Reader Paul Wiley writes:

The Wall Street Journal’s profile of Travis Crum and his influential Note about the VRA’s Section 3 sheds light on one of the Justice Department’s most important tools in the ongoing voting rights battles. But it also gets a few things wrong, either explicitly or by implication.

For one, the article says that using Section 3 would “expand the reach of the federal government over states’ voting laws beyond the handful of states—primarily in the South—that have traditionally been subject to the Voting Rights Act.” It may seem nitpicky, but every state has always been subject to the Voting Rights Act. Section 5 pre-clearance—the kind the Court gutted in Shelby County—was traditionally applied in Southern states, true. But the VRA is more than just Section 5. And Section 3 has already been applied outside the “traditional” footprint of Section 5 pre-clearance: counties in Nebraska, South Dakota, California, and even the entire state of New Mexico have been under Section 3 pre-clearance orders.

As another matter, Bert Rein’s comments in the article mischaracterize Section 3. Mr. Rein, who argued Shelby County’s appeal to the Supreme Court, seems to criticize Section 3 by saying “it’s better to give [a challenged jurisdiction] a day in court than assume by legislation their past history makes them a bad actor.” But Section 3 DOES give the challenged jurisdiction its day in court. Instead of imposing pre-clearance by statutory or administrative formula—as Section 5 did via the now-defunct coverage formula of Section 4(b)—Section 3 is only imposed as an equitable remedy, either after a trial or by a consent decree entered into by the litigants. If the day in court is the preferred way of balancing the franchise with state sovereignty, as Mr. Rein seems to be suggesting, then Section 3 fits the bill.