on notice of the mistake. The creditors knew that Revlon was insolvent; it had no apparent source of funds with which to prepay the loan. Shares in the loan were trading at 30 cents on the dollar; it would have been much cheaper for Revlon to buy up loan shares rather than prepay in full. Just four days earlier, Revlon had been maneuvering to avoid default in a way that made no sense if it were about to prepay the loan. The loan agreement required advance notice of any prepayment; no such notice had been received.

The district court had believed the creditors' testimony that they had not suspected mistake. This sounds like a finding of fact, and the Second Circuit did not say that it was clearly erroneous. Rather, it said that the court's reliance on this testimony "reflected a misunderstanding of the inquiry notice test." *Id.* at 68. There were enough "red flags" suggesting mistake to require further inquiry, whatever the creditors subjectively believed, or even if they hadn't thought about the possibility of mistake at all, which was apparently the case for some of them. The court said that the standard was not knew or should have known, but rather enough information to lead a reasonably prudent person to inquire further. This reasoning turned the trial court's error into an error of law that the court of appeals could review *de novo*.

If the Court of Appeals had affirmed the district court, Citi would have been subrogated to the creditors' claims against Revlon, entitled to be repaid pursuant to the original terms and schedule of the loan agreement. But with Revlon in deep financial trouble, this right would likely not have been worth much. Nearly two years after the mistaken payment, Revlon filed for bankruptcy. Lauren Hirsch & Julie Creswell, [Revlon, a Makeup Staple for Generations, Files for Bankruptcy](#), N.Y. Times (June 16, 2022).

The financial press reported that the industry was shocked by the district court's judgment and

had drafted language to contract around it. See, e.g., Amanda Montano, [What Happens if You Make a Payment in Error? The LMA Responds to the Revlon Loan Dispute](#), JD Supra (Blog) (July 6, 2021), 2021 WLNR 21891398. The LMA is the Loan Market Association, which describes itself as “the authoritative voice of the syndicated loan market” in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. This development raises questions about whether the industry really needs or supports the *Banque Worms* rule, and perhaps, whether and how mistaken payments on a syndicated loan are different from mistaken wire transfers for other purposes.

Meanwhile, a British branch of Banco Santander, an international bank based in Spain, paid out \$175 million in duplicate payments to 75,000 recipients on December 25, 2021. Merry Christmas everybody! Amanda Holpuch, [British Bank Makes \\$175 Million in Mistaken Payments](#), N.Y. Times (Jan. 1, 2022). Whatever the relevant law in the United Kingdom, recovering 75,000 payments averaging a little more than \$2,000 each may be completely unworkable. Santander was trying to recover through the various banks holding the accounts in which the mistaken payments were deposited.

CHAPTER NINE

ANCILLARY REMEDIES: ENFORCING THE JUDGMENT

A. Enforcing Coercive Orders: The Contempt Power

1. The Three Kinds of Contempt

Page 624. At the end of note 1, add:

1. The basic distinctions. . . .

The Supreme Court clarified the required state of mind for civil compensatory contempt, at least in the bankruptcy context and apparently more generally, in *Taggart v. Lorenzen*, 139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019). At the end of a bankruptcy proceeding, a bankruptcy court typically enters a “discharge order” releasing the debtor from liability for most prebankruptcy debts. The order prevents creditors from attempting to collect any debt covered by the order. In *Taggart*, a creditor attempted to collect from a debtor after a discharge order, and the bankruptcy court held the creditor in civil compensatory contempt under a strict liability standard. The Ninth Circuit, reversing, said that the appropriate standard for judging the creditor’s state of mind was subjective good faith.

The Supreme Court, unanimously reversing the Ninth Circuit, rejected both standards and applied a standard of objective reasonableness:

[A] court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order if there is *no fair ground of doubt* as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct. In other words, civil contempt may be appropriate if there is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct might be lawful.

Id. at 1799 (emphasis in original).

