

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF KINGS: CRIMINAL TERM

-----X
IN THE MATTER :
OF :
CONFIDENTIAL INVESTIGATION R84-11 :
-----X

INTRODUCTION

This is the report of the Term VII extended Grand Jury submitted pursuant to C.P.L. §190.85(1)(c).

The Grand Jury conducted an investigation of fraud and illegality in certain primary elections in Kings County. Officials of the Board of Elections testified as to the manner in which elections are conducted, how the Board's records are received, maintained and utilized, and the manner in which the public gains access to those records. The Grand Jury itself made an on-site inspection of the premises occupied by the Board of Elections for Kings County. Most significantly, the Grand Jury heard and credited the testimony of three witnesses who admitted and explained how they violated the Election Law on numerous occasions.

The Grand Jury examined the activities of a group of individuals with respect to efforts they made to influence, by fraud and illegality, the outcome of primary elections in a limited

geographic area of Kings County from 1968 to 1982. During that period eight primary elections were held, each of them typically including separate races for state legislative positions, Congressional seats and party offices. One or more fraudulent practices occurred in at least one race in each of these eight elections.

The Grand Jury found evidence of fraudulent and illegal practices in two primary elections for Congress held in 1976 and 1982, four primary elections for the Assembly in three different assembly districts, three primary elections for the State Senate in one senatorial district and two elections for state committee in two different districts. Although the Grand Jury was unable to determine the influence of these practices on each election, the testimony indicates that the outcome of at least one state committee election in 1978 was affected by fraudulent activities.

In essence, the investigation revealed that a group of individuals over a fourteen year period engaged in various fraudulent and illegal practices designed to influence the outcome of elections. These practices included the forgery of voter registration cards with the names of fictitious persons, the filing of these cards with the Board of Elections, the recruitment of people to cast multiple votes on behalf of specified candidates using these forged cards or the cards of deceased and other persons,

and the forgery of voter registration cards after an election on behalf of the losing candidate in order to establish a basis for voiding the election.

The core of the democratic process is the right of the people to choose their representatives in fair elections. Fraud in the election process is intolerable. The evidence in this case identified a number of serious fraudulent abuses repeatedly utilized for over a decade. In addition, the ease and boldness with which these fraudulent schemes were carried out shows the vulnerability of our entire electoral process to unscrupulous and fraudulent manipulation. Methods must be devised to secure the integrity of elections. The Grand Jury is not advocating that existing electoral rights be restricted or unduly encumbered, but that safeguards be created to protect those rights from being undermined by fraud. In addition, we call upon the Governor and state legislature to undertake a broader study of the issue and institute appropriate reforms to protect the electoral process.

This report will summarize the evidence before the Grand Jury, set forth specific instances of abuse of the electoral process, and recommend administrative and legislative reforms.

Legal Background

The New York State Election Law provides for the establishment of a Board of Elections of the City of New York with headquarters in Manhattan and an office in each borough

(Election Law §§3-200, 3-214). The function of the Board is to conduct elections, including general elections, primary elections, school board elections and what are commonly known as community anti-poverty elections.

To be allowed to vote an eligible person must register beforehand. The rules governing registration and enrollment of voters are found in Article 5 of the Election Law. In addition to providing for central registration to be conducted at the main office or branch offices of the Board of Elections, and local registration to be run by the Board of Inspectors, the law also permits any qualified person to apply for registration or party enrollment by mail. Further, section 5-210 of the Election Law provides that "[a]pplication forms for use pursuant to [mail registration] shall be furnished by a County Board of Elections to any person requesting such form. . . . Each County Board of Elections shall also cause such application forms to be as widely and freely distributed as possible." ¹

Registration is accomplished by an applicant's completion of a voter registration card (commonly referred to as a "buff card"). (Exhibit 1). The front side of this document contains spaces for the voter's name, address, physical description, voting history, citizenship and party enrollment, as well as a

¹Mail registration also encompasses street registrations commonly seen at street fairs and the like.

statement signed by the applicant affirming that the information contained on the card is true. The front of the card also contains a space for official designation of the applicant's election district and assembly district, as well as party affiliation.

