You can find the majority decision, a concurrence, and the dissent at this link. It’s not every day I side with the conservative justices on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, but they are surely right here. As the majority explained: “As related to this matter, the governor deleted entire words and some numbers from Sections 402, 403, 404, and 408 of Senate Bill 70. The result, published as 2023 Wisconsin Act 19, authorized a $325 per pupil revenue limit increase from 2023–2425,
extending the provision by 400 additional years.”
Here’s the key edit:

Here’s the introduction to Richard Briffault’s amicus brief in this case (authored by Rob Yablon and Bryna Godar):
Wisconsin’s partial veto power stands at a fork in the road. For decades, this Court has been the most permissive in the nation in condoning broad partial vetoes, an outlier even among states with similar constitutional text. But the Court’s most recent precedent has rejected creative partial vetoes, albeit without binding reasoning. See Bartlett v. Evers, 2020 WI 68, ¶ 4, 393 Wis. 2d 172, 945 N.W.2d 685 (per curiam). As the Court considers the future of this jurisprudence, it should maintain guidelines that phold the partial veto’s founding purpose: facilitating the democracy-promoting system of bicameralism and presentment, not subverting it.
Wisconsinites adopted the partial veto to address a defect of early twentieth century democracy: the “[v]ery definite evils” of legislative malfeasance through “log-rolling” multiple measures that “could not pass on their own merits.” State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 442, 447–48, 289 N.W. 662 (1940). As this Court has correctly recognized, the partial veto is a broad gubernatorial power. State ex rel. Wis. Tel. Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 314–15, 260 N.W. 486 (1935). By design, it is an affirmative or even “quasi legislative” power. Id. at 315. “By putting asunder what the legislature has put together,” a partial veto necessarily “results in laws that the legislature never passed.” Briffault at 1174.
But the power is not limitless. The governor may only reject “part” of an appropriations bill for the legislature’s “reconsideration”—he may not invent entirely novel provisions. Wis. Const. art. V, § 10. Neither the text nor purpose of Wisconsin’s partial veto provision establishes a loophole for the governor to act as a unilateral lawmaker. Using the veto to add unforeseen measures cannot be squared with the state constitution’s structural commitment to deliberative, accountable lawmaking. Whatever the merits of this or any individual policy dispute, such an unbounded power is corrosive to democracy in the long run. Line-drawing in partial veto cases is inherently difficult; no state court has avoided close judgment calls. Yet this Court, like every court to consider the question nationwide, has recognized a role for state courts in preventing the partial veto power’s misuse. This is an appropriate case in which to resist further expansion.By striking individual digits and words to convert a two-year revenue limit increase to a 402-year increase, the governor here engaged in novel lawmaking that exceeds this Court’s prior approvals (at least under the Constitution’s current text). Allowing this creativity would further depart from the Constitution’s text, history, and structure and its core democratic commitments. And it would make Wisconsin even more of an outlier among states with partial vetoes.