“This standard reflects the fact that civil contempt is a ‘severe remedy,’ and that principles of ‘basic fairness requir[e] that those enjoined receive explicit notice’ of ‘what conduct is outlawed’ before being held in civil contempt.” *Id.* at 1802.

The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s subjective good faith standard as:

inconsistent with traditional civil contempt principles, under which parties cannot be insulated from a finding of civil contempt based on their subjective good faith. It also relies too heavily on difficult-to-prove states of mind. And it may too often lead creditors who stand on shaky legal ground to collect discharged debts, forcing debtors back into litigation (with its accompanying costs) to protect the discharge that it was the very purpose of the bankruptcy proceeding to provide.

Id. at 1802-1803. The Court added that subjective bad faith also could be grounds for civil contempt.

The Court’s reliance on “traditional civil contempt principles,” and not on anything specific to the Bankruptcy Code, suggests that the statements from lower courts in the second paragraph of note 1 in the main volume are no longer operative. In one of those cases, the court of appeals

affirmed the finding of no contempt without discussion, but vacated and remanded on other grounds. *Grubbs v. O’Neill*, 744 F. App’x 20 (2d Cir. 2018).

Plausible claims of objective doubt as to what the injunction prohibits may arise far more frequently with respect to discharge orders than with respect to other injunctions. Injunctions are supposed to individuate the law’s command, specifying what defendant is required to do or refrain from doing in the circumstances of the particular case. But “discharge orders are written in general terms and operate against a complex statutory backdrop . . .” *Id.* at 1803. The order typically says only that the bankrupt debtor is discharged, *id.* at 1799; the statute says that this operates as an injunction against further collection efforts, 11 U.S.C. §524(a)(2); and the statute also lists 19 categories of debts that are excepted from the discharge, 11 U.S.C. §523. The scope of these exceptions is the subject of vast amounts of litigation, and the law leaves that litigation to later collection efforts; the discharge order does nothing to further specify the scope of the discharge. So *Taggart* applies traditional principles of civil contempt to a very untraditional injunction.

2. How Much Risk of Abuse to Overcome How Much Defiance?

a. Perpetual Coercion?

Page 635. At the end of note 6, add:

6. Recalcitrant witnesses. . . .

Former U.S. Army intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning was sentenced to 35 years in prison in 2013 for disclosing classified materials to WikiLeaks without authorization. President Obama commuted her sentence in 2017. The release did not end her legal troubles. Manning was jailed in coercive civil contempt for 62 days in 2019 for failing to disclose information about WikiLeaks to a federal grand jury. Authorities released her after the grand jury’s term expired, but just days later she headed back to jail after she refused to speak with another grand jury. Jacey Fortin, [*Chelsea Manning Ordered Back to Jail for Refusal to Testify in WikiLeaks Inquiry*](#), N.Y. Times (May 16, 2019). Manning was released in March 2020 but is still being required to pay \$256,000 in fines because of her refusal to speak to the second grand jury. Charlie Savage, [*Chelsea Manning Is Ordered Released From Jail*](#), N.Y. Times (Mar. 12, 2020). If she is unable to pay, which seems likely, she cannot be imprisoned for failure to do so.

b. Anticipatory Contempt

Page 642. After note 6, add:

7. A reverse twist. In *Azar v. Garza*, 138 S. Ct. 1790 (2018), it was the plaintiff who beat the defendant to the punch. We are omitting many details, but even so, some chronology is required to explain what was at issue.

In September 2017, Jane Doe entered the United States as an undocumented and unaccompanied minor. She was immediately apprehended and placed in a federally funded shelter in Texas. An initial medical exam revealed that she was eight weeks pregnant. She said she wanted an abortion, but the federal government refused to let her leave the shelter to obtain one.

On October 18, a federal district court issued a temporary restraining order directing defendants to allow Doe to be transported the nearest abortion clinic, first for the mandatory counseling required by Texas law and then for the abortion. *Garza v. Hargan*, 2017 WL 4707287

(D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2017). On October 19, a panel of the court of appeals stayed that order with respect to the abortion, but she received the counseling that day. 2017 WL 4707112 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 2017).