The reverse side of the card contains a space for the applicant's signature at the time of registration as well as spaces for his/her signature each time he/she votes.

Two poll inspectors supervise the voting at the polls for each election district. (Election Law §8-302(1)). Before being allowed to vote, the voter must sign the back of his/her voter registration card. "The two inspectors shall satisfy themselves by a comparison of this signature with his registration signature and by comparison of his appearance with the descriptive material on the face of the voter registration card that he is the person registered." (Election Law §8-304(1)).

An inspector then writes in the date, other information required for the election and the inspector's own initials next to the voter's signature on the voter registration card. The person is then allowed to vote.

Structure of the Board

Each county's Board of Elections office maintains the voter registration cards for the voters of that county. The office of the Board of Elections for Kings County is located at 345 Adams Street, Brooklyn, New York, a twelve-story office building. The voter

registration cards, as well as other records, are received and maintained on the fourth floor of that building.

This fourth floor facility is split into two main areas. One area is used to receive and process new voter registration cards. The other area houses the voter registration cards which are maintained in large books by election district and assembly district.

New voter registration cards are received by the Board and processed in an assembly-line fashion. The cards are checked to ensure that all the requested information has been provided. Party affiliation, if noted by the applicant, is stamped onto the card. A serial number is then affixed to each completed card. Each card is photocopied, arranged by election and assembly district and added to the appropriate book of voter registration cards. Finally, to determine if the submitted application is legitimate, a serial number sticker corresponding to the number on the voter registration card is affixed to a voter registration notice (Exhibit 2) and mailed to the applicant in a nonforwardable envelope. If the notice is returned by the post office as non-deliverable, the address is checked. If satisfied that the mailing information on the envelope in which the card was sent is correct, the Board employees remove the voter registration card from its book so that it will not be used on election day. This mail notice system is the only check done to verify that a legitimate

registration has been filed.

The books containing the voter registration cards are kept in long freestanding bookcase-type shelving units which are approximately eight feet tall and form several aisles in the second main area on the fourth floor. Tables and chairs are arranged at intervals in front of each unit giving the appearance of library stacks. The effect of this arrangement is to give a significant amount of privacy in certain sections of the registration book area.

All voter registration records maintained by the Board of Elections are deemed by Section 3-220 of the Election Law to be public records and are required to be made "open to public inspection under the immediate supervision of the Board of Elections or its employees and subject to such reasonable regulations as such Board may impose." In Kings County, it is the Board's practice to require an individual seeking access to the voter registration card books to stop at a long three-sided counter which cordons off the main areas of the Board's fourth floor premises. The individual is supposed to complete an access card (Exhibit 3) on which the individual indicates what records he/she wishes to examine, as well as the reason for the examination. The person is also supposed to give his/her name and address. The card contains a warning that mutilation of Election Board records is a penal offense.

Upon completion of the access card, the person is given the requested material by a Board of Elections employee at the counter or is permitted to enter the area where the voter registration cards are kept if there are several other people who are also inspecting public records at the same time. In the latter situation, a Board of Elections employee is supposed to supervise a visitor by accompanying him/her into the area where the voter registration cards are maintained and remaining there to assure that the individual does not deface the records. However, the assignment of one employee to supervise one visitor cannot be accomplished when the demand for access to the voter registration cards is great. In that case one employee must supervise a number of individuals. The number of employees available for supervision is not fixed; availability depends upon whether other Board duties require the attention of employees who would otherwise have been available to supervise.

Creation of Bogus Voter Registration Cards

(a) Pre-1976 Practices

Prior to the institution of mail-in registration in 1976, all blank voter registration cards were serialized and a certain number kept in each voter registration book for each election district. These cards were used to register voters during the two days on which local registration drives were conducted by the Board of Elections. On those days persons approved by the Board as

inspectors were sent to local schools and other officially designated sites with the voter registration books for the purpose of registering new voters. According to one witness who participated in illegal election practices, this system provided two means for creating bogus voter registration cards that could be used to generate illegal votes during the primary election.

