I have been advocating a proactive bailout amendment for VRA renewal that I think can increase the chances that a renewed VRA passes constitutional muster without weakening the important protections of section 5. Rep. Lynn Westmoreland will be offering this amendment on proactive bailout today to the House Rules Committee. That committee will determine if the amendment gets offered on the floor of the House during the vote on VRA renewal on Thursday. His office also has issued this explanation of the proposed amendment.
Aside from the general statement in Laughlin McDonald’s Findlaw piece opposing a “preemptive weakening” of the VRA renewal amendment, I have not seen anything written from anyone on the merits as to why proactive bailout is a bad idea. I think I prefer the language I’ve crafted to the Westmoreland amendment, but I’m asking the more general question. What are the arguments against proactive bailout, provided that the standards for which jurisdictions may bail out don’t change? Just to answer what I consider to be an obvious objection: what prevents a political DOJ from overreaching and consenting to bailout in too many jurisdictions? The answer is that if DOJ does so, at least under my proposal intervenors can object and the three-judge panel considering the bailout request must conduct a hearing on whether bailout is warranted.