On October 24, the court of appeals en banc vacated the stay. 874 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Various lawyers for the two sides e-mailed back and forth through the afternoon and evening and late into the night. Doe's lawyers tried to have her taken to the clinic that evening, but it was too late. In the course of trying to arrange her transportation on the 24th, one of her lawyers said that the doctor who had counseled her was not available that day (the 24th). This implied that she would be counseled a second time by a different doctor, which would trigger a new 24-waiting period under Texas law.

Her lawyers got her an appointment for early on October 25. The government informed her lawyers that on the morning of the 25th, it would seek a stay of the en banc court's decision. At 8:00 a.m. on the 25th, the doctor who had originally counseled Doe on the 19th performed the abortion.

This case is like the anticipatory contempt cases in that she obtained the abortion while knowing that the government was about to seek an emergency stay. It is different in that such a stay, even if obtained, would not have been an order against Doe. It would simply have freed the government from the district court's TRO so that it could again refuse to allow her transport to an abortion clinic. Doe would not have been in contempt even if the stay had been granted and she had somehow gotten the abortion anyway.

So instead of filing a contempt motion against Doe, the government asked the Supreme Court to discipline her lawyers. The government could have filed its stay application on the afternoon or evening of the 24th, but it claimed that Doe's lawyers had led it to believe that she would be counseled by a new doctor on the 25th and that therefore, no abortion could be performed until the 26th. Doe's lawyers responded that nothing in the e-mail trail had made such a representation, and that they had no duty to keep the government continuously updated on her plans or progress.

The Court declined to impose sanctions. It commented on a lawyer's duty not to make false statements; "it is critical that lawyers and courts alike be able to rely on one another's representations." *Azar*, 138 S. Ct. at 1793. But "not all communication breakdowns constitute misconduct." *Id.* The Court declined to investigate the factual disputes about who was to blame for the government being caught by surprise.

B. Collecting Money Judgments

1. Execution, Garnishment, and the Like

Page 681. After note 6, add:

7. Venmo, Zelle, and other non-traditional payment methods. How to collect from judgment debtors who do not keep funds in traditional bank accounts? Journalist Yashar Ali owed a Getty heir hundreds of thousands of dollars in unpaid loans. "The debt collector is asking L.A. Superior Court for the power to seize funds sent to Ali on various online platforms, including PayPal, Venmo, Zelle, GoFundMe and Square. The debt collector also wants 'all rights to future payments' that Ali may get from his newsletter on Substack; income he derives from Twitter, where he has more than 700,000 followers; as well as future payments he may get from freelance journalism he publishes at HuffPost, MSNBC News or New York magazine, according to the

filing.” Matt Hamilton, [Twitter Star Yashar Ali Still Owes \\$230,000 to Getty Heir; A Debt Collector Now Wants His Income](#), L.A. Times (Apr. 24, 2023). Garnishment should be available for these income sources just like any other, but actually identifying and stopping payments might be more difficult in practice.

Page 682. At the end of note 1, add:

1. What if a solvent defendant won’t pay? . . .

The dispute between AGI and BI ended with a global settlement of all claims. Biolitec voluntarily dismissed its sixth appeal. *AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG*, 2019 WL 10734652 (1st Cir. Mar. 25, 2019). The trial court vacated the various contempt orders and the arrest warrant against the CEO, with AGI’s consent. [Agreed Motion to Vacate Civil Contempt Orders and Arrest Warrant at 1, *AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG*, No. 3:09-cv-30181 Doc. 674 \(D. Mass. Apr. 24, 2019\)](#) (with handwritten notation of order). The orders do not reveal what AGI received in exchange for all this, but presumably it was a substantial partial payment.