The first method of creating bogus registration cards involved individuals who appeared at the sites and completed blank voter registration cards under fictitious names. The Board of Elections did not check the accuracy or legitimacy of registrations obtained by its representatives during these drives. Each applicant was provided with a voter identification card at the time of registration so there was no need to mail any other documentation or information which might have served as a check on the accuracy of the information provided.

The second method of creating bogus cards necessarily involved enlisting the cooperation of an inspector who was in charge of the voter registration books at the local site. The scheme entailed removing from the books a number of blank cards which were then taken to another location and turned over to individuals who completed them with fictitious names. This conduct was in contravention of Election Law §5-204(5) which prohibits the removal of voter registration cards or blanks from the voter registration card books that are taken to local registration sites.

The bogus cards were then returned to the local registration sites before the end of the registration drive. The inspector who was an accomplice in this scheme placed these cards in alphabetical order among the cards of legitimately registered voters, making the bogus cards virtually undetectable.

Testimony revealed that a third method of creating fictitious cards prior to 1976 was used during local political club drives as opposed to the drives run by the Board of Elections as described above. The individuals seeking to create bogus cards caused accomplices to be appointed as Democratic or Republican Party Election inspectors. These individuals were then permitted by the Board to take blank voter registration cards ostensibly to register new voters. They were in fact used not only to register legitimate new voters, but to create fictitious registrants as well. Upon receipt of the voter registration cards, the Board prepared and mailed voter identification cards to the new voters. Although the primary purpose of this mailing was merely to send out the identification card, it was also intended to ensure that a real person had registered. The Board of Elections relied on the post office to return as undeliverable any cards addressed to fictitious registrants. But, in fact, mail carriers often did not return these cards particularly where the address on the card was that of a large multiple dwelling. In such cases mail carriers would frequently leave the undeliverable

voter identification cards in a common area of the building. Taking advantage of this fact, individuals creating bogus voter registration cards used addresses of multiple dwellings in which one of them resided. That resident was assigned the job of collecting the undelivered voter identification cards left in the common area and turning them over to the interested organization. To minimize the possibility that an accomplice would mistakenly take a card sent to a legitimate voter, the creators of the fictitious cards were careful to use only names starting with one particular letter for each address, for example, "B", and the accomplice would collect only those cards with a name starting with that letter. The cards could then be used by the persons who went to vote under the assumed names as proof of identity in case they were challenged.

(b) Post-1976 Practices

The advent of mail-in registration in 1976 made the creation of bogus registration cards even easier and less subject to detection. In a laudable effort to increase voter registration, the Board allows almost any organization to obtain bulk quantities of these cards by presenting to the Board the letterhead stationery of that organization. These cards contain no identifying serial number at the time they are given out.

According to testimony, mail-in registration has become the principal means of perpetrating election fraud and has

apparently resulted in the abandonment of the pre-1976 election fraud methods.² The new scheme involves obtaining quantities of blank mail-in voter registration cards from the Board of Elections. These applications, which become voter registration cards when accepted and filed by the Board of Elections, are then filled out with fictitious first names and last names taken from party enrollment books within the targeted voting district.³ For example, if a John Brown actually lived at 1 Park Place, Brooklyn, New York, the application would be completed in the name of Mary Brown, 1 Park Place, Brooklyn, New York. It was anticipated that when the mail for the fictitious Mary Brown was delivered to John Brown at his address, John Brown would discard the notice rather than return it to the post office. This plan reduced the likelihood that the voter registration notice card would be returned to the Board of Elections thereby minimizing the possibility that the fraud would be detected.

People voting under bogus voter registration cards used one of two methods to avoid detection. In some cases the person creating the voter registration card entered his/her own physical

²The creation by statute of mail-in registration did not affect the statutory provisions authorizing local registration by the Board of Elections. Theoretically, the abuses described above can still occur.

³The party enrollment book is a Board of Elections document listing all voters by party.

description on the card and would later vote using that card. Since that individual's handwriting matched the signature on the card, the scheme was virtually undetectable. In other cases the person creating the card entered a physical description so general that it would be met by numerous people engaged in the scheme.