Page 684. At the end of note 9, add:

9. Harassment. . . .

But a law firm whose only role is to foreclose a mortgage in a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding (which is permitted in about half the states) is not subject to most of the Act. *Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP*, 139 S. Ct. 1029 (2019). This unanimous opinion was principally based on the negative implications of a sentence providing that such a firm is a debt collector for purposes of a single subsection. *Id.* at 1036-1037.

Page 684. After note 9, add:

9.1. RICO? A frustrated plaintiff has invoked the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §1961 et seq., in his attempt to collect a judgment. *Yegiazaryan v. Smagin*, 2023 WL 4110234 (U.S. June 22, 2023). The dispute began in Russia, where defendant defrauded plaintiff; defendant then moved to Beverly Hills to avoid criminal prosecution in Russia. Plaintiff got a large arbitration award in London, and then obtained a California judgment enforcing that award. Defendant took aggressive steps to hide assets and prevent collection of the judgment. RICO provides a civil remedy with treble damages for persons injured by two or more violations of any of a set of listed criminal statutes. Plaintiff alleged that much of what defendant had done was wire fraud, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice, all on the list of predicate offenses for RICO.

RICO does not apply extraterritorially, and the issue in the Supreme Court was whether plaintiff had suffered a RICO injury in the United States. The Court said yes. Plaintiff’s injury was inability to collect his California judgment, that injury occurred in California, and the whole scheme was organized and carried out from California. It didn’t matter that many of the assets had been transferred abroad, or that plaintiff would experience his economic losses in Russia, where he still lived. The Court appeared to assume, but did not decide, that plaintiff had stated a valid RICO claim.

3. Preserving Assets Before Judgment

Page 702. At the end of note 1, add:

1. Freidman’s other problems. . . .

It turns out that the collapse of taxi medallion prices was driven not just by Uber and Lyft, but also by a bubble driven by price manipulators and predatory lenders in the years before Uber and Lyft. And one of the major manipulators was apparently Evgeny Freidman. He bought medallions at inflated prices in the belief that such purchases would drive up the market price and increase the value of the other medallions that he already owned. Brian M. Rosenthal, [*‘They Were Conned’: How Reckless Loans Devastated a Generation of Taxi Drivers*](#), N.Y. Times (May 19, 2019). The scheme is further detailed in Brian M. Rosenthal, [*The Epic Rise and Hard Fall of New York’s Taxi King*](#), N.Y. Times (Dec. 5, 2019). Freidman was sentenced to five years’ probation on the tax-fraud charges in exchange for his cooperation in the government’s prosecution of Michael Cohen, who was President Trump’s former lawyer and “fixer.” Freidman died from a heart attack in 2021. Sam Roberts, [*Gene Freidman, ‘Taxi King’ Who Upended His Industry, Dies at 50*](#), N.Y. Times (Oct. 25, 2021).

CHAPTER ELEVEN

REMEDIAL DEFENSES

B. Unclean Hands and *In Pari Delicto*

Page 766. At the end of note 1, add:

1. Two defenses. . . .

Gilead and Merck competed in selling drugs to treat Hepatitis C. Gilead sued for a declaration that Merck’s treatment patents were invalid and that Gilead was not infringing Merck’s patent. Merck counterclaimed for infringement. *Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Merck & Co., Inc.*, 888 F.3d 1231, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2018). After preliminary rulings that favored Merck, Gilead eventually stipulated that it had infringed, and the jury awarded \$200 million in damages. The district court then held a bench trial on Gilead’s “equitable defenses,” including unclean hands, and ruled that Merck could not collect its damages because of both its pre-litigation business conduct and its litigation tactics. The Federal Circuit affirmed, without discussing whether unclean hands could be used to defeat a legal remedy such as damages, and without acknowledging that it had recently been reversed on the related question of whether another equitable defense, laches, could be applied to claims for damages from patent infringement. See the main volume at 785. The Supreme Court denied cert, despite an amicus brief by Professor Samuel Bray arguing that if the Federal Circuit decision were allowed to stand, the “right to trial by jury in patent cases will be severely undermined by the reconsideration of damage awards via equitable defenses,” and that the decision would “cause confusion throughout the lower courts about whether equitable defenses apply to claims for legal remedies.” [Brief for Samuel L. Bray As Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners](#) at 4-5, *Merck & Co., Inc. v. Gilead Sciences, Inc.*, 139 S. Ct. 797 (2019) (No. 18-378).

C. Estoppel and Waiver

1. Equitable Estoppel

Page 772. After note 5, add:

5.1. More on estoppel and federal claims. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the rule that an owner of a patent who assigns (sells) the patent to another, and explicitly or implicitly represents that the patent is valid, is estopped from later asserting in litigation against the assignee (buyer) that the patent is invalid. *Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc.*, 141 S. Ct. 2298 (2021). The issue typically arises when the original inventor who assigned the patent later invents something new and related that competes with the original version.

The rule is called “assignor estoppel” in patent law, and it appears to be a straightforward application of general estoppel principles. But Justices Alito and Barrett filed dissents, and Thomas and Gorsuch joined the Barrett dissent. There was some disagreement about precedent, but the principal ground of the dissents appears to be that estoppel cannot be applied in patent cases because it is not codified in the Patent Act. This approach to statutory interpretation would wipe out all kinds of long-established background principles of law, including the remedial defenses, unless Congress thinks to write them into every statute creating a federal cause of action. Or perhaps Congress could enact a universally applicable estoppel statute. There probably isn’t much political incentive to do that.

2. Waiver

Page 777. At the end of note 2, add:

2. Is reliance required? . . .

The Supreme Court has reaffirmed, without discussion, that reliance is not required for waiver under federal law. *Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.*, 142 S. Ct. 1708 (2022). The issue was whether there should be an exception to this rule for waiver of a right to arbitration instead of litigation. Plaintiff sued her employer in a class action alleging systematic violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The employer litigated for eight months before first alleging that plaintiff’s employment contract contained an arbitration clause. The Eighth Circuit, following most others, held that because of the federal policy favoring arbitration, defendant could not waive its right to arbitration unless plaintiff was prejudiced. The majority found no prejudice in eight months of wasted litigation; the district judge, and the dissenter, found prejudice.

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is no arbitration exception to the general federal rule that waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right and that prejudice is not required. And it said that the federal policy favoring arbitration is only a rule that courts should not discriminate against arbitration, not that they should create special rules favoring it.

D. Laches

Page 782. At the end of note 2, add:

2. Prejudice and preventive injunctions. . . .

The Arizona Libertarians did not give up their legal fight after the district court denied a preliminary injunction. Eventually the district court granted summary judgment for the state on the merits and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the law did not violate the party’s constitutional rights. But it took another three years to get that final resolution. *Arizona Libertarian Party v. Hobbs*, 925 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2019).

Page 783. At the end of note 6, add:

6. Speculating at defendant’s expense. . . .

Laches also figured heavily in 2020 post-election litigation. President Trump refused to concede his race to Joe Biden, claiming without evidence that election irregularities led to Biden’s victory. Trump and his allies brought over 60 lawsuits, losing all but a few inconsequential ones. A number of courts rejected Trump’s post-election claims as barred by laches, because they raised issues about election rules that could have been raised well before the election. E.g., *Kelly v. Commonwealth*, 240 A.3d 1255 (Pa. 2020); *Trump v. Biden*, 951 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 2020).

E. Statutes of Limitation

1. Continuing Violations

Page 792. At the end of note 5, add:

5. Tolling rules. . . .

In *McDonough v. Smith*, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019), the Court held that when a §1983 claim accrues, and therefore when the statute of limitations begins to run, is a question of federal law, even though the number of years is borrowed from a state statute. *McDonough*, a former election

official, was prosecuted for ballot tampering. The first trial ended in a mistrial and the second in an acquittal. McDonough alleged that the prosecution was based on fabricated evidence, and he brought a §1983 suit against the special prosecutor. The Court held that the §1983 action against the special prosecutor accrued upon McDonough's acquittal at the second trial, and not at the earlier times when the fabricated evidence was first used against him or when he first learned that the evidence was fabricated. The Court analogized the claim to accrual rules applicable to common law tort actions for malicious prosecution, and it distinguished the very harsh results in similar false imprisonment claims, summarized at page 1040 of the main volume.