The participants in the fraud would mail or deliver the bogus registration cards to the Board of Elections, usually with a group of legitimate registrations. Prior to primary day, the party enrollment book would be checked to see if the phony cards had been accepted. As a further check, workers would be sent to the Board of Elections to review the voter registration books under the guise of checking petitions to make sure the bogus registration cards were in the books.

In 1978, in one legislative race, approximately 1,000 bogus voter registration cards were filed. In a 1980 legislative race, between 1,500 and 2,000 bogus cards were prepared but were not filed because the opposition candidate did not ultimately run in the primary. In a 1982 legislative race, approximately 1,000 such cards were forged, but the Grand Jury could not determine whether they were filed. In each of these races the bogus cards were obtained through the use of mail-in registration.

Ballot Box Stuffing

The attempt to steal an election culminates on primary day with an effort to vote under the fictitious registration cards.

One witness testified that crews of five to eight people, who had been instructed to vote for a particular candidate or candidates, would go to each polling site in a given election, and using the names from the phony registration cards, vote once at each location.

In 1968, when the legal voting age was 21, a seventeen-year-old voted in a legislative primary election race by using a registration card prepared under a different name by a member of the local Democratic club.

In 1970, that same individual voted at least ten times in a Democratic primary race, using bogus registration cards at ten different polling sites. The individual was part of a crew of five led by a crew chief who was responsible for delivering his crew to the various sites. Each crew member was paid \$40.00 for the day's "work."

In a 1972 Democratic primary election, the same individual served as a crew chief, controlling the voting activities of five crew members who each voted in excess of ten times. As crew chief, the individual handed out voter identification cards to the crew members. There were approximately six crews engaged in similar activities during that election. In a 1974 Democratic primary race, the individual ran a crew of eight members, each of whom voted in excess of twenty times. Approximately twenty other crews operated during that primary election. Each crew member

received \$50.00 for the "work."

In 1976, the individual led a group of five persons who cast at least 100 votes in total. Prior to primary day, that individual was present at a meeting attended by twenty crew chiefs.

As recently as 1982, the individual was to have provided twenty-five workers to vote in a Congressional primary election again using bogus voter registration cards that had been prepared and filed in the manner described above.

An alternative fraudulent voting technique sometimes involved having individuals vote under voter registration cards of legitimate voters. This was accomplished by reviewing the voter registration books at the Board of Elections prior to the election. The voter registration cards of newly registered voters are typically found at the front of the books. Using names from these cards, individuals on the day of the election would proceed to the appropriate polling sites as soon as the polls opened to vote under those names. The reasoning behind this method, according to the experience of one witness, was that newly registered voters often do not vote. By arriving at the polling sites early, the bogus voter would not need to worry about the possibility that the real voter had actually voted.

A similar method used during the period 1978-1982 entailed collecting, during the nominating petition drives, the names of voters who had died or moved recently and then sending people on election day to vote under those names.

Forging Voter Registration Cards After an Election

Electoral fraud may continue even after the ballots are cast. In one election a losing candidate caused the creation of so many voter irregularities that the election results were almost set aside.

After an election, the losing candidate may seek to set aside the results by contending that the election must be found to be invalid because so many voter irregularities occurred. One such irregularity is the apparent forgery of a voter's name on his/her voter registration card. If the signature on the card for the election in issue is not the same as the registration signature on that card, that vote may be challenged.⁴ If there are enough irregularities, and if enough votes are successfully challenged, a new election could be ordered.

In the case in point, campaign workers, under the guise of reviewing voter registration cards for legitimate irregularities, were instructed to forge the names of voters on those voter registration cards which had not been signed during the election. No attempt was made to match the true voters' signatures since the intent was to create detectable forgeries which would result in a successful challenge. Over a period of several days, one worker was able to forge in excess of a hundred names. Another worker forged at least seventy-five names.