Justice Thomas, joined by Gorsuch and Kagan, dissented, arguing that McDonough did not clearly articulate the constitutional basis for his fabricated evidence claim, and that until he did so, it was impossible to evaluate either his analogy to malicious prosecution or his argument that the prosecutor engaged in a continuing violation. (The majority did not reach the continuing violation argument.) The dissenters also noted that McDonough brought a separate state-law malicious prosecution claim, which the trial court dismissed on grounds of absolute immunity, and it was unclear how the §1983 fabricated evidence claim was different. They would have dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. On absolute prosecutorial immunity, see the main volume at 424-433.

The Court held that the statute of limitations begins to run on a §1983 claim to DNA testing when the state litigation ends, in this case when the state court of last resort denied a petition for rehearing. *Reed v. Goertz*, 598 U.S. 230, 143 S. Ct. 955 (2023). Three Justices dissented.

2. The Discovery Rule

Page 800. At the end of note 9, add:

9. Codification. . . .

The Court in *Rotkiske v. Klemm*, 140 S. Ct. 355 (2019), appeared to further close the door on reading discovery rules into federal statutes that do not expressly state the discovery rule. At issue was a limitation clause in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) authorizing private civil actions against debt collectors who engage in certain prohibited practices. An action under the FDCPA may be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. §1692k(d). The Court wrote that “[a] textual judicial supplementation is particularly inappropriate when, as here, Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted language or provision,” citing other statutes that explicitly included the discovery rule. 140 S. Ct. at 361. The Court distinguished the general discovery rule, which it entirely and unanimously rejected, from what it called the “equitable, fraud-specific discovery rule.” *Id.* at 357. But it held that plaintiff had not preserved the equitable issue for appeal.

Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, thought the equitable rule had been preserved and that it applied where the underlying claim was for fraud and also where defendant fraudulently concealed the claim. The defendant in the FDCPA case had sued plaintiff on a debt allegedly barred by the statute of limitations. She would not have treated that as a fraud. Defendant had served the debt-collection complaint on a person found at an old address where plaintiff no longer lived, filed a false affidavit of service, and had allegedly done so knowingly. Then it got a default judgment on the time-barred debt when plaintiff, who knew nothing of the case, failed to appear. She would have treated the deliberate failure to serve process and the false affidavit as frauds that supported application of the equitable doctrine.

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) requires plaintiffs with “actual knowledge” of an alleged fiduciary breach to file suit within three years of gaining that knowledge rather than within the 6-year period that would otherwise apply. 29 U.S.C. §1113. The Court held that a plaintiff does not necessarily have “actual knowledge” of the information contained in disclosures that he receives but does not read or cannot recall reading. *Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma*, 140 S. Ct. 768 (2020).

In *Sulyma*, the plaintiff alleged that Intel invested his retirement funds in unduly risky investments with excessive fees. Intel says that it disclosed all these investments in various plan documents that were sent to all employees, including fact sheets on individual investments. But plaintiff says he never read those disclosures or at least has no memory of ever seeing them. The Court rejected Intel’s argument that it need not prove a plaintiff’s “actual knowledge,” and remanded for resolution of the factual dispute over plaintiff’s knowledge.

CHAPTER TWELVE

FLUID-CLASS AND CY PRES REMEDIES

Page 819. At the end of note 6, add:

6. The Supreme Court steps in, in a case where plaintiffs recovered nothing. . . .

The Supreme Court declined to reach the merits, remanding the case to consider potential standing problems under *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (a case further described in the main volume at page 213). *Frank v. Gaos*, 139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019). The Court then tightened the *Spokeo* standing rules even further in *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021). The Court has not yet taken another case to revisit the cy pres issue.