⁴Voters may be challenged for other reasons. These include party cross-over votes (a Republican voting in a Democratic Primary), one person's card accidentally signed by another legitimate voter, etc.

Several factors permitted the execution of this bold scheme to attempt to overturn an election. The election in issue was a primary held less than two months before the general election. Due to limited time, extraordinary measures were employed to enable the opposing parties in this contest to review the voter registration cards at the Board of Elections, challenge the results in court and, if necessary, hold a new election before the November general election.

Although the Board is generally open to the public only between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:15 p.m., Monday through Friday, court orders were issued requiring extended evening and weekend hours to allow completion of the review of the voter registration cards by the parties within a reasonable time before the general election. Partially as a result of the extended hours and partially as a result of the amount of work necessary to prepare for the general election within a relatively short period of time, the number of Board personnel available to supervise those with access to the voter registration cards at any one time was greatly diminished.⁵ Added to this unhappy situation was an unusually large volume of requests for access to the records. No limits were placed on the number of people who

⁵The Board of Elections personnel had other assignments to complete in addition to supervising review of voter registration cards, including changing voter registration cards to different books due to reapportionment. This further reduced the number of employees available to supervise the public.

could have access to the voter registration books at any one time.

Because of the large number of people seeking entry to the Board, access cards were not always completed and production of identification was not required. This enabled individuals to come and go without creating a complete record of who had been at the Board, enabling some forgers to avoid detection.

Supervision was further hampered by the layout of the Board of Elections office. Once having gained entrance to the area where the registration books are kept, individuals had complete access to the voter registration books. They could freely take books from and return them to their shelves. No procedure for checkout of the books existed, nor was a log maintained of who had access to the books. Further, the layout of the area easily allowed for substantial privacy when reviewing the books.

The Board of Elections seeks to prevent defacement of voter registration cards by requiring that only red pens be used in the Board of Elections' facility. Lack of sufficient supervision by Board employees enabled individuals to disguise other colored pens as red pens and commit the forgeries.

Although ostensibly watched by Board of Elections personnel, an individual claimed that there were so many people scattered about looking at records and so few supervising those people,

that it was easy to commit the forgeries. Additionally, the individual did not believe it was criminal to commit these forgeries. Although believing that forging names on voter registration cards was wrong, the individual did not believe that this conduct was any more serious under the law than "spitting on the sidewalk." The individual added that if there were any one factor that might have discouraged the commissions of the forgeries it would have been some form of express notice that forgery is a felony carrying a substantial criminal penalty.

So chaotic and unsupervised did the situation at the Board of Elections become in this instance, that some individuals were able to hide in an opening in a restroom's ceiling at the Board and accomplish their forgeries undetected after the close of business. Although a guard patrolled the building at night, his footsteps alerted the forgers who returned to their hiding place until the guard left the Board of Elections area.

A senior official of the Board of Elections who was present during this election challenge period stated that in his experience the situation was atypical only to the extent that a larger number of individuals sought access to the records than usual. The problems encountered, in that official's opinion, could be repeated even allowing for fewer requests by the public for access to the voter registration cards.

This official testified that there were no security aids,

such as closed circuit T.V. cameras and security mirrors. He also noted that in the past a uniformed police officer had been assigned to the Board during business hours, but that budgetary cutbacks forced the elimination of the assigned officer. Officers are not assigned to the Board even during periods of peak demands such as after an election when votes are being challenged. One of the witnesses who admitted having committed forgeries at the Board testified that a highly visible presence of uniformed officers might have dissuaded that individual from tampering in any way with the voter records. At the present time not even private security guards are employed as a deterrent. It appears that only untrained Board employees enforce security at the Board of Elections during business hours. A Board of Elections employee stated that some of the security burdens imposed on the staff might be alleviated by limiting access to the voter registration books to a manageable number of people, but he/she is not authorized to refuse access.

Security after business hours is provided by the building staff whose job it is to patrol the entire twelve-story building. There are no alarm systems covering either entrances to the fourth floor, or those areas of the Board where important documents are stored. Therefore, those who choose to remain hidden until after business hours to work on the Board's records may be able to do so undetected.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon the credible and legally admissible evidence received by the Grand Jury, which is summarized above, the Grand Jury finds that during the period 1968 through 1982 serious and repeated fraud in the electoral process occurred in Kings County affecting and having the potential to affect the outcome of elections and that the factors allowing that fraud to occur still exist.

FINDING I

THE GRAND JURY FINDS that current voter registration procedures do not adequately protect against the mass creation and filing of fraudulent voter registration cards. Nor do procedures at the time of voting prevent persons from voting using such fraudulent cards or the cards of deceased and newly registered voters.

Recommendations

In order to remedy this problem:

1) THE GRAND JURY RECOMMENDS that the Governor and State Legislature promptly study the problems of election fraud identified in this report and take the appropriate legislative and administrative actions. The study should evaluate various proposals and strike a balance between solving the problem of election fraud and continuing the recent gains in facilitating unimpeded access to the ballot box. The study should examine as possible remedies requiring

identification from voters at the time of voting or registration (as is done in twenty-five states)⁶, serializing and recording the serial numbers of all voter registration cards distributed in bulk and insisting on greater accountability by organizations engaged in voter registration.

2) THE GRAND JURY RECOMMENDS that the legislature enact a statute that revises the voter registration card affirmation. The language of the affirmation as it is now written is legalistic, cumbersome and printed in small typeface. It is therefore recommended that the language be simplified and the typeface be bold enough to be easily noticed and to alert the applicant that the affirmation is serious, important and not merely an extension of the section of the card which requests simple pedigree information.⁷

⁶For example, the State of Connecticut mandates pursuant to the Connecticut General Statutes Annotated, Title 9, section 9-20, that each individual who registers as a voter in that state present to the appropriate official at the time of registration a birth certificate, driver's license or Social Security card. Connecticut does not provide for mail-in voter registration as does New York. Further, under New Hampshire law, an applicant for admission as a voter may be required to produce, among other things, a birth certificate or naturalization papers if the applicant is a naturalized citizen.

⁷As an example, the voter application form utilized by Vermont contains a straightforward affirmation that advises applicants of the criminal penalties for false statements. It is printed on the form in bold, uppercase letters. A second example is the warning that pertains to false statements that is described in the Criminal Procedure Law of New York, Section 100.30(1)(d).

FINDING II

THE GRAND JURY FINDS that forgeries committed at the Kings County Board of Elections after an election occurred as a result of insufficient security, failure to supervise properly those persons gaining access to the voter registration cards and inadequate of warnings to the public regarding the criminal sanctions for failure to abide by the laws that apply to the electoral process.

Recommendations

In order to remedy this problem:

3) THE GRAND JURY RECOMMENDS that the legislature require by statute that the voting inspectors, upon obtaining a voter's signature on the voter registration card at the time of voting, place next to the signature line that was used, a unique stamp, mark, perforation or other symbol that would indicate that the signature was made contemporaneously with casting a vote on the day of the election and that would be difficult to duplicate. Such a requirement would make it extremely difficult for persons to forge signatures in the Board of Elections after the election and then challenge votes based on forged cards that did not bear the appropriate marking.

4) THE GRAND JURY RECOMMENDS that persons seeking admission to the Board of Elections be required to produce identification prior to their admission to the area in which voter registration cards are kept. The tendered identification

should contain the individual's signature and current address. The Board of Elections employee responsible for overseeing the admission of visitors and the completion of access cards would be responsible for placing on the access cards all identifying information found on the proffered identification. In addition, the Board of Elections employee would be responsible for comparing the signature on the identification to that on the access card. It is essential that the rule that access cards be signed by all visitors to the Board of Elections be stringently enforced. These simple and easily effected precautions should act as a deterrent to those individuals whose purpose it is to tamper with the voter registration cards.

5) THE GRAND JURY RECOMMENDS that in order to avoid defacement, alteration or forgery of voter registration cards the Kings County Board of Elections institute a system that would require that all voter registration books be kept in a secure area which is accessible only to Board employees. Any individual seeking a particular book or books would sign a ledger or complete a standardized form which would include at the very least his or her name, the date, time, the book or books requested and his or her signature. Upon completion, the form would be submitted to a Board of Elections employee who would then obtain the requested voter registration book(s). When the requesting party has concluded his/ her inspection of the book he or she would return it to a Board of Elections employee who would

note the time the book was returned. In addition, the individual signing for the book would be required again to sign his or her name.

6) THE GRAND JURY RECOMMENDS that the Kings County Board of Elections designate a single area for the inspection of the voter registration books by people who have signed access cards. This viewing area should contain flat top tables and chairs for the general public to facilitate their inspection of the requested voter registration books. The viewing area should be totally open so as to permit an unobstructed view of all those inspecting voter registration books by the Board of Election employees responsible for monitoring those activities. The assigned employees should conscientiously patrol the area to insure that the voter registration cards are not tampered with, altered or mutilated.

7) THE GRAND JURY RECOMMENDS that the Board of Elections take steps to insure that there are always sufficient personnel to supervise those seeking access to the voter registration cards and in particular to avoid a situation where individuals using the voter registration books are left unsupervised and in a position to tamper with the records. In order to accomplish this it is recommended that the Board provide for the hiring of additional personnel to assist at the Board during peak election preparation and public access demand periods.

8) THE GRAND JURY RECOMMENDS that the Kings County Board

of Elections obtain and utilize such monitoring aids as closed-circuit television cameras and security mirrors.

9) THE GRAND JURY RECOMMENDS that the access cards used by the Board of Elections be revised to the extent that they contain a clear warning that tampering with the records is a violation of the New York State Election Law, that forgery is punishable as a felony under the New York State Penal Law and that these crimes are punishable by imprisonment. In addition, there should be a separate signature line below this admonition and the words: "I have read the warning and I understand that criminal penalties can be imposed for tampering with or forging voter registration cards." Similar warnings should be conspicuously posted on the walls in all areas open to the public.

10) THE GRAND JURY RECOMMENDS that the areas used to house public records, such as voter registration cards, and the entrance to the Board's premises be wired with an alarm system to protect against illegal use of or entry into the facilities.

11) THE GRAND JURY RECOMMENDS that uniformed police officers be assigned to the Board of Elections voter registration card inspection area during peak use periods.

E X H I B I T S

ALSO
SIGN ON
REVERSE
SIDE

Last Name		First Name		Initial Jr. or Sr.		Name and Address of Employer	
No. Street or Road		City or town, zip code		Mailing address if different		Village	
Date of birth	Sex	Height	Color of eyes	Telephone No (if listed)	If Apartment Dweller Rm. No. Floor No. Apt. No.	Length of time at residence Years Mos Days	
Did you previously vote in New York State? Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> If yes, complete following line.				Did you register under your present name? Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> If not, under what name did you register? If no, previous address— Street _____ City or town _____ County _____			
In what year did you last vote in an election in this State? Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>		Born in U.S.A.? Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> If no, complete following line.		Court		Name of person to whom issued	
Naturalization papers Own <input type="checkbox"/> Mother <input type="checkbox"/> Spouse <input type="checkbox"/> Father <input type="checkbox"/>		Number on papers		Date of papers		City and State	
ENROLLMENT (check only ONE) If you wish to enroll in a political party, check the party of your choice: <input type="checkbox"/> Democratic <input type="checkbox"/> Republican <input type="checkbox"/> Conservative <input type="checkbox"/> Liberal <input type="checkbox"/> Right to Life <input type="checkbox"/> I do not wish to enroll in any political party. <input type="checkbox"/> Transfer my present party enrollment to my new address (See Instruction No. 9) <input type="checkbox"/> I am herewith changing my enrollment (See Instruction No. 10)				AFFIDAVIT "I affirm that the information provided herein is true and I understand that this application will be accepted for all purposes as the equivalent of an affidavit, and if it contains a material false statement, shall subject me to the same penalties for perjury as if I had been duly sworn." Signature of Mark of Applicant _____ Date _____ Witness to Mark (only if applicant is unable to sign) _____ Date _____			
Serial No.		Last Name		First Name		Initial Jr. or Sr.	
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY		Street address		City or town		E.D. Wd or AU	
Date of reg. _____ Cancellation _____ Date _____ Reason <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> 7 <input type="checkbox"/> 8 <input type="checkbox"/> 9 <input type="checkbox"/> 10				Other Remarks _____ Democratic Registrar _____ Republican Registrar _____			

F O R E I G N B O R N C I T I Z E N S

APPLICANT

Sign your name in box opposite arrow. Make no other entry on this side.

YEAR	MONTH	IF PAPER BALLOTS ARE USED		IF PAPER BALLOTS ARE USED MACHINE REGISTRATION	MACHINE PUBLIC COUNTED NUMBER	SIGNATURE OF VOTER	STILLING COMPLAINT
		NO ON BALLOT	ALLI-VERED				
22							
21							
20							
19							
18							
17							
16							
15							
14							
13							
12							
11							
10							
9							
8							
7							
6							
5							
4							
3							
2							
1							

REGISTRATION SIGNATURE → X

CHALLENGED DATE																				
ASSISTED DATE																				

ENROLLMENT AND CHANGE OF ENROLLMENT				
ENROLLMENT NUMBER	DATE	PARTY	REMARKS	INITIALS OF BOARD MEMBERS

FULL NAME SECURED

BROOKLYN - 522-2441

BROOKLYN - 299-9017

Line 225B—AGI—82

**NOTICE OF ACCEPTANCE BY THE BOARD OF
ELECTIONS OF REGISTRATION AND ENROLLMENT
APPLICATION BY MAIL**

Dear Applicant:

Please be advised that your application for Registration and Enrollment by mail has been received and approved by this office.

The following information pertains to your party enrollment:

- ☐ A. Your registration and party enrollment are effective immediately, and you will be eligible to vote at the next ensuing Primary Election of your political party.
- ☐ B. Your registration is effective immediately, but under the provisions of the New York State Election Law, your party enrollment will be effective after the general election in November.

Please notify this office if there are any inaccuracies or discrepancies in the information you have received.

If you desire any additional information concerning your registration or enrollment, please contact this office.

**COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS
JUNTA ELECTORAL DEL CONDADO**

E.D.,

A.D.

**YOUR POLLING PLACE
SU LUGAR DE VOTAR**

KINGS**NOTIFICACION DE APROBACION POR PARTE DE LA
JUNTA ELECTORAL DE SU SOLICITUD DE
INSCRIPCION Y EMPADRONAMIENTO POR CORREO**

Estimado Solicitante:

El motivo de la presente es informarle que su solicitud de Inscripción y Empadronamiento por correo ha sido recibida y aprobada por esta oficina.

La siguiente información se relaciona con su inscripción partidaria:

- ☐ A. Su inscripción y enrolamiento partidario entran en vigencia inmediatamente y usted estará en condiciones de votar en la próxima Elección Primaria de su partido político.
- ☐ B. Su inscripción tiene vigencia inmediatamente, pero dentro de las disposiciones de la Ley Electoral del Estado de Nueva York, su enrolamiento partidario tendrá vigencia después de la elección general de noviembre.

Sírvase notificar a esta oficina si hay algo inexacto o alguna discrepancia en la información que Ud. ha recibido.

Si desea alguna información adicional con respecto a su inscripción o enrolamiento, sírvase ponerse en contacto con esta oficina.

EXHIBIT 2

Line 401—80—T.P.

BOARD OF ELECTIONS IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK
345 ADAMS STREET, BROOKLYN, N. Y. 11201

19

The following papers are desired for examination by the undersigned:

Name of Papers

Date of Filing

Name of the Organization that You Represent

Purpose of Wanting the Papers

Applicant

Residence

Name of the Person You Represent

PENCIL COPYING ONLY IS PERMITTED

Mutilation or alteration of papers is a penal offense and any person discovered altering or mutilating the above named papers will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.

.....A. D.....E. D.